The concept of the collective ądāla of the Prophet Muhammad's Companions by Osman, Amr Ali
 THE CONCEPT OF THE COLLECTIVE 'ADALA OF THE 
PROPHET MUHAMMAD'S COMPANIONS 
 
 
Amr Ali Osman 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
  
2003 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                      
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13234 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
 
The Concept of the Collective ^Adala of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s Companions
Name: Amr Ali Osman
A dissertation submitted for the degree of MoPhiL 
Date of submission: 30/10/2003
ProQ uest N um ber: 10166911
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10166911
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
jE,S2T?
I, Amr Ali Osman, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 40,000 
words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by 
me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
Date: 30/10/2003 Signature of candidate: / I
I was admitted as a research student in 09/2002 and as a candidate for the degree of 
M.Phil. in 08/2003; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the 
University of St Andrews between 09/2002 and 10/2003
Date: 30/10/2003 Signature of candidate:
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and 
Regulations appropriate for the degree of M.Phil. in the University of St Andrews and 
that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.
Date: 30/10/2003 Signature of supervisor:
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving 
permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of 
the University Library for the time being in force, subject to an copyright vested in the 
work not being affected hereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be 
published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide 
library or research worker.
Date: 30/10/2003 Signature of candidate:
T o my grandmother
Acknowledgement
I am greatly indebted to a number of people for the completion of this 
work. I would like to thank Dr. Richard Kimber who helped me organize 
my scattered ideas about the topic and supervised the bulk of this study. 
Professor Muhammad Serag was my advisor in the American University 
in Cairo (AUG) and with him I developed my first thoughts on this topic 
and prepared the proposal for the thesis. Dr. Stuart Sears, AUC, has been 
extremely helpful to me since I got to know him and it is thanks to him 
that I came to the University of St Andrews to complete my studies. Dr. 
Elisabeth Sartain, AUC, has always given me her warm support and took 
the time to read some drafts of this study. My special and sincere 
acknowledgement is due to Dr. Muhammad Shahab Ahmed who was the 
first to introduce me to Western scholarship on Islam, albeit in a way that 
shocked me at the time! Dr. Shahab also read an earlier introduction of 
this study and provided me with valuable feedback. Any deficiency in 
this study is of course only mine.
Even to begin to acknowledge the debt I owe my immediate and 
extended family, I would need more pages than I have available to me 
here. Each one contributed in their own particular way to the completion 
of this study. My deep and real gratitude to them all.
Abstract
This study seeks to investigate the concept of the collective ta ‘dïl of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s Companions as presented in the Sunni sources. 
According to this concept, all the Companions are considered tiustworthy 
transmitters and this is the guarantee of the preservation of the whole 
religion of Islam. From our examination of the early and medieval Sunni 
sources, it is concluded that the root of the concept goes back to the early 
MurjiT attitude towards the Companions, an attitude taken according to 
their definition of faith and the position of the grave sinner. Not only did 
the concept develop out of this, but it also rested on the same 
epistemological ground of Muiji’ism; that is, certitude is the only valid 
basis of any attitude towards people and events. In order to block any 
attempt to question the original ‘adala of the Companions, the Sunni 
scholars argued that it was confirmed by the Qur’an and the Surma. The 
accounts of the early schisms do not provide certain knowledge and thus 
carmot annul the original and certain ‘adàla o f the Compa,nions. This 
agrees with an established rule in Sunni Hadlth criticism that everyone is 
‘adl until proven otherwise (expressed in some Sunni schools of law as 
the rule of istishab). From all this, it is concluded that the SurmI sources 
implicitly make a distinction between the 'adàla and the ta 'dïl of the 
Companions: whereas ‘adàla is the original state that is further confirmed 
by the Qur’an and the Sunna, ta'dll is the sound attitude that Muslims 
should take according to the rule o f istishah and, to a lesser extent, 
according to the view that the Companions were exercising ijtihàd. This 
means that belief in the original ‘adàla of the Companions is the actual 
Sunni doctrine. Ta'dll, which is the main object of ijmà' in this issue, is 
an attitude based mainly on the ground of lack of certitude.
Contents
Introduction     ....................................................................................... 1
Chapter One: A Review of the Sources
Review of the early and medieval Islamic sources on Him al-jarh
wa- %ta ‘dll and the concept of collective ta ‘d ïl ............................. 11
Modem Western contributions to the study of the concept 15
Chapter Two: Linguistic Meaning and Technical Usage of ^adala 
and ta^ dTl
Linguistic definition of ‘adàla and ta ‘d ïl .......................................23
The science o f al-jarh wa- H-ta ‘d ïl ................................................. 25
Chapter Three: A Chronological Analysis of the Sources
Chronological analysis of early and medieval Sunnî sources . . .  38
Conclusion........................................................................................83
Chapter Four: Background of the Concept 
Early MurjiT epistles
1, Review of the sources...................................... 89
2. Examination of the soui c e s ............................ 95
Sunnism and MuijiTsm
1. On the definition o f ïmân, the position of grave 
sinners, and attitude towards the authorities .118
Conclusion......................................................................................122
General Conclusion.............................................. .................................125
Bibliography............................................................................................ 130
Introduction
In spite of the fact that the concept of the collective ta'dïl of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s Companions (ashab or sahabat al-nabi) has assiuned a great 
deal of importance in Sunnî Islam, it has not taken its proper attention from 
either modem Muslim scholars or in Western scholarship. Not only do we 
lack any study that thorouglily examines tlie concept and analyzes its 
foundations and usages, but we also have nothing about the hidden, or better, 
the real meaning of the concept in view of tlie Sunnî writings on it. This 
study is an attempt, therefore, to imcover the way this concept has been 
constmcted.
Importance of the Concept
The concept of collective ta ‘dfl was established in early Islam as an aiticle 
of faith. This is not smprising in view of the fact that tlie concept has been 
represented as tlie guarantee of the uncormpted transmission of the whole 
religion. Like any otlier dogma, tlie Sunnî scholars have argued that the 
concept has always existed in Islam since the time of the Prophet and tliey 
have had no difficulty adducing evidence from the Qur’an, the Sunna, and 
jjma ‘ to argue for this contention. The concept is also used in Sunnî Hadîth 
criticism as a tool, mostly one with a legitimizing role for the authenticity of 
the extant Hadîth corpus and for certain kinds of Prophetic traditions. The 
presentation and discussion of the concept in this context is not without 
difficulties. The Sunnî views differed on many aspects of the concept, not 
the least of wliicli is tlie very definition of companionship {stihba), and, as a 
result, the number of Companions. In addition to what we have said so far 
about the importance that the concept has come to assume in Sunnî Islam,
the concept was used as a tool in Sunni historiography to authorize or 
exclude certain accounts. It is no surprise then to find in a Sunni 
historiographical work, or even in a creed, a summary of the way a Sunni 
Muslim should perceive the events in which the early generation of Muslims 
were involved, and what to take for granted and what to reject at face value.
Modern Studies on the Concept
Towards the middle of the 20*^  century, a fierce debate erupted in Egypt 
when an Egyptian scholar, Mahmud Abu Rayya, published a work in which 
he questioned many of the taken-for-granted beliefs about the Prophetic 
Sunna. One of those beliefs was the concept of the collective ‘adàla of the 
Prophet’s Companions. In his Adwà* ‘Alà al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya^ and 
Shaykh al-Madfra: Abu Hurayra al-Düsï^, Abu Rayya casts harsh criticism 
on Abu Hurayra, the Companion whose narrations of Prophetic traditions 
greatly outnumber those of any other Companion (more than 5000 
traditions). % e  religious circles in Egypt condemned the book and 
associated it with the growing movement that attempts to undermine the 
Prophetic Sunna and thus thieatens Islam at large. In addition to the many 
responses that the publication of Abu Rayya’s works instigated, at least five 
books were exclusively devoted to defending Abu Hurayra in particular.^ In 
all these, of coui'se, the issue of the ‘adàla of the Companions was
’ Mahmud Abu Rayya. A dw a’ ‘ala al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya. Al-Qahira: Dai" al-Ma“arif, 1994 
 ^Mahmud Abu Rayya. Shaykh al-Madira: Abu Hurayra al-DusL Al-Qahira, n. p., 1965 
 ^ See, for instance, ‘Abd al-Mû’min Salâh al-‘Alï. Dija ‘ 'an Abl Hurayra. Al-Qahira: Dai* al-Shurflq, 1973; 
Muhammad 'Ajjâj al-Khatîb. Abu Hurayra: Râwiyat al-Islâm. Ai-Qâliira: Maktabat Wahba, 1982; ‘Abd 
al-Razzâq Hamza. Zulumât AbîRcyya. Al-Qâhira: al-Matba‘a al-Salafiyya, 1959; Muhammad ‘Abd Allah 
Hawwâ’. Abu Hurayra: Al-Sahâbï al-Muftarâ'alayh. Al-Qâhira: Dâr al-Sha‘b, 1998; ‘Abd al-Husayn 
Sharaf al-Dîh. Abû Hurayra. n.p., n.d. For a complete discussion o f the debate that Abu Rayya’s book 
evoked, see G. H. A. Juynboll’s The Authenticity o f  the Tradition Literature: Discussions in Modern Egypt. 
Leiden: Brill, 1969 ^
addressed. What is noticeable, however, is that modem Sunnî writings about 
the concept do nothing more than copy what earlier souices and authorities 
said, and thus they hardly contribute to any scientific investigation of the 
concept. This should not be surprising for two main reasons. First of all, the 
concept of the collective ta ‘dîl of the Companions has come to be 
considered a fundamental doctrine in Sunnî Islam. Such doctrines are not 
invented nor do they develop, believers in any faith would argue. Moreover, 
this doctrine is rooted in the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet; therefore, 
challenging it is a challenge to the Qur’an and the Surma. Finding this 
correlation between these two points is sufficient to block any real 
investigation. Second, the whole debate over the ‘adàla of the Companions 
was from the outset linked to what the orthodox scholars have seen as the 
attempt to undermine the Prophetic Sunna. Therefore, the whole debate over 
this point was prone to failure because it turned to attacks and counter­
attacks and the concern was to defeat and defame the opponent rather than to 
candidly review the concept itself."^  For all this, the basic questions that 
might be raised concerning this concept, therefore, remain unanswered in 
modern Muslim scholarship.
The situation in Western scholarship is not much better. More than 
half a century ago, J. Schacht tried to draw the attention to the “important 
gaps” in the picture of Islamic theology that was based upon the then extant 
primary sources and the elaborations on them at his time. He then suggested 
that “to fill these lacunae, it is necessary either to discover new sources, or to 
draw new information from the sources already known.”  ^ Unexplainably, 
Schacht’s call, as far as the concept of the collective ta ‘dïl of the Prophet’s
** For a brief summary o f one o f tliese debates, see ibid., chapter 6, pp. 55-61 /-
 ^J. Schacht. “New Soui ces for the History of Muhammadan Theology.” Studia Islamica, vol. I (1953), p. 4
Companions is concerned, went unheeded. Only two Western scholars have 
attempted to contribute to the study of the concept. Both studies, however, 
fail to provide a systematic view of the history of the concept and a deep 
appreciation of the significant items of information on it scattered in the 
Sunnî works. This may be due to tlie fact that such contributions were not 
sincerely devoted to the study of the concept per se, and it seems that their 
authors, discussing the concept in passing, only tried to fit the concept in a 
context that they had constructed for other purposes. This does not mean, 
however, tliat their contributions are superfluous or not useful. On tlie 
contrary, both accounts have contributed to the views presented here, if not 
in active and positive terms, at least in diawing the attention to the 
weaknesses of the methods tliey employed in studying the concept and of the 
accoimts they put forward to explain it.
Aim of the Study
To put it in Schacht’s terms, we can say that this study aims at filling, at 
least partly, one of the lacimae in Islamic studies. By confining itself solely 
to the study of the concept, this study tries to avoid the weaknesses of other 
attempts and to build upon tlieir strengtlis. We are concerned here with 
answering specific questions about the concept. Put more realistically, we 
are concerned with answering questions that the extant primaiy sources 
might be able to answer.
Wondering about tlie definition of the concept, we might ask what did 
the early Sunnî scholars really mean when tliey argued that all the Prophet’s 
Companions were Hidüll Did the ‘adala here resemble the ‘adala of other 
transmitters of Prophetic Hadîth? In view of the fact that sometimes we find
the Sunnî sources discussing the 'adàla of the Companions and at other 
times their ta'dïl, it does not seem pedantic to ask whether this was a 
genuine and conscious distinction tliey made. Moreover, did they have any 
idea in mind when they made such a distinction? But who is to be 
considered a Companion in the first place? Was tliere a unanimous 
agreement on a definition of companionship (suhba)! If not, how did the 
Siumî sources, if ever, tackle this? We might also ask about tlie incentives 
that might have instigated the Sunnî scholars to introduce the concept. Did 
tliis have anything to do with earlier discussions about the involvement of 
some of tlie prominent Companions in the early schisms (fltari)! Wliy were 
the Suimîs very keen to argue that all the Companions were Hidül, while it 
was not unpalatable for other sects to abuse some or most of the 
Companions? We can also ask questions about the grounds on which the 
Simnî scholars argued for the concept. How much was tlie Qur’an helpful in 
tliis respect? How often was it employed and what kind of verses were used? 
How did the Sunnî scholars deal with the verses that might contradict the 
view of the Companions they wanted to construct and put forward? Wliat 
role did the Prophetic Hadîth play in the argument about the concept? How 
consistent, if at all, was tliis concept with otlier beliefs the Simnîs held either 
about credal issues or about the criteria of eligibility for Hadîth 
transmission? These are die kinds of questions that this study seeks to 
answer.
Division of the Study
This study starts with a brief introduction to Him al-jarh wa- H-ta 'dll, one of 
the sciences of Hadîth under the rubric of which the concept of 'adàla is
mostly discussed. Following that, an overview of what could be collected 
about the concept of the collective ta'dJl of the Companions from the 
primaiy sources at our disposal will be given. The earliest works that have 
survived are consulted and works as late as the 10*/17^  ^C. are also checked. 
The analysis of those sources, apart from disclosing to us what is behind the 
concept, has referred us back to early Islamic history. It has refeired us to 
the schisms in which the Companions took part, and which detennined the 
way later Muslim sects looked to them.
It seemed to me likely from tlie outset tliat tlie origin of tlie concept of 
collective ta'dll was to be sought in one of two contexts: the context of the 
early sectarian milieu and the context of Sunni Hadlth criticism. The first 
context had to do with tlie conflicting views of early Muslim sects on the 
early events of tlie Muslim commimity, and consequently on the 
Companions who were involved in those events. My assiunption was Üiat 
earlier generations of Muslims would naturally look back to tlie times of the 
Prophet and his Companions, if not initially as a source of guidance and 
legitimization, at least out of mere curiosity. After the death of the Prophet, 
events did not follow in a smooth way. Disagreements among the members 
of the early Muslim community arose on the first day of the Prophet’s death. 
Shortly after that, a civil war erupted in Arabia which had been almost 
subdued by the Prophet. The third successor of the Prophet, ‘Utlimân Ibn 
‘Affan, was assassinated by groups of Muslims fr om different places of the 
ever-growing Muslim empire, and the legitimacy of the leadership of the 
fourth successor, ‘All ibn Abî Tâlib (from the Sunni point of view), seems to 
have been questioned and even imaclaiowledged by many Muslims, amongst 
whom were some prominent “Companions.” Two battles—the Battle of the
Camel in 36/656 and the Battle of Siffîn in 38/658—were fought and 
tliousands of Muslims were killed. The seeds of schism grew and Muslims 
were grouped in mutually exclusive sects. The state, established by the 
triiunphant party and its allies in the schisms, was not a neutral party in tliat 
sectaiian milieu. In addition to the military coercion it exercised, theological 
legitimation for the Umayyad Caliphate was needed and different Caliphs 
had different techniques for acliieving that. Reference to the early events, of 
which the Umayyad Caliphate itself was a result, was thus inevitable. 
Wliether ‘Uthman ruled justly or highliandedly and whether he was justly or 
wrongly killed; whetlier the early commimity (the Companions, to be 
precise) sinned when they denied ‘All his alleged right to the leadership of 
tlie commimity and whether he was really supposed to be tlie legitimate 
successor of tlie Prophet; whether he knew the murderers of ‘Uthman or not, 
and whether he was justified in accepting tlie arbitration at Siffîn or not, 
were all questions that the early Muslim community must have had to 
answer. And most early Muslims did have opinions. We could then argue 
tliat tlie views on the Companions and the positions that the various groups 
of early Muslims adopted towards the early events were the main groimd on 
which different early Muslim sects were established. This assiunption was 
not erroneous but it was imfoimded at tlie time. This study will show tliat the 
concept of the collective ta'dïl of the Prophet’s Companions not only 
developed on the basis of earlier opinions tliat the proto-Simnîs had, but also 
used many of the tools and relied on tlie same gi oimds as “proto-Simnism.”  ^
The second context suggested at the beginning of oiu research was tlie 
context of Simni Hadîth criticism and the disagreements of the early Muslim
 ^By “proto-Suimism” I generally mean tlie early version of wliat has become later to be known as Sunni 
Islam.
jurists and schools of law over the authenticity and usage of the Prophetic 
Hadîth and the assessment of the different kinds of chains of transmission. 
This context, however, fails to provide answers for many of the questions 
about the origin of the concept and how it has been developed. This context, 
as this study hopes to show, could only have played a role in the 
development of the concept, but it camiot account for its introduction. This 
study seeks to demonstrate that by a close reading of the early and medieval 
Muslim discussions and presentations of the concept, it can be argued that 
the concept of the collective ta ‘dïl of the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions 
is not in fact a belief in their ‘adàla rather than a position or an attitude they 
adopted towards them. This is what is really meant by ta ‘dïL That position 
was consistent with the earlier position the Sunnîs took concerning the status 
of the Companions, a position which was in turn consistent with other 
beliefs they maintained. That position is very reminiscent of the position of 
the Murji’a, from whom the Sunnî scholars probably adopted the 
epistemological ground on which their attitude towards the Companions and 
the concept of collective ta ‘dïl were built. Tools and ideas taken fr om Sunnî 
Hadîth criticism were used and applied to put the concept in its final shape.
From this brief discussion, it should be clear now that this study 
makes a distinction between two phases in the development of the concept 
of collective ta ‘dïl, the earlier of which paved the way to the later. However, 
and perhaps paradoxically, the study starts with the second phase; i.e., the 
later in chronological order. This, nevertheless, should not be smprising 
given that the bulk of the sources that are of direct relevance to the study of 
the concept of collective ta ‘dïl belong to the second phase. We only went 
back to the early events when the sources instructed us to do so. In the
conclusion, the whole picture that the study has drawn will be constructed, 
but finally in order.
This study is therefore divided as follows. In the first three chapters, 
the concept of collective ta ‘dïî is to be studied and analyzed as represented 
in the Sunnî works on or pertaining to the concept. Chapter one gives a 
summary of the kinds of Muslim souices used in this study in addition to a 
presentation and a critique of the Western contributions to the study of the 
concept. In chapter two, a linguistic definition of ‘adàla and ta ‘dïl is offered 
in addition to their technical use in ‘Urn al-jarh wa- H-ta ‘dïl. In chapter three, 
a detailed examination of the content of the Sunnî sources will see what can 
be inferred fiom them. Chapter four goes back in history to the early schisms 
and the early Muslim views on them. Since the main hypothesis is that the 
proto-Sunnî stance was based on MurjiT ideas, it was to the early MurjiT 
primary sources that we had to resort. Putting the concept in its appropriate 
wider theological context made it necessary to draw the link between the 
concept and other “Suimî-MurjiT’ beliefs. A general conclusion at the end 
of the study will rearrange the ideas put forward in the earlier chapters to 
provide a consistent view of how the concept might have come into 
existence.
The system of transliteration used in this study is generally that of the 
new edition of the Encyclopedia o f Islam (hereafter E f).^  The only 
exceptions are q for k, and j for dj. Conversion fi*om the Hijrî calendar to the 
Christian calendar is made according to G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville The 
Muslim and Christian Calendars.^ Throughout the study the Hirjî and 
Western dates are given respectively separated by a slash. Qur’anic verses
 ^The Encyclopaedia o f  Islam, New Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1954-2002
® Freeman-Grenville. The Muslim and Christian Calendars. London: Oxford University Press, 1963
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are translated from Arabic to English according to Mohammad Maimaduke 
Picktall’s The Meaning o f  the Glorious KorarP with some changes when 
thought necessary for a better revealing of the meaning of the Qur’anic text 
quoted.
 ^ Mohammad Maiinaduke Piclcthall. The Meaning o f  the Glorious Koran. New York; New American 
Liberaiy, n.d.
Chapter One
A Review of the Sources
Information about and discussion of the concept of the collective ta ‘dïl of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions are scattered in a wide variety of 
early and medieval Muslim sources. The concept has been established as 
an article of faith in Sunnî Islam and thus it exists in many Sunnî creeds. 
In creeds, doctrines are usually stated but not necessarily argued for; in 
heresiographical works, however, dogmas and beliefs of other sects are 
refuted and the heresiographer’s own creed is always explicitly or 
implicitly defended and justified. It should not be surprising to find 
Prophetic traditions that deal with the Companions in the major canonical 
compilations. Although those compilations only provide traditions or 
anecdotes about the Companions, some of them have shown a good deal 
of significance in the study o f the origin and development of the concept 
of collective ta ‘dïl. The concept of collective ta ‘dïl has also come to play 
a very important role in Sunnî Hadîth criticism, which only points to the 
importance of the concept in Sunnî Hadîth criticism and should not be 
taken as a an evidence for a link between the development of Sunnî 
Hadîth criticism and the origin of the concept. Therefore, almost all 
works on the Hadîth sciences { ‘ulUm al-hadïth) address with varying 
length and depth the concept o f collective ta ‘dïl. The same applies to the 
biographical lexica, the authors of some of which, especially those 
devoted solely to the biographies of the Companions, also referred to the 
concept mostly in the introductions of their works. In some of the works 
on the sources of jurisprudence {usül al-fiqh) the concept is also 
addressed and discussed as part of the theorizing about the role of the 
Prophetic Hadîth or Sunna as a source of Islamic law. The concept is also 
discussed, as much as employed as a tool of either endorsing or rejecting
12
certain historical accounts, in many Sunnî historiographical works, 
especially with reference to the events that took place in the early Muslim 
community. In view of this wide range of sources, the following review 
has no claim to comprehensiveness or exhaustiveness: it is only a list of 
the works that were consulted to see how they, if ever, contribute to the 
development of the concept. For many reasons, however, some of them 
proved to be useless for our purpose. Therefore, only those works that are 
thought to present a contribution to the concept in the subsequent stages 
of its presentation by the Sunnî scholars will be analyzed. It should be 
noted that the following sources will be analyzed in chapter three in their 
chronological order rather than thematically.
Among the earliest creeds we have is Abû Ja‘far al-Tahâwî’s (d. 
321/933) al-‘Aqîda al-Tahàwiyya} Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘arî (d, 
324/936), the famous MuTazilî convert to Sunnism, compiled al-Ibana 
‘an Usül al-Diyâna to present and argue for his new creed.^ The 
celebrated 8*/14* C. Sunnî scholar Taqî al-Dîn ibn Taymiyya (d. 
728/1327) has al- ‘Aqïda al-Wàsitiyya?
As for the heresiographical works, we have Abû al-Hasan al- 
Ash‘arfs Maqalat al-Islâmiyyïn wa-Ikhtilâf al-Musallïn; ‘Abd al-Qâhir 
al-Baghdâdî’s (d. 429/1037) al-Farq Bayna al-Firaq wa-Bayàn al-Firqa 
al-Nâjiya Minhum^; ‘Alî ibn Hazm al-Andalusî’s (d. 456/1064) al-Fisal 
f l  al-Ahwâ' wa-H-Milal wa-H-Nihaf; and Abû al-Fath Muhammad al- 
Shahrastânî’s (d. 548/1153) al-Müal wa-H-Nihaf. The famous MuTazilî 
scholar Abû Bakr Muhammad al-Bâqillânî (d. 403/1011) also compiled
 ^E f ,  vol. X, pp. 101-02. s.v. “al-Tahâvw.”
" E f,  vol. I, pp. 694-95. s.v. “al-Ash‘arî, Abu ’1-Hasan.’ 
 ^E f, vol. III, pp. 951-55. s.v. “Ibn Taymiyya.”
 ^E f ,  vol. I, p. 909. s.v. "al-Baghdâdî, ‘Abdu T -ï^ ii-.” 
® E f,  vol. III, pp. 790-99. s.v. “Ibn Hazm.”
 ^E f , vol. EX, pp. 214-6. s.v. “al-Sh^-astânî.”
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al-Tamhïd f l  al-Radd 'alâ al-Mu'attila wa-H-Râflda wa-H-Jahmiyya 
which can be classified as either a creed or a heresiographical w ork/ 
Unfortunately, the way these works are structured makes it almost 
impossible to benefit from them. The authors of these works give their 
opinions on the Companions only when they comment on certain stories 
or anecdotes. Incorporating their contributions, if any, would expand this 
study beyond its allowed length.
As far as tiaditions. Prophetic and non-Prophetic, are concerned, 
Atunad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) wrote Fada'il al-Sahaba, a fairly big 
work where he collected all the Prophetic and non-Prophetic traditions in 
his age that praise the Companions.^ In the two most famous Simnî 
compilations, the two SahJhs of Muhammad ibn IsmaTl al-Bukliârî (d. 
256/870)^ and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-Qiishayii (d. 261/875)^^, we have 
chapters that list traditions and anecdotes about the Companions, Related 
to this group of works is Ibn Qutayba al-Dmawarfs (d. 276/890) Ta’wTl 
Miikhtalif al-Hadîth fl. al-Radd 'ala A 'dâ ’ al-Hadïth where he seeks to 
efface the contradictions between some seemingly contradictory 
Prophetic traditions.^^
According to the Muslim sources, the first to compile a work on 
tlie sciences of Hadlth was Abu Muhammad al-Ràmhurmuzï (d. c. 
360/971) in the fourth century of the Hijra. After his al-Muhaddith al- 
Fasil bayna al-RawT wa-H-Sami', al-Halcim al-Nîsâbûrî (d. 405/1014), 
the well-known traditionist and Hadîth scholar, wrote Ihs Ma'rifat 'Ulüm 
a l-H a d îth .The fifth century of the Hijra witnessed the work of the
' E f.  vol. I, pp. 958-59. s.v. “al-BâldlIânî.’'
 ^E f.  vol. L pp. 272-77. s.v. "Ahmad ibn Hanbal."
 ^E f, vol. I, pp. 1296-97. s.v. “ai-Biikliârî."
E f, vol. VII, pp. 691-92. s.v. “Muslim ibn al-Hadidiâdj.” 
E f, vol. Ill, pp. 844-47. s.v. “Ibn Qutayba al-Dmawaiî.” 
E f. vol. Ylil, pp. 420-21. s.v. “al-Râiiümmiuzr.”
E f. vol. Ill, pp. 82-83. s.v. “al-Hakim al-Naysâbûrî."
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celebrated Hadîth scholar and historian known as al-Khatîb al-Baghdâdî 
(d. 463/1071)/"^ His al-Kifaya f i  Tim al-Riwàya is considered the earliest 
comprehensive work on the subject. In the seventh century, a more 
comprehensive work on the subject was written by the Egyptian Hadîth 
scholar Taqî al-Dîn Abû ‘Amr, widely known as Ibn al-Salah (d. 
643/1245).^^ His work— ‘Ulum al-Hadîth, which is widely known as 
Muqaddimat Ibn al-Salah—is regarded as the most comprehensive of all 
and the few works that were compiled thereafter are only considered 
commentaries on it as we will see later. The most important of those 
commentaries is Ibn Kathîr’s (d. 774/1343) Ikhtisdr ‘Ulüm al-Hadîth}^ 
Finally, Abû ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Sakhâwî (d. 902/ 1497) wrote his 
Fath al-Mughïth bi-Sharh alflyyat al-Hadîth}^ Tadrïb al-Râwï was the 
work on Hadîth Sciences of the prolific 9*-10*/15* C. Jalal al-Dîn al- 
Suyûtî (d. 911/1505).^* Fortunately, most of these works are at our 
disposal and are indispensable for this study.
Another important source of information on the subject is the 
biographical lexica, amongst the earliest of which at our disposal is Ibn 
Abî Hâtim al-Râzî’s (d. 327/939) Taqdimat al-Ma‘ârif, which is the 
introduction to his general biographical dictionary al-Jarh wa- H-Ta 'dîl}^ 
After that, many works that were devoted solely to the biographies of the 
Companions were compiled and naturally they give a brief reference to 
the concept of collective ta ‘dil in their introductions. According to E f  
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Sulayman al-Hadramî (d. 297/909) was 
the first one to compile a work on the role of the Companions as Hadîth 
transmitters. No manuscript of this work is listed in Fuad Sezgin’s
E f,  vol. IV, pp. 1111-12. s.v. “al-Kliatîb al-Baghdâdî.” 
E f,  vol. Ill, p. 927. S.V. “Ibn al-Salah.”
E f,  vol. Ill, pp. 817-18. s.v. “Ibn K a to .”
E f,  vol. VIII, pp. 881-82. S.V. “al-SakliâwI.”
E f,  vol. IX, pp. 913-16. s.v. “al-Suyütl."
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Geschichte Des Arabischen Schrifttums {GAS), we are told. The earliest 
work at our disposal that has the sahaba in its title is Muhammad ibn 
Hibban’s (d. 354/965) Târïkh al-Sahâba Al-ladhma Riiwiya 'Anhum al- 
Akhbâr. In the fifth century of the Hijra, Abu ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 
463/1071) compiled his al-lstï'âb f t  Ma'rifat al-Ashab. Two centuries 
then lapsed before ‘Izz al-Dîn ibn al-Athîr (d. 630/1233) compiled his 
Usd al-Ghâbafî Ma'rifat al- Sahaba. The last biographical lexicon tliat 
has been compiled was Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalanf s (d. 852/1449) al-Isaba f t  
Tamylz al-Sahâba.
Many works on usül al-fiqh have survived. The earliest is the 
Risala of the celebrated Sunnî scholar Muhammad ibn Idrls al-Shaft‘î  (d. 
204/820). We also have al-Ihkam f t  Usül al-Ahkâm by Sayf al-Din Abu 
al-Hasan al-Amidî (d. 631/1233).^^ Ibn Hazm al-Andalusî has a work 
bearing the same title as al-Amidî’s. Abu al-Ma‘âlî al-Juwaynî, known as 
Imam al-Haramayn (d. 478/1085), wrote al-Biirhàrf^ and his famous 
disciple Muhammad Al-Ghazzâlî (d. 505/1111) wrote al-Mustasfa f l  
Usül al-Fiqh in addition to his famous Ihya ’ 'Ulüm al-Dîn where he 
addresses a wide range of issues/^ Jamal al-Dîn ibn al-Hajib (d. 
646/1248) also wrote his Muntahâ al-Wusül wa- 'l-Amal f t  'Ilmay al-Usül 
wa- l-Jadal^"^
A review of Western scholarship on the concept 
As it was noted before. Western scholai'ship is inexplicably reticent about 
the Sumiî concept of the collective ta'dll of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
Companions. In some works it is absent where it would have a great deal
EI~. vol. H. p. 462. s.v. “al-Djarh wa '1-Ta‘dîl.”
E I\ vol. VIL p. 517. S.V.
El~. vol. I, p. 434. S.V. “al-Ainidï.”
E I\ vol. II, pp. 605-06. s.v. “al-Djuwai.'iir.”
E f. vol. II pp. 1038-42. s.v. “al-GliazSlT,”
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of relevance. Michael Cook’s Early Islamic Dogma is an example.^^ At 
our disposal is a Ph.D. dissertation which addresses the attitude of the 
ShiT Muslims towards the C om panions.N o similar work is devoted to 
the study of the Sunnî attitude. As we have mentioned before, only two 
western scholars have endeavored to account for the emergence of the 
concept. Below is a presentation of their contribution followed by a 
critique of the ideas they put forward.
The first work is G. H. JuynbolPs Muslim Tradition: Studies in 
Chronology, Provenance and Authorship o f Early Hadîth?'^ What 
follows is an attempt to reconstruct an argument based on the somewhat 
scattered ideas Juynboll gives on this issue (which he discusses in about 
10 pages). Juynboll tries to associate the appearance of the concept with 
the attempts of the traditioysts to curb the process of Hadîth fabrication 
at the end of the second century “with the general awareness that 
mendacity in Hadlth transmission had grown to dangerous 
proportions.” *^ Those traditionists had to have a say on, among other 
things, the deteriorating reputation of Abû Hurayra, the Companion 
whose name is associated with alleged Prophetic traditions more than any 
other Companion, and who, according to Juynboll, “had to suffer the 
heaviest attacks.”^^  This was not restricted to Abû Hurayra, Juynboll 
states, as “the Companions have, from the very beginning, been exposed 
to disparaging remarks.”^^  The ground was paved for that since the 
Companions got involved very early in schisms and mutual cursing
E f, vol. Ill, p. 781. s.v. “Ibn al-Ha^ib.”
^  M. Cook. Early Muslim Dogma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978 
E. Kohlberg. The Attitude o f S h il Muslims to the Companions. Oxford: Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, 1973
G. H. A. Juynboll. Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, Provenance, and Authorship o f  Early 
H adlth  Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1983
*  Ibid., p. 199 
Ibid., p. 201 
Ibid., p. 201
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became widespread, “Tliis political cursing became in due course 
something which was also associated witli lack of reliability in Hadîth 
transmission,” Juynboll contends/^ This atmosphere made it possible for 
Abu ‘Awana al-Waddah ibn ‘Abd Allâli (d. 176/792) to compile a work 
entitled Ma 'âyïb Ashàb Rasül Allah. “But gradually,” Juynboll points 
out, “all the Companions were exonerated and this resulted in the doctrine 
of the collective ta'dll which was formulated in its definitive fonn 
sometime towards the end of the third/ninth centuiy.”^^  He also adds, 
relying on a single passage in Ibn Hibban’s Kitâb al-MaJrühJn, that Abu 
Hâtim al-Râzî (d. 277/890) was responsible for the introduction of the 
adage of collective ta'dll and that his son “promoted this opinion by 
incorporating it in tlie introduction of his Taqdima."^^^ This adage, 
Juynboll argues, legitimized the tadlJs of the Companions (i.e. when a 
Companion does not identify exactly whether he has heard a tradition 
from the Prophet or from a soince wliich he does not name) on tlie groimd 
that all the Companions were ‘udfd. It had also anotlier use in that it 
justified a tmdition with a chain of transmission in which the Companion 
is missing on the ground that an unknown Companion was just as reliable 
as one mentioned by name thanks to the adage of collective ta 'dll?^
Yet Juynboll does not accoimt for the “gradual” process of 
exonerating the Companions, nor does he explain why it was vital for the 
Muslims to exonerate the Companions. Even when he mentions how the 
adage was made use of, he does not explicitly state that it had been 
introduced for those particular purposes. Yet in spite of the ambiguity of 
JuynbolPs treatment of the subject, what is certain is tliat he links the
Ibkl. p. 201 
Ibid.. p. 201 
^Dbid.. p. 201 
^Dbid.. p. 194 
Ibid.. p. 201
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subject with the emergence of (Sunni) Hadïth criticism and suggests that 
the development of the concept may have been associated with the efforts 
of the rijal critics to exonerate Abu Hurayra in particular/^
The second Western work that has shown interest in the subject is 
Eerik Dickinson's The Development o f Early Sunnite Hadïth Criticism: 
The Taqdima o f I  bn AbT Hâtim al-Râzi?^ Here Dickinson makes it 
explicit that the concept of the collective ta ‘dfl of the Companions was 
part of the general development of Sunni Hadïth criticism. Two attitudes 
towards the Prophetic Hadïth developed in eaiiy Islam. The first was that 
of those who were very strict in accepting die authenticity of Hadïth and 
were very close to rejecting the Hadïth altogether, without actually 
stating that, as Dicldnson points out. These are refeixed to as ahl al-ra y  
or ahl al-kalâm?^ The second attitude was much more lenient towards 
and dependent on the Prophetic Hadïth but it split in its own turn into two 
opposing factions. The first faction sought to “thiead their way tlnough 
the contradictory hadïth by rational means.” To this faction belongs al- 
ShâfTï, his disciple al-Muzanï, Ibn Qutayba al-Dmawarï, and al-Tabarï, 
all of whom compiled works that ventured to efface apparent 
contradictions in the contents of some Prophetic traditions while 
maintaining their authenticity.^^ The second was that of the Hadïth critics 
to whom Ibn Abï Hâtim al-Râzï belonged."^  ^Dickinson argues that in the 
Taqdima^ Ibn Abï Hâtim was very much concerned with legitimizing his 
methodology of Hadïth criticism by projecting it back to earlier 
authorities."^  ^ According to Dickinson, tiiat methodology involved tliree
p. 192
E. Dickinson. The de\>elopment o f Early Sunnite Hadïth Criticism: The Taqdima o f Ibn AbT 
Hâtim al-Razi. Leiden: Brill, 2001
Ibid., pp. 3-4. By that tiine, we can infer, tlie antliorit}- o f Hadîtii was difficult to challenge. 
Ibid.. pp. 5-7 
Ibid.. pp. 7-10 
Ibid., pp. 127-8
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sets of evidences: testimonial, biographical, and documentary. The last 
set is what interests us here for it is in this context that Dickinson tries to 
account for the emergence of the concept,
Dickinson explains that Hadïth critics were faced by three types of 
chains of transmission. In the first one the lines of transmission did not 
converge, and here a tmdition was evaluated by collating different 
narrations of the tradition in addition to the evaluation of the transmitters 
on intrinsic as well as extrinsic gi'ounds,"^  ^ The second case is when the 
lines of transmission converged on a single transmitter which, for the 
critics, suggested a likely case of forgery because it meant that only one 
student narrated a traditions fi*om his teacher, which is not likely and in 
most cases led to the rejection of the tradition,"^  ^ The third case is when 
the lines of transmission converged on a gap and here the critics were 
confronted with all sorts of inteiTupted chains of transmission. Dickinson 
gives a detailed study on how the Hadïth critics used to deal with that 
problem. The focus was mainly on the chain of transmission itself hoping 
that they could discover a defect in it or, if not, declare it sound. In this 
respect they used many techniques such as evaluating the cohesiveness of 
the chains of transmission, examining the extrinsic information they had 
about the transmitters, using the death dates at their disposal to evaluate 
the chains of transmission, and scrutinizing the wording of the chain of 
transmission to see how each transmitter narrated fr om his source,"^ '^
One of the cases that caused a serious problem to the Hadïth critics 
was when the chain of transmission read: ‘‘X narrated from  Y,” The 
problem here is that the word “fi'om” ( 'an) does not necessarily prove that 
X heard the tradition directly from Y, a case which Dickinson calls
Ibid, w- 83-104 
105-6 
^ /W .,p p . 106-18
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“audition.” “From” allows for the possibility that there was an 
intermediary between X and Y. This intermediary, being a majhül 
(unknown), can very easily be unreliable. Two attitudes developed in 
respect to this point. The first was that of Muslim, the author of the 
famous Sahîh, who argued that contemporaneity was sufficient to 
legitimize a chain of transmission that contains “from.” Muslim rejected 
the stipulation that in order to legitimize a chain of transmission, it must 
contain unequivocal statement that the transmitters met with each other. 
According to Dickinson, Muslim thought that this restriction was “at once 
too lax and too strict.” Too lax because it “does not guarantee that any 
paiticular transmission is unmediated” on the ground that the fact that X 
met Y does not necessarily suggest that all X 's tiunsmissions from Y are 
unmediated. And too strict because it would eventually lead to the 
rejection of many traditions, some of which are “universally reckoned 
authentic.” A famous case of this is when a Successor {tàbi ') transmits 
from  a Com panion.Dickinson says that the Hadïth critics, who were 
keen to “introduce greater rigor into Hadïth criticism” to legitimize their 
methodology, rejected Muslim’s objections regarding “from.” While his 
first objection, that the stipulation was too lax, “fell on deaf ears” as 
Dickinson puts it,'^  ^his second was dealt with by the introduction of “the 
new dogma which decreed that all of the earliest Muslims were to be 
considered reliable for the purpose of Hadïth transmission.”"^’ Dickinson 
then quotes a passage from Ibn Hibban’s Sahîh  where he aigues that 
since all the Companions are declared by God to be “above weakness 
attaching to them” there is no harm in accepting a tradition from a 
Companion in which he does not make it clear that he heard it fr om the
pp. 119-120 
Ibid, p. 120 
Ibid, pp. 120-21
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Prophet/^ Dickinson also argues that “the introduction of the dogma of 
the collective reliability of the earliest Muslims . . . seemingly must be 
ascribed to Ibn Abï Hâtim”"^  ^ on the groimd that it is here that the 
“earliest explicit fonmilations” are to be found/° This new dogma 
“allowed tlie term ‘from’ to be more strictly inteipreted, but rendered the 
matter virtually meaningless by neutralizing its effect in sphere (sic.) 
where it would have been tlie greatest, namely in the transmission of the 
earliest Muslims,” he concludes/^
There is no doubt that Dickinson’s contribution to the study of the 
concept of collective ta 'dll of tlie Prophet’s Companions is a major step 
in imderstanding the origin and development of the concept. However, it 
is not adequate. Dickinson’s tlieory cannot explain the fact that the 
concept appears in ahTahâwï’s creed in a way that is far from being 
developed (al-Tahâwï died in 341/952 and Ibn Abï Hâtim died in 
327/938). This suggests that Ibn Abï Hâtim may have been responsible 
for the elaboration of tlie concept and how it is to be used in Hadïth 
criticism. But to say that he was responsible for its introduction would 
necessitate that al-Tahâwï discusses it in a way similar to that of Ibn Abï 
Hâtim, wliich is not the case [we also need to know why al-Tahâwï was 
prepared to incorporate the concept into his creed]. This means tliat al- 
Tahâwï laiew about the concept from another source. Moreover, Ibn Abï 
Hâtim, according to Dickinson, talks about the accredition of “early 
Muslims” which is quiet different from believing that all the Companions 
are 'udfiL Ibn Abï Hâtim, we would guess, does not try to argue that all
^DbicL p. 121 
^Dbid.. p. 124 
'"Dbid.. p. 121 
Ibid., p. 124
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-7 52the individual Successors are also 'iidüL Explaining the emergence of a 
dogma by the mere ascription of it to a single scholar who wanted to 
solve a certain difficulty is not an easy argument to defend. If we can say 
that Juynboll was much more successful and more logical in his attempt 
to seek tlie root of the dogma within the context of eaiiy schisms, 
Dickinson was much more successfiil in putting the concept in a likely 
later context, but failed to accoimt for its early development. Dickinson 
himself, in a statement contradictory to his own work, says that “it is 
difficult to trace the origin of this doctrine [of the collective ta ‘dîl of the 
C om pan ions].B erg , in his review of Dickinson’s book, is justified 
when he says that “more could have been said about [the accreditation of 
early generations of Muslims].
In general, both theories on tlie origin and development of the 
concept are insufficient, perhaps because, it seems to be, that tiiese two 
authors discuss the concept in passing. Botli of them reach conclusions 
about the concept but fail to develop a systematic way to study it. This 
study is an attempt to present a different argument based upon a more 
systematic study.
Actually. Dickinson does say that “‘Ibn Abï Hâtiin seems to place tlie next generation of Muslims, 
tlie Follow ers, on the same plane as tlie Companions'’ (p. 122). If tliis were to be taken at face value. 
Dickinson would tlien need to explain why the concept of tlie collective ta 'dïl of tlie Successors was 
not established as an article of belief in Sunni Islam.
p. 121
IntemationalJournal o f Middle East Studies, vol. XLIII: 4 (2002), pp. 135-6
Chapter Two 
Linguistic Meaning and Technical Usage 
of ^Adala and Ta^dtL
The lexica consulted here^ make a distinction between a number of 
meanings derived from the root 'adala, three of which concern us most in 
this study. These are 'adala, ddula, and ‘addala. According to Ibn 
Manzûr’s Lisàn al- 'Arab, “ 'adald"" means “to pass a fair verdict (al-hukm 
bi- ’l-haqqf^; and Lane defines it as “to act equitably, justly, or rightly.”  ^
'Adi, ma'dala and ma'dila, the verbal nouns, are thus the opposite of 
injustice (didd al-jawr),^ The adjective of 'adl in this sense can be either 
'adil (pi. 'udül)‘, or 'adl (pi. 'udUl) which, being identical with the verbal 
noun itself, is supposed to give more effect because it reveals that the one 
described as such is so just that he can be accredited with the verbal noun 
itself.^ The root in this sense, it can be said, is basically related to one 
who is entitled to make decisions or judgements, mostly a ruler or a 
judge.
'Adula, on the other hand, means “to become W /,” and the verbal 
nouns are 'adala, ma 'dila, ma 'dala, and 'udüla.^ What these verbal nouns 
specifically mean here, the lexica do not tell us. The 'adl (pi. 'udüï), in 
this sense, is the one whose testimony is accepted on the basis of his 
'adala (or, as Ibn Manzür puts it, “rq/W 'adl: ridan wa-maqna 'un f i -  7-
These lexica are Al-Qâmiîs al-Muhlt ofMajd al-Dm Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Fayrüzabâdr (vol. 
IV, p. 13); Al~Sihâh o f Ismâ'ÏÏ ibn Hammâd al-Jawharî (vol. V, pp. 1760-1); Lisân al- ‘Arab o f Abfl 
al-Fadl Jamal al-Dm ibn Manzür (vol. II, p. 430); Qutr al-MuhJt of Butms al-Bustânî (vol. II, p. 
1315); Mukhtar al-Sihah  o f Muhammad ibn Abï Bakr ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Râzï (pp. 442-3); Asâs al- 
Balâgha of Abu al-Qasim Mahmud Al-Zamakhsharï (vol. II, pp. 68-9); and An Arabic-English 
Lexicon o f E. W. Lane (Book I, pp. 1972-5).
 ^Ibn ManzOi*, Lisâna l-‘Arab, vol. II, p. 430 
 ^Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, Book I, p. 1972 
Ibn Manzüi', Lisân al- ‘Arab, vol. H, p. 430 
 ^Ibid, vol. II, p. 430
® Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, Book I, p. 1974
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shahâdd^)? Another meaning for 'adl put by Ibn Manzür is “he who has 
not shown what malces him liable to suspicion {alladhJ lam tazhar minhii 
rJba)'"^ This last definition will be important in our discussion of the 
teclmical use of this term. So, whereas the first meaning of the root is 
related mainly to the process of passing a (fair) judgment, tlie second one 
has to do with tlie process of giving a (candid) testimony.
Closely related to this meaning is the verb 'addala, which means to 
“ascribe purity to” (zakka).^ Ta'dfl, tlie verbal noim of ‘addala, is the 
process of accrediting someone with 'adala; or, in other words, declaring 
one to be 'adl as defined in the preceding paragraph. Those who accredit 
other people with 'adala are called 'adala and 'udala.^^ In this study, 
'addala will be translated as “to bestow 'adala on,” and ta'dJl as “tlie 
bestowal of 'adala on.” The opposite of 'addala is jaraha  or jarraha, 
which will be translated hereafter as “ to disparage.”
As defined linguistically, the meanings of die root 'adala we have 
dealt with now clearly involves a process of legitimization. The first 
meaning legitimizes a verdict by basing it, or asserting it to be based, on 
justice and impartiality. The second and the thhd legitimize someone’s 
testimony by declaring his 'adala. Once someone’s 'adala is established, 
his testimony is legitimized correspondingly.
As used teclmically, this root constitutes one of the two pillars of 
'ilm al-jarh wa- 'l-ta 'dXl (the science of the disparagement of or [lit. and] 
die bestowal of 'adala on [the transmitters of Prophetic Hadïth]). The 
task of this science, which is a core branch of 'idUm al-hadfth, is to 
establish the theoretical bases according to which the scholars of 'ilm al-
' Ibn Manzur. Lisân a/- 'Arab. vol. IE. p. 430
* Ibid.. vol. II. p. 431 
 ^Ibid.. vol. II p. 430
Arabic-English Lexicon, Book I, p. 1974
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rijàl (tlie science of the study of [the biographies of] men [who transmit 
Prophetic Hadïth]) assess tlie transmitters of Prophetic traditions {niwat 
al-hadfth). hi other words, it is the task of 'ilm al-rijal to apply the 
theoretical criteria of ‘ilm al-Jarh wa-'l-ta'dfl to all the transmitters of 
Prophetic traditions. It was the scholai's of 'ilm al-rijal who compiled the 
voluminous biographical dictionaries starting from the C. These
two sciences— 'ilm al-jarh wa-’l-ta'dïl and 'ilm al-rijal—constitute the 
backbone of Simnï Hadïth criticism for they provide the legitimation of 
Simnï Hadïth literature. By legitimizing the hansmitters of the Prophetic 
traditions (i.e. by declaring then 'adala), they provide the legitimation of 
tlie Sunnï Hadïth literature at large.
The science of al-jarh wa-l-ta^dTli
The criteria for assessing the reliability and capability of the transmitters 
of the Prophet’s traditions are discussed in a wide variety of soinces, the 
most important of wliich are the works on Hadïth sciences. In the 
following brief description of some of the basic mles of ‘ilm al-jarh wa- 
'l-ta'dïl, we will depend primaiily on al-Kliatïb al-Baghdâdï’s al-Kifaya 
j t  'Ilm al-RIwaya^^ and Ibn al-Salah’s Muqaddima^''. These two works 
have been established as tlie most influential works on 'ulûm al-hadïth in 
Sunnï Islam and tliey are the ones most often cited in the secondary 
soinces on different branches of 'îdüm al-hadïth. The prominent 9^ 715^  ^
C. Sunnï scholar, Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalânï, for instance, approvingly cites 
an earlier opinion that all the works compiled after al-Kifaya aie
' ' Tlie lexica do not refer to tins teclmical usage of tlie root ‘adala and tlieir autliors tlius escape having 
to iiave a say on tlie complexities tliat the teclmical usage introduces.
Al-Kliatïb al-Baghdâdî. Jî 'Uni al-Riwâya. Bayrût: Dâral-Kutub al-Tlmiiwa, 1988
Taqï al-Dïn ibn ‘Anir ibn al-Salâh. Muqaddimaî Ibn aï-Salâh. (Ed. 'Â’isha ‘Abd al-Rahmân.). Al-
Qâliira: Dâr al-Ma‘ârif. 1989
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dependent on al-Kliatîb’s work/"^ A modem Simni scholar argues tliat Ibn 
al-Salah was the Sunnï scholar who put the rules of 'ulûm al-Hadïth in 
order. Most of the works that have been written after Ibn al-Salah, he 
adds, were either elaborations on or abridgments of his Miiqaddiina. He 
has come to tliis conclusion by enumerating more than 15 works whose 
authors admitted their debt to Ibn al-Salah. Both works give fairly 
detailed studies of all aspects of Him al-jarh wa- ’l-ta ‘dîL More important, 
these two works give different views on some points that aie directly 
relevant to our subject. Al-Kliatïb al-Baghdâdï, whose discussion of the 
subject is very disorganized, tends to give all the different and conflicting 
opinions on eveiy point, and his own opinion remains obscure in many 
cases. On die otiier hand, Ibn al-Salah, whose work is much more 
organized, is very selective and his selections are mostly those accepted 
by most Sunnï scholars who came after him. One point should be clear 
from the outset: the following is not an exliaustive analysis of Him al-jarh 
wa- ’l-ta 'dll. This subject is very wide in the scope of the ideas it deals 
with and in its ramifications. Therefore, only those points that are thought 
to be relevant to our discussions on die main subject of this study will be 
briefly addressed.
Two criteria were stipulated by the scholars of Him al-jarh wa- 7- 
ta'dJl according to which diey passed judgment on the capability and 
reliability of the transmitters of die Prophetic traditions. These are 
respectively the dabt and the 'adala of the transmitters,^^
Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalânî. Niikhbat aJ-Fikar jiM iistalah Ahl al-Athar (Ed. by Abû Malik Kamal Salim 
as Nuzhat al-Nazar Shark Nukhbat al-Fikar f i  Mustalah Ahl al-Athar.) Al-QaJiira: Maktabat aI-‘Um, 
n.d., p. 21
Al-RasMd Tmâd al-Dm Muhammad. Nazariyyat Naqcl al-Rijal wa-Makânatuhâ f t  Daw  ' al-Bahth 
al- 'Ilmf: Dirâsa Ta 'sJliyy>a Tatbiqiyya f î  Tim al-Jarh wa- 'l-Ta 'dtl, Dimashq: Dâr al-Sliiliâb, 1999, pp. 
330-1
Al-Kliatïb al-Baglidâdï, .4/-Â7/ova, pp. 34, 53; Ibn al-Sal^ , Mtiqaddima, p. 288
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The concept of dabt as used technically in Him al-jarh wa- H-ta 'dïl 
refers mainly to the mental capacity of a transmitter and the accuracy and 
precision of what he naixates. A transmitter of Prophetic Hadïth must be 
aware of what he narrates and from whom he receives the narrations. He 
must have a good memory that does not fail him when he cites his 
narrations. In addition, he must be fully aware of the meanings of the 
traditions he narrates to avoid changing those meanings if he does not 
narrate them verbatim.^’ The narrations of a transmitter who is known to 
be careless in either learning or transmitting the traditions (samà' 7- 
hadïth wa-ismà'uH) are to be deemed weak or even discarded.The dabt 
of a transmitter can be attested by, inter alia, the agreement of his 
narrations with those of other scholars who are well-known for their 
daht}^ To summarize, this criterion seeks to ensure that a transmitter of 
the Prophetic Hadïth does not suffer from any physical or mental ailment 
that might affect the precision of what he narrates.
The second criterion of 'ilm al-jarh wa-H-ta'dil is 'adala. This 
concept is never very clearly defined, but what the sources do make clear 
is that a transmitter must possess this quality if his narrations are to be 
accepted. The 'adala of a transmitter can be established by one of two 
ways. The first is the testimony of others, who normally must be 'udUl 
themselves. The second is common knowledge (istifada)—that is when 
someone’s 'adala is so well known to the scholarly community that he 
does not need to be declared 'adl by any individual scholar.^^ There is a 
disagreement, however, on the number of people required to attest to the 
'adala of a transmitter. Some scholars required the testimony of two
Al-Khatîb al-Baghdâdï, Al-Kifaya, p. 23; Ibn al-Salâh, Muqaddima, p. 288 
Al-Khatïb al-Baghdâdî, Al-Kifaya, pp. 143-4,147-8; Ibn al-Salâh, Miiqaddima, p. 306 
Al-Khatîb al-Baghdâdï, pp. 13-4; Ibn al-Salâh, Muqaddima, p. 290
Al-Khatïb al-Baghdâdî, Al-Kifaya, pp. 86-8; Ibn al-Salah, Muqaddima, pp. 288-9
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people on the ground that only tlie testimony of two people is admissible 
in court. Other scholars, however, argued for the acceptance of the 
testimony of just one person making an analogy with the acceptance of 
solitaiy traditions (akhbar al-âhâd). A fortiori, tliey concluded, the 
testimony of a single person in establishing the 'adala of a ti'ansmitter 
should be accepted. Al-Kliatîb is more inclined to the first opinion which 
requhes two persons but says that the second opinion can also be 
accepted if only one mn 'addil exists.’  ^ Ibn al-Salâh prefers the second 
opinion and considers it “more soimd.”^^
This seems to raise a problem. That is, if by 'adala one 
understands the characteristic which legitimizes someone’s testimony or 
nan'ations; and by ta'dXl the process of legitimizing someone on the basis 
of such characteristic, the question then is: who bestows 'adala on tlie 
'iidala—those who accredit people with 'adalal We said before that it is 
assumed that the 'iidala themselves aie 'udüL If we are to attest tlie 
'adala of the ‘udala and the 'adala of tliose who bestow 'adala on the 
'iidala, we will fall into the trap of infinite regression. The impracticality 
of tliis procedure was indeed acknowledged in the judicial system. The 
author of the article “ 'Adr in E f,  E. Tyan, says that when the ^Hazkiyd’^ 
[synonymous with ta'dil] procedure was applied in court, the dilemma 
tliat “die witnesses of the instnunent [i.e., the process of tazkiyd\ could 
always themselves be challenged on the groimd of lack of 'adald^ had to 
be dealt with. “This difficulty was overcome,” Tyan says, “by the use of a 
preliminary tazkiya; die judge recognizes once and for all the 'adala o f a 
certain number of persons, who thus become in principle irreproachable 
witnesses, . . . This question is worth posing here because we will
Al-Khatïb al-Baghdâdî. Aî-Kijaya, pp. 96-7 
Ibn al-Salah, Muqaddima. p. 293
E r  , vol. I, p. 209
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need to know how the Sunnï scholars dealt with it as far as the 'adala of 
the Companions is concerned.
Another disagreement among the scholars of 'ilm al-jarh wa-’l- 
ta 'dïl, which both Al-Khatïb al-Baghdâdï and Ibn al-Salâh address, is: on 
what basis can the 'adala of a transmitter be established? The two 
scholars take two different routes as regards this question and then 
disagieement is substantial. The pomts at stake here are: what does a 
transmitter need to show in order to have his 'adala acknowledged by the 
nuqqad'^^ and, consequently, what does a nâqid need to see and witness 
to bestow 'adala on a transmitter?
Al-Khatîb Al-Baghdâdï argues that 'adala requhes more than a 
mere declaration of someone’s belief in Islam. It requhes an active 
fulfillment of the requirements of Islam. Therefore, a nâqid who bestows 
'adala on a transmitter has to verify and testify that the transmitter “does 
not do this and that and does so and so.”^^  His argument goes as follows. 
In a chapter entitled “the refutation of those who claimed that ‘adala is 
the declaration of Islam and abstention jhom declared f l s q f  al-Khatïb 
argues that the 'adala is “something additional to Islam {shay ’ zà Hd 'ala 
H-islam)C He strives to reinteipret the traditions that those people, named 
here as ahl al-'iraq, employ to back their position that the mere 
confession of Islam is enough to establish one’s 'adala. What al-Khatïb 
means by “Islam” here is the mere repetition of the confessions of Islam 
(that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of 
God). He states, accordingly, that 'adala is only attested by the 
examination of deeds or conduct and the scrutinizing of positions {bi- 
ikhtibâr al-af'àl wa-tatabu' al-ahwâl). Therefore, one’s testimony that
‘''Nuqqad'' is the pliu al o f nâqid. A nâqid is the one who evaluates people (originally it meant the 
expert who used to test the genuineness of coins). In other words, he is the one who either bestows 
'adâla on or disparages tr ansmitters. This is the teim that will be used hereafter.
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another is 'adl is accepted only if one Imows the other and witnesses his 
good acts. A nâqid, therefore, should not be satisfied with what 
everybody knows about a transmitter. He should seek to ascertain that 
what a transmitter does in fi'ont o f people conforms to what he does out of 
their sight. From this we can understand that al-Khatïb held that a 
person’s religious and moral behavior affects his 'adâla either negatively 
or positively.
Some of the definitions of 'adâla that al-Khatîb cites, however, 
apparently contradict his view on this point. For instance, he gives a 
considerable number of quotations that associate 'adâla with a person’s 
acts. However, “acts” here are to be understood in the negative sense; i.e. 
acts that must not be done rather than those that must. He cites a 
Prophetic tradition in which the Prophet stipulates the criteria of ‘adâla. 
According to this tradition, the ‘adl is the one who when dealing with 
people does not wrong them; when narrating [Prophetic traditions?] to 
them {idhâ haddathahum), does not tell lies to them, and when making 
promises to them, does not break his promise. This, the Prophet adds, is 
the one whose 'adâla has been manifested. However, this tradition, as it 
stands, shows that 'adâla is acquhed by abstention from certain acts 
rather than by doing certain acts. In other words, it defines 'adâla in the 
negative sense by putting the emphasis on what one has to avoid in order 
to have his 'adâla attested. Another saying that al-Khatlb quotes is that 
the 'adl is one “who has not shown that which makes him liable to 
suspicion.” ’^ This saying, the reader will recall, is also used by Ibn 
Manzür in his definition of the ‘adl. This definition also suggests that in
AI-Khatîb Al-Kijaya, p. 100
Ibid., p.78
^Dbid.,p. 78
31
order for someone to have his ‘adâla acknowledged, he has to avoid 
doing what might cast doubt on his ‘adâla.
From this it should not be understood, however, that al-Khatïb was 
of the opinion that only the ‘adâla of those people who are sinless can be 
accepted. On the contrary, al-Khatïb gives his complete support for the 
view of some earlier authorities that a person whose good acts and
obedience to God outweigh and exceed his wrongdoings and
disobedience is to be considered ‘adl. Al-Khatïb adds that if the rulers 
and scholars were to acknowledge only the ‘adâla of a Muslim who is 
completely free from sin, they would accept the ‘adala of no one, as God 
has made it known that even the prophets and apostles committed sins. 
However, the criteria should not be so lax as to allow the testimony of a 
fasiq (evildoer) or a kâfir (disbeliever).^^
Ibn al-Salâh, on the other hand, states that ta ‘dïl is to be accepted 
without questioning the reason for it. The rationale is that the reasons for 
it are too many to be counted. A nâqid required to give the reasons for his 
bestowal of ‘adâla on a transmitter would have to attest that that
transmitter does not do this or that act of the acts which lead to
disparagement.’  ^From this we can understand that a nâqid needs only to 
verify that a transmitter avoids what might vitiate his ‘adâla. He, the 
nâqid, does not need to know whether the transmitter he evaluates does 
what is normally required of Muslims as far as the religious duties are 
concerned. In other words, if the ‘adâla is to be established, it can only 
be done in a negative way; i.e. by the negation of the causes of jarh. This 
means that whereas a scholar who disparages a transmitter has to produce 
his evidence, he does not have to do so if he bestows ‘adâla on him.^^
pp. 79-81 
Ibn al-Salâh, Muqaddima, p. 290
30 Ibid., p. 290
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From Ibn al-Salâh, we can understand then that 'adâla is the normal case 
of eveiybody and that jarli is the exception which alters someone’s 
original 'adâla as a result of committing what is forbidden by religion. 
We will see later tliat this idea was one of tlie bases upon which the 
concept of the collective ta 'dïl was based.
That a scholar has to produce his evidence when disparaging 
another is explained by the fact that people differ regarding what 
constitutes a sufficient cause for jarh  and what does not. After giving 
instances in which al-Bukhârî and Muslim, the two celebrated 3^ 7^10^  ^C. 
Sunni traditionists, accepted the narrations of some transmitters whom 
other scholars deemed umeliable, Ibn al-Salâh concludes that the theories 
of the scholars of 'ilm al-jarh wa- j-ta ‘dïl are ambiguous and conflicting 
{madhahibu j-niiqqadi li- j-rijali ghâmidatim miikhtalifa).^^ This point is 
of utmost importance for oiu study because here it is made plain that the 
criteria of 'ilm al-jarh wa- 'l-ta 'ciïl aie far from being objective; and that 
disagieement among tlie scholars on this is not only to be expected, but 
also tolerable.^’ But what if two nâqids give two differing judgments on 
someone’s 'adalal Ibn al-Salâh here reiterates al-Khatîb’s argmiient that 
if tajrJh and ta'ciïl are simultaneously ascribed to someone, tajrJh is to 
have the priority on the ground that the jârih  must have known what the 
mii'addil was ignorant of as far as the reliability of the transmitter is 
concerned.Again, this point is very important for our piupose and we 
will see later that the Sunni scholars did not, or could not, apply it to their 
theory of 'adalat al-sahaba.
p. 291
In tlie article on ‘“Adl” in EI~ tlie autlior says that al-Mâivardï understood 'adâla to be “a state of 
moral and religions perfection.” For Ibn Ruslid. it meant “not committing major sins, and also avoiding 
minor ones.” The former defines tlie tenn in a positive sense while tlie latter’s statement defines it 
negatively. Ibn Rushd argues, in agreement witli Ibn al-Salâh, tliat “agreement lias never been reached 
on a definition of tlie tenn.”
Ibn al-Salâh, Muqaddima, p. 294
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The gap between the two views is hardly bridgeable. Al-Kliatîb al- 
Baghdâdî suggests that a nâqid must seek actively to demonstrate that the 
one on whom he bestows ‘adala does not commit what might make him 
liable to jarh  and, equally importantly, does what is required of a good 
Muslim. Ibn al-Salâh, however, does not put the same emphasis on the 
second point and is satisfied to say that if the nâqid does not see what 
constitutes a reasonable cause for jarh, he can attest to tlie ‘adâla of a 
transmitter without ftirther examination. Put differently, while the two 
scholars associate judging someone’s ‘adâla with knowledge, al-ICliatîb 
argues that knowledge is as much needed for bestowing ‘adâla as it is for 
disparaging. Ibn al-Salâh, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is 
only needed for disparagement. As will be seen, it is Ibn al-Salah’s 
opinion that has come to triumph as far as tlie concept of collective ta ‘dïl 
is concerned.
Two points can be concluded from this discussion: the ‘adâla as 
discussed by tlie Sunnï sources used here is conceived of as a vaiiable 
and approximate term. It is variable in its definition and in respect to its 
relation to the overall acts of a person. It is approximate in the sense tliat 
it cannot be based on certainty. The ‘adl, we can conclude, is the one 
whose known wrong acts do not constitute a sufficient cause for jaifr. If 
his wi'ongdoings that people know of do not constitute a sufficient cause 
for jarh, he is to retain his original ‘adâla.
In chapter four, two definitions of mân  (faith) will be discussed. 
The disagreement between the Hanbalî al-Khatîb al-Baghdâdî and the 
ShâfiT Ibn al-Salâh on the two last points reflects tlieir respective 
understandings of Imân and its relation to acts. It is one of the contentions 
of this study that Sunnï ideas about the ‘adâla of the Companions were
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very much dependent on their definition of man  and their arguments 
about the Tman of the Companions.
In his discussion on the criteria of ‘adâla, al-Kliatïb raises the issue 
of the relation between innovation (bid'a) and 'adâla. In many of the 
statements which he seems to cite approvingly, 'adâla is associated with 
the uprightness of one’s doctiine (madhhab).^^ In contrast to this, al- 
Kliatlb argues that earlier scholars accepted tlie nan'ations of “a/i/ al- 
ahwâ' wa-’l-bida"' (people of whims and innovations) such as tlie 
ICliawarij, Muftazila, Murji’a, and Slifa.^^ Ibn al-Salâh also discusses 
this point in a rather clumsy way.^^ Tliree points can be identified in this 
context. The first is whether the imiovation is or is not tantamoimt to 
imbelief (hifr). Secondly and closely related to the first point is whether 
tlie hmovator (mnbtadi') is an interpreter (miita'awwil) or not; i.e., 
whether he, being sincere in his approach, bases his innovation on an 
en oneous interpretation of the religious texts or deliberately upholds a 
view tliat he knows to be inconsistent with religion. The tliird point is 
whether the innovator makes his position worse by actively seeking to 
spread his imiovation. It is implied tliat the innovator whose innovation is 
tantamount to imbelief cannot be regarded as 'adl. Some scholars aigiied 
tliat innovation, whether or not it results firom a sincere interpretation, 
deprives its upholder of his 'adâla and his nan'ations are to be discarded 
accordingly. Others argued that he retains liis 'adâla if he does not justify 
lying in support of his doctrine, whether he be a preacher of his 
innovation (dâ'iya ilâ bid'atihi) or not.
Two important points aie at stake here concerning the relation 
between 'adâla on the one hand and orthodoxy and innovation on the
Al-Kliatib ai-Baglidadi. p. 80
Ibk l. pp. 120-5
Ibn al-Salâh, Muqaddima. pp. 298-300
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Other. The first is the relation between 'adâla and two kinds of 
innovation: that innovation which results firom sincere interpretation or 
ijtihâd, and that wliich does not. The second point has to do with the 
innovation that is accompanied by active preacliing, and that which does 
not involve action. As for the first point, al-Khatîb al-Baghdâdî says that 
a group of earlier scholars argued against the acceptance of the 'adâla of 
the muta 'awwilün because they are eitlier kuffar or fussâq?^ According to 
Ibn al-Salâh, most scholars accept the narrations of an innovator, and by 
implication his ‘adâla, if he does not call people to embrace his 
innovation. This is the convention of the prominent scholars of Hadïth, 
he claims.
Both scholars discuss tlie possibility of a transmitter regaining his 
‘adâla after having lost it for ascribing false statements to someone else. 
Here tlie distinction is made between putting false statements into the 
mouths of common people {al-kadhib ft  hadith al-nâs), and deliberately 
putting them into the mouth of the Prophet {al-kadhibu muta 'ammidan j i  
hadïth rasül Allâh), Whereas tlie forger in tlie first instance can regain his 
‘adâla by repentance, in the second case his 'adâla can never be 
reestablished.^^
As a tool of Sunnï Hadïth criticism, dabt is no less important 
than 'adâla. On the contrary, both are of equal importance and are given 
almost the same space in the works on Hadïth sciences. Al-Khatîb al- 
Baghdâdî argues that knowledge of the dabt of tiansmitters can only be 
attained by specialists (al-khâssa) while knowledge of ‘adâla can be 
attained by lay people (al- 'âmmd) (which contradicts some of the views 
he put forwai’d about the role of the niiqqâd). The distinction between the
Al-Kliatïb al-Baghdadï,.4/-iQy^ya. p. 120
299-300
300-301
36
two criteria of 'ilin al-jarh wa- 'l-ta 'dll should be clear, however. 
Wliereas possessing ‘adâla denotes that the transmitter cannot be thought 
of as deliberately putting a false statement into the mouth of someone 
else, tlie Prophet in this case; possessing dabt denotes that the transmitter 
enjoys the mental and physical qualities winch make him not liable, or 
not likely, to err in transmission. In other words, dabt is concerned with 
the ability of a person to transmit and narrate accurately, and 'adâla with 
his reliability. There is a ftirther difference between the two. Wliile the 
absence 'adâla caimot be tolerated in a transmitter, the scholars of al-jarh 
wa- j-ta 'dll are much more lenient concerning tlie latter criterion in their 
assessment of the narrations involved. That is, if a transmitter of 
Prophetic traditions is foimd to be lacking 'adâla, all traditions with 
chains of transmission in which he appears are to be suspected, if not 
discarded, imless they are supported by similar traditions. However, if a 
transmitter is known to have suffered from mental lapses or deficiencies 
such as recurrent forgetfulness or confusing traditions and accounts, to 
mention but a few, tliis only lowers or degrades the soundness of the 
traditions narrated tlirough him. On tliis basis, the scholars of al-jarh wa- 
j-ta'dïl classified people according to their efficiency into different 
ranks. In fact they also classified people according to their 'adâla, and 
Ibn al-Salâh gives an account of such classification."^^ However, the 
classification here is not based on the degree of the 'adâla of transmitters; 
it is based on the degree of tmst that scholars have in the 'adâla of the 
tiansmitters.
40 Ibid., pp. 309-11
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Conclusion:
The concept of ‘adala as discussed so far clearly involves a process of 
legitimization. The transmitters are first legitimized by the ‘udala and it is 
the ‘adala of the transmitters that legitimizes their narrations. The process 
takes into account the liistories of individual transmitters.
The preceding examination of some aspects of ‘ilm al-jarh wa- j-  
ta ‘dïl has nevertheless revealed some problems. The first has to do with 
the ‘adala of the ‘udala. In a perfect world, we should have ‘udala whose 
‘adâla is certain. We will see if the Sunni scholars could produce such 
‘udala. The second problem is the disagreement on the ‘adala of a single 
transmitter and the disagreement on what constitutes a sufficient cause of 
jarh. It is generally held that ta ‘dïl does not have to be explained or 
justified. ‘Adâla, we can infer, is the normal case of anyone and they are ^  ^ /  
to retain it until they have committed what might deprive them of it. 
Moreover, that different people may have different criteria on what 
constitutes is acknowledged. This creates room for disagreement on 
the ‘adâla of any transmitter. In the following chapter we will see how 
these points are related to our investigation of the concept of the 
collective ta ‘dïl of the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions.
Chapter Three
A Chronological Analysis of the Sources*
This chapter investigates the concept of the collective ta'dil of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s Companions as discussed by the Sunnï sources. It 
aims to trace any development that the concept might have gone thiough 
since it started to appear in the Sunnï sources until it took the shape we 
Imow today.
To the best of my knowledge and on the basis of the available 
primary and secondary sources, no C. work of any kind referred to 
the concept of the collective ta'dil of the Companions or to the 
Companions as a privileged group in Islam. In the C,, a work
devoted to the virtues of the Companions (fadd HI al-sahàba) appears. 
This is the title of Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s (d. 241/855) work^ which he 
opens with a list of Prophetic traditions that prohibit the abuse and 
vilification of the “Companions.” In one of those traditions, the Prophet 
warns those who vilify the Companions that they are liable to God’s curse 
and punishments (“Upon him who insults my Companions is the curse of 
God and the Angels and all people. God will accept from him neither an 
excuse nor a ransom” (man sabba ashabi fa-'alayhi la'natu Hlahi wa- 
malà Hkatîhi wa- T-nàsi ajma 'in, là yaqbalu Hldhu minhd sarfan wa-ld 
'adlan)} In a second tradition, the Prophet associates love of him and of 
God with love of the Companions (“[fear?] Allah, [fear] Allah with 
respect to my Companions. Do not make them a subject of abuse after my 
death. He who loves them, does so out of his love of me. And he who 
hates them, does so out of his hate for me. And he who hurts them, hurts
 ^Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Kitab F adà’îl al-Sahâba. (Ed. Wasî-Allâh ibn Muhammad ‘Abbâs.) Al- 
Dammâm: Dâr Ibn al-Jawzï, 1999
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me. And he who hurts me, hurts God. And he who hurts God, then God is 
about to punish him” (allaha allaha f i  ashabt la tattakhidhUhum 
gharadan min ba'di. Fa-man ahabbahum fa-bi-hubbi ahabbahum, wa~ 
man abghadahum fa-bi-bughdi abghadahum, wa-man âdhâhum fa-qad 
àdhàni, wa-man âdhâni fa-qad àdhâ Hlàha, wa-man àdhà jlaha fa- 
yUshiku an ya 'khudhahu). In a thhd tradition, the Prophet explains why 
the Companions are not to be a subject of abuse: “Do not insult my 
Companions, for if one of you spent [by way of chaiity] what is equal to 
[mount] Uhud in gold, he would not equal their measure or [even] half of 
it” (la tasubbU ashabi, fa-law anna ahadakum anfaqa mithla uhudin 
dhahaban ma balagha mudda ahadihim wa-là nasifah). We should note 
however that no traditions unequivocally charging those who insult the 
Companions with unbelief are given. Only one tradition that praises the 
Companions is given (“My Companions are like the salt in food. Can 
food be good without salt?” (inna mathala ashabi ka-mathali H-malhi f i  
j-ta'ami, wa-halyafiuhu j-ta'àmu ilia bi-j-malhi?). After mentioning 
the traditions that are taken to refer the “Companions” as a group, Ibn 
Hanbal mentions traditions that refer to certain individual contemporaries 
o f the Prophet, starting with the merits of the four rightly-guided Caliphs. 
No definition of companionship (suhbd) is given. No Qur’anic verses are 
used and the root ‘adala does not appear at all.
Ibn ‘Abbâs is quoted here as saying: “Do not insult the 
Companions of Muhammad for God has enjoined asking [him] for 
forgiveness for them while he knew that they would fight [each other] (la 
tasubbU ashàba muhammadin fa-inna jlaha ‘azza wa-jalla qad amara
Ibid., vol. I, pp. 56-69
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bi-'l-istighflri lahum wa-huwa yajamii annahum sayaqtatilünd)C^ From 
tliis it can be inferred that the fact that some Companions fought each 
other was used by some people to justify abuse and vilification of the 
Companions. In siun, the fust work that deals with the “Companions” is 
primarily concerned with prohibiting the vilification of the Companions 
and the reason suggested for that vilification is the schisms in which the 
Companions were involved.
Al-Bulchârî (d. 256/870) and Muslim (d. 261/875) devoted chapters 
in their canonical compilations to the “virtues of the Companions 
(manâqib al-sahâba)T In al-Jâmi' al-SahJlfi, al-Bukliârî mentions two 
Prophetic traditions with different versions. The two traditions 
supposedly venerate the “Companions.” In the first one, tlie Prophet is 
reported to have said: “You will raid and it will be said [to you]: ‘did any 
of you see the Apostle?’ They will say: ‘yes,’ and it will be victorious for 
you” (taghzima fa-yiiqahi: hal fl-kum man ra ’â rasüla jlâhi? Fa- 
yaqülüna na'am, fa~yitftahu lakum.) In the second one, the Prophet says 
that “tlie best of people are those of my age, then those who follow them 
(in time), then those who follow them” (khayru ’l-qunmi qamJ thiimma 
'Idhma yaltmahiim thumma 'Idhma yalünahiim.Ÿ No definition of 
companionship is given. Al-BukliaxI also mentions traditions and 
accounts that refer to certain “Companions” in particular.
 ^ Ibid., p. 70. According to tiie text we have, the last word in tliis tradition can be read eitlier 
‘‘sayoqtiiliina (they nill kill)” or ‘^sayuqtahlna (tliey m il be killed).” The editor of Ibn Hanbal’s book 
left tills word unvoweled, probably intentionally. Neitlier reading does really seem to fit what tlie 
quotation seems to seek to establish. Tlierefore, it can be suggested tliat tliere was a textual corruption 
in tlie manuscript of tlie work and tliat tlie original word was ‘^ sayaqtatililm (tliey will fight each 
otlier), or "sayataqatalima (tliey will fight).”
Muhammad Ibn IsmgTl al-Bukliâiï. Al-Jâmi' al-Sahîh. Al-Qâlura: Matba'at Mustafa al-Halabî. 
1377H. (1957A.D.).
 ^Ibid.. vol. V, pp. 2-3
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In his Sahiffi Muslim mentions the same two traditions that al- 
Bukhari gives.’ Other traditions that allude to those who fought in the 
Battles of Badr and Uhud, and those who gave the pledge to the Prophet 
in al-Hudaybiyya {Bay 'at al-Ridwan) are also given. Muslim has also a 
section on “The prohibition of insulting the Companions of the Prophet,” 
in which he gives the same tradition used by Ibn Hanbal, where the 
Prophet prohibits the abuse of his Companions because no one would 
equal their merits.^ No definition of companionship is given here either, 
and the root 'adala does not appear.
Ibn ‘Abbas appears here too. In al-Jami' al-Sahïh in a section on 
“the virtues of Mu‘awiya,” al-Bukhârl gives a single but revealing 
anecdote. According to this, Mu‘awiya was seen by one of Ibn ‘Abbas’s 
clients making a mistake in the evening prayers. Ibn ‘Abbas’s client 
conveys the incident to his patron who says: “leave him: he had 
companionship with the Prophet {da 'hu, fa-innahu sahiba rasüla jlàhi; 
lit. he accompanied the Prophet).”  ^It is obvious that this saying seeks to 
establish a special status for Mu‘awiya as a Companion by excusing him 
for any mistake that he might have made. If the authenticity of this 
anecdote is to be acknowledged, it gives two possibilities. The first is that 
Ibn ‘Abbas’s client did not know that Mu‘awiya was a Companion. The 
other possibility is that Ibn ‘Abbas’s client did not know that being a 
Companion confers a special status. In both cases, this anecdote does 
more harm than good to the final Sunnï version of the collective ta 'dïl. 
Both possibilities show that some of the ideas of that version were not 
universally known to the early generations of Muslims.
 ^Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj al-QushayrI Sahih Muslim. Al-Qahira: Malctabat al-Mashhad al-Husaynî, n.d. 
Uô/i/., vol. IV, pp. 183-6 
U W ., vol. IV, p. 188
 ^M-B\Mim^,Al~JâmV al-Sahih, vol. V, p. 35
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Also in the C., Ibn Qutayba al-Dînawarï (d, 276/890)
compiled his Ta'wTl Miikhtalif al-Hadïth}^ Here he mentions a tradition 
that the “rowq/icZ” (an eaiiy Shi‘T sect) use to chai'ge all except six of the 
Prophet’s Companions with kufr (unbelief). According to this tradition, 
the Prophet tells his Companions that some of them will, on Doomsday, 
seek his basin [to drink from it] and will be kept away from him 
(layaridanna ‘alayya j-hawda aqwœnun thumma layukhtalajunna diint). 
The Prophet will then appeal to God on behalf of his Companions and 
God will tell him that he, the Prophet, does not know what they did after 
his death. They kept turning back on their heels after he left tliem (fa- 
aqidu yâ rabb: usayhâbï usayhâbf fayuqâlu 17, innaka là tadrJ mâ 
ahdathü ba'dak. Innahum lam yazàlü miirtaddïna 'alâ a'qâbihim 
mundhu Jâraqtahum)fi To tliis Ibn Qutayba replies Üiat by a caieftil 
reading and imderstanding of the tradition, which he seems to accept as 
genuine, it can be imderstood that the tradition refers to only a few of the 
Prophet’s Companions. If the Prophet had been alluding to all of them, he 
would have spoken directly to liis Companions and would not have used 
tlie third person speech. In addition to this, the Prophet uses tlie 
diminutive form of the word ashabi which constitutes additional 
evidence that the Prophet did not mean all of his Companions.^’ Ibn 
Qutayba points out here that it was well known that some of the Prophet’s 
companions in his wars were hypocrites and doubters, and he also gives 
examples of those who apostatised after the death of the Prophet, pointing 
out that God Himself talked about the hypocrites in the Qur’an. Those are 
tlie ones who are kept away from the Prophet, he explains. Nevertheless,
Ibn Qutayba al-Dmawarî. Ta ’wïl Miikhtalif ai-Hadîthyî al-Radd 'alâA ‘dâ ’ al-Hadïth. Al- 
Qâliira.Maktabat al-Mutanabbl. n.d.
" Ibid.. p. 157 
Ibid.. p. 157
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he says, the Qur’an also talked about God’s satisfaction with people who 
witnessed some events with the Prophet. God would not be pleased with 
people who go astray upon the Prophet’s death, he adds.^^
It is significant that Ibn Qutayba does not question the authenticity 
of the tradition but seeks to interprets it in a way that would restrict its 
reference to a few of the Prophet’s Companions. Moreover, he does not 
argue that those to whom the Prophet refers were not among his 
Companions, which means that Ibn Qutayba had no problem with 
accepting that some of the Prophet’s Companions were not only not 
W m/, but were also hypocrites and unbelievers. In this context he 
mentions a Qur’anic verse that alludes to the hypocrites. Nowhere later 
do we see any reference to this kind of verse.
The first work in the 4^VlO^ C. to talk about the Companions is al- 
Ash‘arl’s (d. 324/935) creed al-Ibana ‘an Usui aUDîyàna^^. Giving a list 
of the articles of faith, al-Ash‘arI states: “and we are devoted to the love 
of the ancestors whom God chose to accompany his Prophet and we 
praise them in the way God praised them and we affiliate with all of them 
{wa-nadînu bi-hubbi 'l-salqfi 'lladhlna ikhtàrahumu llahu ta ‘âlà li- 
suhbati nabiyyihi wa-nuthm ‘alayhim bimà athnâ ’llahu ‘alayhim wa~ 
natawallahum ajma‘m )r  Al-Ash‘arl then declares his acknowledgment 
of the legitimacy of the first four Caliphs and the wrongfulness of killing 
'Uthman. He also declares his acknowledgment that the Prophet testified 
that ten Companions were destined for paradise. He concludes this part 
by saying: “and we affiliate with all the Companions of the Apostle of
'"/Wc/., pp. 158-59
Abû al-Hasan al-Ash‘ai*r. Al-Ibàna ’an Usül al-Diyâna. (Ed. ‘Abbâs Sabbâgh.) Al-Qâhira: Dâr al- 
Nafô’is, n.d.
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God, and we keep silent on what took place among them {wa-natawalla 
sà 'ira ashâbi rasüli 'llàhi wa-nakiiffu 'ammâ shajara baynahum).''^^^
No definition of companionship is given by Al-Ash'arl, nor is there 
any reference to 'adala or ta ‘dll. As a creed, al-Ibana presents its article 
of faith in the form of dogmas and does not quote either Qiir’anic verses 
or Prophetic traditions. Wliat the relevant article of al-Ash‘aiTs creed 
tries to establish as a sound attitude towards tlie Companions is: first, 
having love for them; second, affiliating with “all” of them; and thhd, 
abstaining from discussing what took place among them; i.e., the scliisms 
they were involved in. The transition from tlie C. to tlie 4*/10^^
centuries is clear here. In tlie 3^ /^9  ^ century tlie main concern was to 
prohibit abusing the Companions; the 4^710^  ^century sought to establish 
love for and affiliation with them.
hi his Taqdimat al-Ma'rifa^^, Ibn Abi Hàtim al-Râzî (d. 327/938) 
begins by representing tlie rules of 77;?? al-jarh wa- 1-ta 'dîL He classifies 
the transmitters of Prophetic traditions into different ranks according to 
tlieir reliability and accuracy. He then refers to tlie “Companions” and 
starts his very brief discussion of their status as Hadlth transmitters by 
enumerating their merits. The “Companions” were the ones who 
witnessed tlie revelation and had knowledge of its exegesis and 
interpretation. They were also chosen by God to accompany the Prophet 
and to support him and his message. Thus, tliey were made exemplary 
models for the subsequent Muslims because they were the ones who saw 
the Prophet, knew from liim what God enjoined and forbade, and loiew 
the interpretation of the Book, Ibn AbT Hâtim concludes. God, tlierefore.
Ibid.. pp. 38-9
Ibn Abr Hatiin al-Razi. Taqdimat al-Mo'rifa li-Kitab al-Jarh w a-’l-Ta'dfl. Hydarabâd: Dâ’irat ai-
Ma‘ârif al-Islaniiwa. 1952
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venerated all of them by ruling out the possibility^^ of any doubt, lying, 
mistaking, or innuendo from their side (The Arabic text reads: ^^fa-nafa 
‘anhumu 1-shakka wa-'l-kadhiba wa-l-ghalata wa-1-rîbata wa-'l- 
ghamz.y^^ He also called them “ ‘udüîu Ibn Abï Hâtim refers
to a single Qur’anic verse in this context: “Thus We have appointed you a 
middle nation (ummatan wasatan) that ye may be witnesses against 
mankind {li-takünü shuhadà'a ‘alà %nàs\ and that the messenger may 
be a witness against you” (II, 143).^  ^ Ibn Abl Hâtim points out that the 
Prophet explained that "‘wasatan" in this verse means “ ‘adlan" a point 
for which he gives no reference and on which we will comment below. 
What should draw our attention here is that the Companions are seen as 
not only ‘udül according to the technical meaning of the term (refer to 
chapter two), but were also considered unsusceptible to error in 
transmission.
Ibn Abï Hâtim’s account is the first where a meaning of the root 
""adala" appears. Although no definition of companionship is attempted 
here, the account seems to seek to establish one point: that the 
“Companions” are irreproachable transmitters of the Prophetic Hadlth. 
This is done by establishing the legitimacy of the Companions on the 
basis of their many virtues, and by the unequivocal declaration that the 
Companions are not only reliable transmitters, but also free from 
committing mistakes in transmission. (This last point, the ruling out of 
the possibility that the Companions were liable to error, is never to appear
Ibid.  ^vol. I, pp. 6-7. For a comprehensive analysis o f Ibn Abï Hâtim’s contribution to Hadlth 
criticism, see E. Dickinson’s The Development o f  Early Sunnite Hadlth Criticism: The Taqdima o f  Ibn 
A bï Hâtim al-RâzL Leiden: Brill, 2001
“«q/a ‘anhumT Juynboll translated this as “immunized them against” (Juynboll, Muslim Tradition, 
p. 195) which, besides being a wrong usage o f the English verb, gives a different sense of the sentence.
Ibn Abï Hâtim, Taqdimat al-Ma‘ârif vol. I, p. 7 
"^/W .,voL I,p .7
Roman letters between par entheses refer to the number' of Qur’ânic suras (chapters), Arabic 
numerals to the numbers of ayas (verses).
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again in the subsequent sources. However, in view of the fact that the 
belief in the collective ta'dfl of the Companions was taken as the 
guarantee of the genuineness of the Qur’an and the Sunna; i.e., as tlie 
guarantee of the preservation of the whole religion, there is every reason 
to suggest that is was always assiuned in the subsequent writings about 
the concept of collective ta ‘dfl.) The only basis of tliis perception of the 
Companions as Hadlth transmitters is tlie Qur’ânic verse quoted above 
and no mention of ijma ‘ is foimd here. Wliat we should also note in this 
account is that the first employment of the root “ dddla" as far as tlie 
Companions are concerned was in association with the transmission of 
Prophetic Hadlth.
A word must be said here about two Qur’ânic verses tliat have 
come to play a significant role in the foiiniilation of the concept of 
collective ta ‘dïL These are: “Thus We have appointed you a middle 
nation {ummatan wasatan), tliat ye may be witnesses against mankind (/z- 
takunü shiihadâ 'a ‘alâ 'l-nâsi), and that the messenger may be a witness 
against you” (II, 143); and “Ye aie die best community {kimtiim khayro 
ummatin) that hath been raised up for mankind” (III, 110). (Hereafter, the 
first verse will be referred to as die ""ummatan wasatan" verse and the 
second as die ""khayra ummatin" verse.)
The Qur’ânic verses diat the Sunni soiuces adduce to buttress the 
concept of the collective ta ‘dll of the Companions are of two kinds: 
general ones that do not explicitly refer to a particulai' person or group, 
and verses with specific references. The two verses quoted above are of 
the first kind, probably the only ones of the first kind, and are the most 
commonly cited ones. ""Ummatan wasatan" in Qur’an II 143, and 
""khayra ummatin" in Qiu’an III 110, are key words diat the Simiil 
scholars employ to prove diat the collective ta ‘dXl of the Companions is
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rooted in the Qur’an. The word ""umma" in the two verses are taken by 
the Sunnï sources to refer to the Companions in particular, as we have 
seen in Ibn Abï Hâtim’s account and as we will see passim in this 
chapter. The word ""wasatan" in the first verse is also taken to refer to the 
‘adala of the Companions: it is interpreted to mean “ ‘adlan" as the root is 
used technically. In many accounts, the authors claim that these 
interpretations of the two verses are “agreed upon” by the mufassirün. 
Below are our findings after checking some exegeses {tafasïr).
When we check the earliest exegeses at our disposal—i.e. those of 
Mujâhid ibn Jabr^^ (d. 104/722), Muqâtil ibn Sulaymân^^ (d. 150/767), 
and Ibn Jarïr al-Tabarf'^ (d. 310/923),^^ we find no reference to the 
concept of collective ta ‘dïl in the context of the ""umatan wasatan" verse. 
In the exegeses of Mujâhid, Sufyân, and al-Tabarï, however, the word 
""wasatan" is interpreted to mean ""‘udülan"^^ (Actually, al-Tabarï 
himself only mentions this interpretation as one of the interpretations of 
the verse. However, he takes the word to refer to the middle point 
between two extremes: the exaggerated monasticism of the Christians and 
the exaggerated dereliction of the Jews.^^)
But regardless of how this word is understood and interpreted by 
the Qur’an exegetes, the significance of what the authors of these 
exegeses take the word ""umma" in the two verses to mean is more 
evident. It is a striking fact that in all the early Qur’ân exegeses there is 
an inclination not to acknowledge the restricted interpretation of the word
TafsJr Mujâhid ibn Jabr, (Ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Abû al-Nîl.) Al-Qâhiia: Dm al-Filcr al- 
Islâmî, 1998
TafsJr Muqâtil ibn Sulayman. (Ed. ‘Abd Allah Shihata). Al-Qâhira; Mu’assasat al-Halabl, n.d. 
Muhammad ibn Jarîr al-Tabari. Jâmi ' al~Bayân ‘an Ta 'wïl Ay al-Qur’ân. Al-Qâhira: Maktabat 
Mustafa al-Halabî, 1954
^  The debates over the authenticity or otherwise o f some of these exegeses are beyond the scope of 
tliis paper.
Tcfsir Mujâhid ibn Jabr, pp. 25,38; TafsJr al-TabarJ, vol. II, p. 7 
Ibid., p. 7
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""umma" in these two verses. The ""umma" in these verses is not taken to 
refer to the Prophet’s Companions in particular. Rather, it is taken to refer 
to all the subsequent generations of the Islamic umma since its inception 
until the Day of Resurrection. The Companions are not given a privileged 
status in this respect.^^ Moreover, in the inteipretation of the ""khayra 
ummatin" verse, tlie continuity of their [whoever tlie verse refers to] 
being “imconditionally best” for ever is not granted. In one of the 
manuscripts of Mujaliid’s tafsTr, being “best” is made dependent upon the 
condition of “enjoining the good and forbidding the evil.”^^  The same 
opinion is ascribed to ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab in al-Tabari’s exegeses.In  
other words, the idea is not put in categorical terms.
It might be expected that these verses would be interpreted 
differently in later Sunnï exegeses, when the concept of collective ta ‘dfl 
had matured and been established as an article of faith in Sunnï Islam. 
Surprisingly enough, this is not the case. We do not find even a faint trace 
of the concept of collective ta'dll in the interpretations of these two 
general verses, hi Ibn Katlhr’s exegesis^\ a prestigious and authoritative 
late Simnï exegesis, no reference is ever made to the concept of collective 
ta ‘dll. The verses are still explained in general tenns as in the early 
exegeses. Ibn Katliïr explains the ""ummatan wasatan" verse in light of 
the preceding verse in sura II which changes the direction of the Qibla for 
the Muslims. Ibn Katliïr explains that wasatan here means “tlie best” and 
that God simply says that he has changed the Qibla for the Muslims to 
make them the best of people. The interpretation of wasatan to mean
111 Ms TafsJr, vol. HI, p. 43, al-Tabari, however, gives one interpretation according to wliicli tlie 
reference in the ‘'immiatan-wasatair verse is to tlie MuhajirCm in particular. Even tliis interpretation is 
inconsistent witli tlie Sunnï understanding tliat extends tlie reference to include all the Companions. 
~^ TafsJr Mujâhid, p. 257 
^  Jami ‘ al-Bayan, vol. Ill, p. 44
Abû al-Fidâ’ Ismail ibn Katliïr al-QurasliI. TafsJr al-Our'an al-'AzJm. Al-Qaliira: Dâr Ihyâ’ al- 
Kutub al-'Arabiwa. 1950
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32‘adlan is also given with the same prophetic tradition/ As for the 
""khayra ummatin" verse, Ibn Katliïr rejects tlie restriction of the reference 
in the verse to the Muhajinm and argues tliat the reference is general to 
the Islamic umma {al-umma al-muhammadiyya)?^
The absence of any reference to the concept of collective ta ‘dfl in a 
late Sunnï exegesis like Ibn Katliïr’s, especially in the context of these 
two verses is significant. Even if it could be argued that the concept was 
still in its beginnings when a relatively late “early” scholar like al-Tabarï 
compiled his exegesis, tliis cannot be the case with a work as late as Ibn 
Katliïr’s. Accounting for this is beyond the scope of this paper. It could 
be tentatively suggested, however, that the exegetes might have found 
that this concept would vitiate one of their foremost goals: to prove die 
generality and applicability of the Qur’ânic texts to all people, 
everywhere, and at all times. Now we can go back to our sources.
A third 4^711^  ^C. work is Abû Ja‘far al-Tahâwî’s (d. 341/952) al- 
‘AqJda al-Tahawiyya?'^ A mention of the “Companions,” who are never 
defined, is given here in a brief passage wliich reads: “and we love the 
Companions of the Apostle of God, and we do not exceed in loving one 
of them, and we do not dissociate from any of them. We hate him who 
hates them, and who mentions them without goodness. We do not 
mention them except with goodness. Loving them is belief and faith and 
acting well (towai'ds them), and hating them is imbelief and hypocrisy 
and acting wrongfully (towai'ds them) {wa-nuhibbu askaba rasüli 'llâhi 
wa-Iâ nufritu f i  hubbi ahadin minhum, wa-lâ natabarra’u min ahadin 
minhum, wa-mibghidu man yubghiduhum, wa-bi-ghayri ’l~khayri
Ibid., vol. I, p. 190 
Ibid.. vol. I, p. 391
Ibn Abl al-‘Izz al-Dimashqu ‘All ibn ‘All. Shark al- 'AqTda al-Tahmvivva. (Eds. ‘Abd AUali al- 
Tnrla and Sliu‘ayb Amâ’ût). Baymt; Mu'assasat al-Risala. 1997.
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yadhkuruhum, wa-lâ nadhkuruhum illâ bi-khayrin, wa-hubbuhum dînun 
wa-ïmânun wa-îhsânun, wa-bughduhum kufrun wa-nifaqun wa- 
tughyànun)"^^
This creed obviously seeks to define the proper attitude to the 
Companions as a middle way between, on the one hand, execrating and 
dissociating from them, which is associated here with unbelief and 
hypocrisy, and, on the other hand, loving them excessively. The implied 
reference to the Khawarij and Shï‘a is also very obvious. The sound 
attitude as defined by al-Tahâwî is to speak only of their [the 
Companions’] good deeds, which implies that one would find what one 
needed should one decide to speak otherwise. For the first time, a link 
between attitudes towards the Companions on the one hand, and faith and 
unbelief on the other, is made explicit.
In the opening of his Târïkh al-Sahâba alladhïna Ruwiya ‘anhum 
al-AkhbâP^, Ibn Hibbân (d. 354/952), after quoting the Prophetic 
tradition in which the Prophet allegedly says that the best of ages was his, 
comments that “the best of this umma are the Companions of the Apostle 
of God who accompanied him and supported him, and sacrificed their 
lives and money for the sake of attaining God’s pleasure, that is to say, 
the Muhâjirün and the Ansar^ and those others who believed in him and 
believed him [the Muhâjirün and the Ansâr^ (khayru hâdhihî j-ummati 
ashâbu rasüli jlâhi alladhïna sahibühu wa-nasarühu wa-badhalü 
anfusahum wa-amwâlahum ibtighâ'a mardâti jlâhi mina j-muhâjirïna 
wa-j-ansâri wa-man âmana bihi wa-saddaqahu min ghayrihim)"^^ In 
his Kitâb al-Majrühîn min al-Muhaddithïn w a-j-D u‘qfa' wa-j-
Ibid., p. 218.
Ibn Hibbân al-Bustî. Târïkh al-Sahâba alladhïna Rimiya ‘Anhum al-Akhbâr. (Ed. Büi'ân al- 
DannâwL) Bayrüt: Dâr al-Kutub al-Tlnilyya: 1988.
^Ubid, p. 23
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Matrükîn^^, Ibn Hibbân argues that “those who witnessed the revelation 
and accompanied the Apostle, abusing them is not [religiously] legal, and 
disparaging them is against faith, and degrading one of them is very 
hypocrisy; as they are the best people after the Prophet {wa-ammà man 
shahida j-tanzîla wa-sahiba j-rasüla, fa- j-thalbu lahum ghayru 
halàlîn, wa-j-qadhu fihim diddu j-ïmàni, wa-j-tanqïsu U-ahadihîm 
nafsu j-nifaqi, li-annahum khayru j-nasi qarnan ba ‘da rasüli jlàh)"  He 
moves on to say that the fact that the Prophet trusted them with what had 
been revealed to him by God, should be sufficient for not disparaging 
them, because the Prophet would not have done so and would not have 
asked them to transmit from him, unless he had considered them reliable 
and acceptable as witnesses {sàdiqüna jà  jzü j-shahàda)?'^ After that he 
mentions an anecdote according to which ‘Umar, the second Caliph, 
prohibited and punished some Companions for excessively narrating from 
the Prophet. Ibn Hibbân argues that ‘Umar was not suspecting the 
Companions. In order to deter people from carelessly narrating about the 
Prophet, ‘Umar, in fact, wanted to make it clear for other people who 
were not equal to the Companions in reliability that narrating ft om the 
Prophet was a serious matter, Ibn Hibbân explains."^^
Ibn Hibbân’s works belong again to the works concerned with the 
transmission of the Prophetic Hadlth. Again the legitimacy of the 
Companions as Hadlth transmitters is being established here, yet this is 
done now by counting mainly on a Prophetic tiadition and the good deeds 
of the “Companions” during the lifetime of the Prophet. Reference to the 
sTra of the Prophet is also made and Ibn Hibbân strives to prove that the
Ibn Hibbân al-Busti. Kitâb al-Majrühîn min al-Muhaddîthîn wa-’l-I)u‘qfa’ wa-’l-Matrükln. (Ed. 
Muhammad Ibrâhïm Zâyid.) Halab, Dâr al-Wâ‘T, 1980
Ibid., p. 34 
"° Ibid., pp. 35-8
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Prophet considered the Companions ‘udüL He also strives to prove tliat 
‘Umar, by prohibiting the Companions from frequently narrating from the 
Prophet was not in fact casting doubt on their ‘adala. Associating the 
veneration of the Companions with faith, and vilifying them with 
imbelief, is also reiterated here.
Towards the end of the 4^ 710^  ^ C. Abu al-Hasan al-Dârqutnï (d. 
385/996) compiled a work entitled Fada'il al-Sahâba wa-Manâqibuhum 
wa-Oawl B a‘dihim f i  Ba'd^^ (i.e. The Merits o f the Companions and their 
Virtues and Their Sayings about Each Other). Wliat has survived of this 
work, according to the editor of the book, is only a small fragment of the 
original, which seems to have been of considerable length (the fragment 
that we have is supposed to be chapter 11 of al-Dârqutnï’s original 
work)."^^  This extant part of the work starts with a number of sayings 
ascribed to ‘Alï ibn Abï Tâlïb—the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law and 
the fourth Caliph—in which he praises both Abû Bakr and ‘Umar. In one 
of those sayings, ‘Alï, when asked about a garment he used to wear very 
often, replies that it was given to hmi by his brother and intimate friend 
‘Umar (the Arabic reads: ""akhJ wa-sadlql wa-safiyyT—and in other 
accounts wa-khalTlT—‘Umar.”)"^  ^ Tlie second part talks about tlie sayings 
of ‘Alï’s descendants about Abu Baki* and ‘Umar. To many Shï’ï  Imams 
are ascribed statements that praise and venerate the first two Caliphs.
Al-Dârqutnï’s work, as the title itself reveals, seeks to prove that 
the Companions maintained high opinions of each other. The focus of the 
part we have is on Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Alï. The book obviously 
responds to Shï’ï accoimts of ‘Alï’s alleged insinuations against the first
Abû al-Hasan al-Dârqutnï. Fadâ'il al-Sahâba wa-Manâqibuhiun. Al-Madma: Maktabat al- 
Ghurabâ’ al-Àtliaiiyya, 1998 
Âl-Rabbâh, Muhammad ibn Kbalrfa in the “Introduction” to Al-Dârqutnï's Fadâ 'il al-Sahâba >ra- 
Manâqibuhum. p. 6
Ibid.. p. 38
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two Caliphs and it should be understood against the background of the 
Shfï claim that Abû Bakr and ‘Umar usurped ‘All’s right to succeed the 
Prophet.
In the two earliest works on the Hadlth sciences—those of al- 
Râmhui'muzî (d. 360/971) {Al-Muhaddith al-Fasil bayna al-Râwî wa-j- 
and al-Hakim al-Nîsàbûiï (d. 405/1014) (Ma‘rifat ‘Ulüm al- 
Hadlth^^)—no reference to the concept of the collective ‘adâla of the 
Companions is given. Al-Râmhurmuzî only mentions the “Companions” 
to note that some of them were known by their father’s or grandfather’s 
names."^  ^ Al-Hakim, however, mentions the maràtib (ranks) of the 
Companions, According to him, the Companions are classified into 12 
ranks, the first of which comprises the early converts, whereas the last 
consists of the children who saw the Prophet on the day of the conquest 
of Mecca and during the Farewell Pilgrimage."^^
The fact that the two earliest works on the Hadlth sciences that 
have reached us do not mention the ‘adala of the Companions, which had 
already been mentioned by Ibn AbT Hâtim, is significant. It suggests that 
the link between attitudes towards the Companions and the ‘adala of 
Hadlth transmitters was not yet well established and generally 
recognized. Al-Hàkim al-Nîsâbürl’s account, however, can be taken as 
the first attempt to address the problem of the definition of 
companionship. The 12* rank of Companions that he mentions suggests 
that he thought that companionship could be established by the mere 
m 'ya  (sight) of the Prophet. This means that the first appearance of
^Ubid, pp. 47-96
Al-Hasan ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmân BSmhxmnu'a. Al-Muhaddith al-Fasil bc^na al-Râwî w a-j-W â‘î. (Ed. 
Muhammad ‘Ajjaj al-KhaGb.) Al-Qâhira: Dâi’ al-Fila’, 1984 
Al-Hâkim al-Nïsâbûi'î. Ma'rifat ‘Ulüm al-Hadîth. (Ed. Al-Sayyid Mu‘azzam Husayn.) Al-Qâhira: 
Maktabat al-Mutanabbî, n.d.
Al-Muhaddith al-Fâsil, pp. 180-1 
Ma 'rifat ‘Ulüm al-Hadîth, pp. 22-24.
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'adula was in a work on Hadïtli tradition, and the first attempt to define a 
Companion (prefeiTing a definition that would incorporate thousands of 
people imder the term) was also made by a Hadlth scholar.
Simnî scholarship on tlie Companions in the first four centuries of 
Islam can tlius be smnmarized as follows: a keen interest to proliibit the 
vilification of the Companions (who are never explicitly identified) 
followed by a more positive attitude towards them by enjoining love of 
and affiliation with them. Hati'ed towards and dissociation from the 
Companions were seen as tantamoimt to imbelief. Abstaining fi'om 
discussing the schisms tliey got involved in was also recommended. 
‘Adula appears once in a work on Hadlth sciences and is used to refer to 
tlie ‘adala of the Companions as established by God and the Prophet, or 
by the Qur’an and Sunna. The link between the ‘adâla of the Companions 
and their role as Hadlth transmitters is also made clear. No reference to 
ijma ‘ is made.
In the 5* /ll*  we have an abundance of works that talk about the 
Companions. The first of these is ‘Abd al-Qaliir al-Baghdâdî’s (d. 429- 
1037) heresiograpliical work Al-Farq bayna al-Firaq"^  ^ in which he also 
states his creed. He says in a chapter entitled “our saying about the 
righteous ancestors of the umma" tliat “tlie ahl al-sunna have agreed^^ on 
tlie faith (Imân) of the Muhâjirün and the Ansar, in opposition to the 
claim of the Rqflda that the Companions reverted to imbelief (kafarat) 
when they declined fi'om giving the bay‘a to ‘All, and [in opposition to] 
the saying of the Kamiliyya (a khârijJ sub-sect) to tlie effect of charging 
‘All with unbelief when he abstained from fighting them [the
‘Abd al-Qaliir al-Baghdàdï. Al-Farq bayna al-Firaq. (Ed. Miihairanad Muhyî al-Dîn). Al-Qâliira: al- 
Maktaba al-'Asri^ya, n.d.
The Arabic reads '"ittafaqüF Later he says tliat tliere is "inifaq'' among tlie Sunnis, which we 
translate hereafter as agreement. ''IJnia and ""ajma'd' are not used here at all.
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Co m pan ion s ] .H e  then adds that agreement was also achieved on the 
point that those who apostatized after the death of the Prophet were not of 
tlie Muhajinm—a term which only refers to those who migrated before 
the conquest of Mecca, he explains—or the Ansar. Agreement was also 
achieved that those who witnessed [the battles of] Badi' and Uhud and 
Bay‘at al-Ridwan in al-Hudaybiyya are in paradise. The ahl al-sunna 
have also agreed, he adds, to charge witli imbelief anyone who accuses 
any of the ten Companions whom the Prophet had promised paradise 
{wa-qâlü bi-tal<flri kulli man akfara wahidan mina 7- ‘asharati jladhJna 
shahida lahiimu 'l-nabiyyu bU 'l-janna)j^ In a following chapter entitled 
“On God’s protection of the ahl al-sunna from charging each other with 
unbelief,” he says tliat God has restrained die ahl al-sunna from speaking 
ill of the ancestors of the umma or disparaging them {wa-qad ‘asinia 
jlâhu ahla j-simnati min an yaqûlü Ji asldfi hâdhihi 'l-ummati 
munkaran, aw yaVanü fihim ta ‘nan). They, consequently, do not say 
anything but good about the Muhâjirün, die Ansar, the people of Badr, 
Uhud, Bay‘at al-Ridwan, to all of whom the Prophet testified paradise, 
and his wives. Companions, childien and grandsons.
‘Abd al-Qaliir al-Baglidâdî’s work is the first to refer to an 
“agreement” by die ahl al-sunna as regards the Companions. The 
agi'eement is first on the “faith (Iman)" of certain groups of the Prophet’s 
contemporaries, and the second is on charging anyone who vilifies the 
groups of the Prophet’s contemporaries to which he alludes with imbelief. 
The fii'st point of agreement suggests that die wide definition of 
companionship introduced by al-Hakim was not yet widely loiown or
‘Abd al-Qaliir al-Baglidâdï. al-Farq bavna al-Firaq. p. 359
Ibid., p. 359
Ibid.. p. 360 
'U W ..p p . 361-2
56
accepted. The contemporaries of the Prophet who are given a special 
status in this account are only those who witnessed certain events with 
him, not all who had the chance to see him. ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdâdî 
seems indeed unaware of the attempt to give all the contemporaries of the 
Prophet a special status. Unlike al-Hakim, who classified those 
contemporaries in ranks but seems to have granted all of them the title of 
companionship, al-Baghdâdï seems to strive to clear the histories of 
certain groups of contemporaries in particular. For example, an attempt to 
make a clear distinction between the Muhâjirün and those who 
apostatized upon the Prophet’s death is made by restricting the definition 
of Hijra (the Muhâjirün are only those who migrated before the Conquest 
of Mecca; the definition which found a tradition to support it^ )^. Ahl al- 
sunna^ we are told, are protected by the grace of God from speaking evil 
of those people.
The second 5* /ll*  C. work is Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr’s (d. 463/1071) al~ 
IstVâb f i  M a‘rifat al-Ashâb^^. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr introduces his 
biographical dictionary with a discussion of the importance of the 
Prophetic Sunna and its role in understanding the Book of God.^^ One of 
the ways by which the Muslims know about the Sunna of the Prophet, Ibn 
‘Abd al-Barr explains, is to know the biographies of those who narrated it 
from the Prophet; i.e., the Companions. “The ‘adâla of all of them has 
been confirmed by God’s and the Prophet’s praising of them (thabatat 
‘adâlatu jamVihim bi-thanâH jlâhi ‘azza wa-jalla ‘alayhim wa-thanâj
The h aditions is: “There is no migi ation after the Conquest [of Mecca], but [onlyjy/harf and intention 
{là hijrata ba'da T-fathi wa-lakinjihâdtm wa-niyyd)". For a discussion on a possible puipose that this 
h aditions was supposed to establish, see M. Cook’s Early Muslim Dogma, p. 100, where he aigues that 
“the concern of the h adition, in short, is to absolve the Meccans of the stigma of living in the city that 
the prophet had left.” By emphasizing that the term ‘‘MuhâjirürC only applies to those who migrated 
before the Conquest o f Mecca, al-Baghdâdî seeks to exonerate the Muhâjirün o f any possible 
abandonment of Islam after the deatli o f ftie Prophet.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr. Al-Isiï‘âb f i  Ma'rifat al-Ashâb. (Ed. ‘All Muhammad al-BajawT.) Al-Qâliira: 
Maktabat Nahdat Misr, 1958.
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rasülihi ‘alayhi j~salâin)f he states/^ Ibn ‘Abd al-Baix also states that 
tlie Companions are “the best generation” and the “best commimity that 
has been raised up for mankind” in a reference to a Prophet tradition and 
a Qur’ânic verse (the khayra ummatin verse)
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr does not directly address tlie issue of the 
definition of companionship, but he seems reluctant to put all the 
contemporaries of the Prophet on an equal footing. He says, after quoting 
a Qur’ânic verse tliat praises “those who aie with him [i.e., Muhammad]” 
(Qur’ân: XLVIII, 29), “tliis is tlie sign of those who hastened to believe 
him and believe in him, and who backed and supported him, and who 
(stuck to him) and accompanied him. This does not apply to all who saw 
him or to all who believed in him {""fa-hâdhihi sifatu man bâdara ilâ 
tasdïqihi wa- ’l-ïmâni bihi wa-âzarahu wa-nasarahu (wa-lasiqa bihi) wa- 
sahibahu, wa-laysa kadhalika jamJ‘u man ra'ahu wa-lâ jamJ'u man 
àniana bi-hi").^^ Some Qur’ânic verses and Prophetic traditions are then 
presented, most of which refer to specific groups of the Prophet’s 
contemporaines in specific situations (e.g. those who took part in the 
Battles of Badr and Uhud and tlie Bay‘at al-Ridwan in al-Hudaybiyya). 
A verse of no specific reference is also adduced and Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 
quotes earlier interpretations that give eitlier restricted or unrestricted 
meanings to it.^  ^ A keen and a rather lengthy interest is shown here in 
identifying the nmnbers of the Prophet’s Companions in each event. At 
the end of his account, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr says that the Muslims have no
Ibid., vol. L p. 1 
Ibid., vol. L p. 2 
Ibid., v o l t  p. 1 
^  Ibid.. v o l t  p. 2 
Ibid.. vol. I. p. 11
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need to scrutinize the Companions as transmitters because of the ijmâ ' of 
""ahli 'l-haqqi mina 'l-miislimm" tliat all of them aie
The fact that Ibn ‘Abd al-Ban' starts his biographical dictionary, the 
first work in the second half of the 5* /ll*  C, with a discussion of the 
importance of the Prophet’s Sunna, and links this to the study of the 
biographies of the Companions, suggests diat by his time interest in the 
Companions as Hadlth transmitters was well-established. The link is also 
made here between the Sunna and the Qiu’an. Like ‘Abd al-Qahir al- 
Baghdâdï, he shows a special interest in certain groups of the Prophet’s 
contemporaines.
In accordance with his reluctance to put all the Companions of the 
Prophet on equal footing, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr quotes some earlier authorities 
to argue against the wide or die imconditional interpretation of the 
""unimatan wasatan verse.” Ibn ‘Abbâs is quoted as saying that the verse 
refers to the Muhâjirün in particular. The Tafslr of Mujâhid, which makes 
the verse conditional as we seen before, is also cited,^  ^This may be taken 
to mean diat Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr was against die widening of the definition 
of companionsliip to include all the contemporaries of the Prophet. In Ibn 
‘Abd al-Barr, we encoimter for the first time an ijma ‘ that is linked with 
die root ‘adâla. The ijma‘ of ahl al-haqq here is on the ‘adâla of the 
Companions.^"*
The diird 5*/10* C. work is al-Kijaya f i  ‘Ilm al-Riwâya^^ of al- 
ICliatib Al-Baghdâdî who discusses the concept of the collective ta ‘dJl of 
die Companions at some length. He aigues diat all the transmitters in a 
chain of transmission are to be scrutinized except die Companions, who
Ibid.. vol. I. p. 19 
Ibid.. vol. I, p. II 
Ibid.. vol. L p. 19
Al-Kliatïb al-Baghdâdî. f i  'Ilm ai-Riwaya. Bayrüt: Dâr al-Kutub al-TImi\ya. 1988
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have been declared ‘udül by God and his Apostle. Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, 
he refers to many Qur’ânic verses and Prophetic traditions. In two of 
these traditions the issue of disagreement among the Companions {ikhtilàf 
al-sahabd) is addressed. In the fnst tradition, the Prophet is reported to 
have said: “I have asked my Lord about what my Companions [will] have 
disagreed on after my death, and God has revealed to me: ‘O Muhammad. 
Your Companions for me are like the stars in the sky, some of which are 
brighter than the others. Whosoever takes something of their 
disagreements is guided in my sight” {sa ’altu rabbi fi-ma ikhtalafa fi-hi 
ashàbï min ba ‘dï, fa-awha jlâhu ilayya: yâ muhammad, inna ashabaka 
Hndï bi-manzilati j-nujümi fi-  j-samâ j, ba ‘dihâ adwa 'u min ba ‘din. fa- 
man akhadha bi-shay Hn mimmâ hum ‘alayhi min ikhiUafiMm, fa-huwa 
‘indi ‘alâ hudâ.) The second tradition reads: “Whatever you are given in 
the Book of God, you should do it, and none of you has any excuse for 
leaving it; if it is not in the Book of God, then from a valid sunna of mine; 
if there is no valid sunna of mine, then [follow] what my Companions 
have said. Verily! My Companions aie like the stars in the sky. 
Whichever of them you follow, you will be guided. Their differences are 
mercy for you” {mahmâ ‘ütïtum min kitâbi llâhi f a - j - ‘amalu bihi lâ 
‘udhra li-ahadikum f i  tarkihi, fa-in lam yakun f i  kitâbi jlâhi fa-sunnatun 
mînnï mâdiyatun; fa-in lam takun sunnatun minnï mâdiyatun, fa-mâ qâla 
ashâbl inna ashàbï bi-manzilati j-nujûmi fi-j-sam â j, fa-ayyuhâ 
akhadhtum bi-hi ihtadaytum, wa-ikhtilâfu ashàbï lakum rahmatun.)
In a third tradition, the Prophet prophesies that among posterity 
will be people who speak ill of his Companions and he orders his umma 
to shun them or to have nothing to do with them. This tradition has it that 
“God has chosen me [the Prophet] and has chosen my Companions and 
has made them my relatives by marriage and my supporters. Towards the
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end of time will come a sect of people who speak ill of them. Do not 
many them, or give them your daughters in marriage. Do not pray with 
them, or pray over them [when they die]. Upon them the curse has fallen” 
{inna jlaha ïkhtàranï wa-ikhtâra ashàbï fa -ja ‘alahum ashàrï wa- 
j a ‘alahum ansârï. wa-innahu sayajï’u j ï  àkhiri j-zamâni qawmun 
yantaqisûnahum. Alà fa-lâ tunâkihühum, alà fa-lâ tunkihü ilayhim. Alâ 
fa-lâ tusallü m a‘ahum, alâ fa-lâ tusallû ‘alayhim. ‘alayhim hallati j-  
la ‘natu). Al-Khatïb concludes this chapter by quoting Abu Zur‘a [al- 
Râzî]—who was, it is worth noting here, Ibn Abî Hâtim’s closest friend 
and intellectual companion—who argued that he who speaks ill of any of 
the Prophet’s Companions is a zindïq, because the Companions are those 
who transmitted the Qur’an and Sunna to us. “They [only] want to 
disparage our witnesses in order to vitiate the Book and the Sunna. They 
are to be disparaged and considered zanâdiqa {wa-innama yurïdüna an 
yujarrihü shuhûdanâ li-yubtilü j-ldtâba wa- j-sunnata wa- j-jarhu bîhim 
awlâ wa-hum zanâdiqa) f  Abu Zur‘a explains.^^
As for the definition of companionship, al-Khatîb presents 
differing views that either restrict the definition of companionship or 
widen it. Al-Khatîb’s own attitude is ambivalent: he quotes earlier 
authorities who gave quite differing definitions of the term. On the one 
hand, he adduces a linguistic analysis to the effect that companionship 
(suhba) refers to the case when someone accompanies another, be it for a 
long or a short time. On the other hand, he says that it is the habit of the 
umma not to use suhba except when referring to a long or frequent 
companionship. This is how it should be used, he ifwa-ma ‘a dhâlika fa- 
qad taqarrara li- j-ummati ‘urfun f i  annahum là yasta ‘milüna hâdhihi 7-
66 Ibid., p. 49
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tasmiyata illâ fl-mân kathiirat suhbatuhu."^^ “However,” he adds, “the 
transmission of an honest and reliable man from him [the Prophet] is 
acceptable and acted on, even if his [the honest and reliable man’s] 
companionship was not long, and even if he heard no more than a 
tradition from him (""wa-iiia'a hâdha fa-inna khabara ’l-thiqati 'l-amlni 
‘anhii maqbfdim wa-ma‘mûlim bihi, wa-in lam tatul siihbatuhu, wa-lâ 
sami‘a minhti illâ hadïthan wâhidan."Ÿ^ The last point al-Kliatïb 
addresses is how the companionship of a Companion is to be recognized. 
He says that the first way is the concurrence of reports to that effect 
(tazahiir al-akhbâr bi-dhâlik). The second and tlie tliird is the testimony 
of a reliable person that he is a Companion, or the testimony of another 
Companion that he is such.^^
Before quoting tlie fierce attack of Abû Zur‘a on those who used to 
disparage tlie Companions, al-Kliatîb says tliat some innovators {ahl al- 
bida ‘) have argued that the condition of the Companions (hâl al-sahâba) 
was satisfactory until they engaged in war and mutual shedding of blood. 
Those events, they argued, led to their losing then ‘adâla. Therefore, the 
innovators add, tlie transmitters from amongst tliem must be scrutinized 
to distinguish those who remained ‘udül from those who did not. To this 
al-Kliatîb responds that no one among the righteous scholars says 
anything about those events tliat cannot be reinterpreted or imderstood as 
a matter of ijtihâd, like the disagreements among tlie jinists to which their 
ijtihâd in problematic matters leads them {j"wa-laysa f t  ahli j-dfni wa-'l- 
miitahaqqiqma bi-'l-‘ilmi man yasrif ilayhim khabaran mâ là yahtamihi 
naw‘an mina 'l-ta'wTli wa-darban mina 'l-ijtihâdi fa-hiim bi-mathâbati 
’l-miikhtaliftna mina 'l-fiiqâha 1. 'l-mujtahidina f i  ta ‘wlli 'l-ahkâmi li-
Ibid.. p. 51 
Ibid.. p. 51 
Ibid.. p.51
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ishkâli 'l-amri wa-iltibàsih). Al-Kliatïb then adds that the condition of the 
Companions should remain satisfactory as it was originally, because 
nothing has been proven that calls to change that ()"wa-yajibii an yakünü 
‘alâ 'l-asli 'l-ladhT qaddamnâhu min hâli 7- ‘adâlati wa- ’l-ridâ, idh lam 
yathbiit mâ yiizllii dhâlika ‘anhiim")?^
Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Bair’s, Al-Kliatib Al-Baglidâdî’s own stance on 
the issue of the definition of companionship is ambiguous, although it 
represents tlie first genuine attempt to define the tenn. Al-Kliatib, we can 
safely say, was tlie first scholar who presented all the possible definitions 
of companionship with the weaknesses of each definition. Taken 
together, his and Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr’s accounts suggest that imtil the 5* /ll*  
C. no imiversal definition of companionship was agreed upon by the 
Simnî scholars. In complete opposition to Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Kliatlb 
argues tliat although the reference in the ""ummatan wasatan" verse is 
general, it is intended to be restricted [to the Companions] ( “wa-hâdhâ 7- 
lafzu wa-in kâna ‘âmman fa- 'l-murâdu bi-hi l-khâss. ") Put differently, 
both scholars are against the widening of the reference in the verse: but 
while Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr seems to be opposing the widening of the 
reference to include all the contemporaries of the Prophet (from wliich we 
can infer that he held that not all people who saw the Prophet are to be 
considered his Companions), al-KliatIb al-Baghdâdî seems to be 
opposing the widening of the reference to include all the subsequent 
generations of Muslims.
The issue of the ‘adâla of the Companions is also linked here with 
tlie preservation of the whole religion, not only tlie Simna, as suggested 
by al-Kliatîb’s quotation of Abu Zur‘a’s statement. Moreover, for the first 
time we have traditions that refer to the disagreements among the
■‘^ IbicL p. 49
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Companions. What is interesting about these traditions is their assertion 
that those disagreements constitute “mercy” to the umma., and that all the 
conflicting views and deeds of the Companions are valid and equally 
worthy of imitation. To the cursing of the first four centuries, exclusion 
and even a clear charge of unbelief are added here to the condemnation of 
those who vilify and abuse the Companions.
Al-Khatib al-Baghdâdï’s refiitation of the argument of the 
innovators is worth commenting on here. What we can understand from 
this passage is that al-Khatîb does not rule out the possibility that the 
Companions could have done something that might lead to their losing 
then ‘adâla. He simply argues that nothing of that sort was proven. What 
we know about them, he adds, can be either reinterpreted or explained as 
ijtihâd. Therefore, he concludes, we must stick to their original ‘adâla.
The last point to observe is: starting from al-Khatîb al-Baghdâdî, 
we notice an interest in detennining how the companionship of a person 
is to be established. Common knowledge (istifada) is the first criterion. 
The testimony of a person that he is a Companion, or the testimony of a 
well-known Companion that a certain other person is a Companion, are 
the second and the third criteria. Ibn Kathn adds to these narrating from 
the Prophet while being contemporaneous with him as we will see. In 
other words, anyone who narrates directly from the Prophet is considered 
a Companion if he is one of the contemporaries of the Prophet 
(contemporaneity is meant to exclude the Successors (tâbi‘ün) who 
narrated from the Prophet without mentioning the Companions from 
whom they got their narrations). Interest in this point may be due to a 
desire to account for the growing number of the Companions. The Sunnï 
scholars wanted to warn against considering common knowledge or the 
concurrence of reports the only criterion by which the companionship of
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a person is Icnown. However, no attempt is made to determine the number 
of Companions whose companionship was acknowledged by each 
method. Apart from common knowledge, which could hardly extend to 
more than a dozen of hundreds of people who were known to have 
actually lived in the same place with the Prophet, we do not know exactly 
how many people claimed to have been Companions. Eerik Dickinson 
points out that it might have been common for people to claim 
companionship, given the fact that this conferred upon them a number of 
benefits.^*
The third 5* /ll*  C. Sunnï work that addresses the concept of 
collective ta ‘dll is al-Juwayriï’s (d. 478/1085) Al-Burhan f i  Usui al- 
Fiqh^^. Al-Juwaynî, who does not address the question of the definition 
of companionship, starts his presentation of the concept of the collective 
ta ‘dll of the Companions with some Qur’ânic verses from which he 
understands that the Companions were declared ‘udül by the Qur’ân. The 
""khayra ummatin" verse is used here with the claim that the mufassirün 
had agreed {ittafaqa al-mufassirün) that it referred to the Companions of 
the Prophet. Like Ibn Abî Hâtim, al-Juwaynî does not provide any 
reference for this claim. He endeavors to refute the argument of those 
who, counting on the histoiy of the Companions, reject the concept, and 
those fuqaha ’ who used to make insinuations and allegations against 
some of the famous Companions of the Prophet (such as ‘Abd Allâh ibn 
‘Umar and Abû Hurayra). To this end, al-Juwaynî refers to the biography 
of the Prophet who, al-Juwaynî points out, used to count on his 
Companions to transmit his narrations and used to ask them about things
E. Dickinson. The Development ofEarly Sunnite Hadïth Criticism: The Taqdima ofIbn AbT Hâtim 
al-RâzT. Leiden: Brill, 2001, p. 123 
Abu al-Ma‘âlî al-Juwaynî. Al-Burhân f t  Usül al-Fiqh. (Ed. ‘Abd al-‘Az1m al-Dïb.) Qatar: Kulliyat 
al-Sharî‘a, 1399 H. (1979 A.D.).
Ibid., vol.II, p. 626
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he did not laiow; i.e., he had confidence in them.^ "* He also argues that the 
Prophet was aware of the existence of some hypocrites and that he named 
them to his Companion Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman. Al-Juwaynî does not 
explain how this last point contributes to his argument for the ta ‘dïl of the 
Companions by the Prophet, but he takes these last two points as decisive 
evidence that the Prophet, by word and deed, attested to the ‘adâla of his 
Companions .He then moves on to refute the allegations about Abû 
Hurayra, arguing that the fact that ‘Umar, who knew that Abû Hurayra 
used to narrate a lot from the Prophet, appointed him governor constitutes 
a proof that Abu Hurayra was considered a righteous man. As for Ibn 
‘Umar, al-Juwaynî is satisfied by saying that he was declared pure by 
Gabriel (zakkâhu jibrïlu) who said to the Apostle: “What a good man 
‘Abd Allah is (m ‘ma j-rajul ‘abdu jlah)\"^^
Al-Juwaynî then discusses in a form of catechism the arguments of 
those who use the histoiy of the Companions to disparage them. He says 
that they might argue that the Apostle’s praise of the Companions does 
not necessarily entail their immunity ( ‘isma) in the future and that some 
of them committed many lapses (ahdatha ba ‘duhum hanât) and many 
grave sins (wa-iqtahamu mübîqât\ the slightest of which suffices to deny 
them ‘adâla. To this, al-Juwaynî replies that if this argument were to be 
lent credence, the door would be opened wide to disparage all the 
Companions of the Prophet; and this is veiy serious and dangerous, he 
e x p l a i n s . H e  then argues that whenever someone disparages a 
Companion whom he does not like, and is faced by a disparaging remark 
about the Companion he likes, he resorts to interpreting the deeds of the 
Companion with whom he affiliates in good faith {""fa-sayantahidu 7-
’’Obid., vol. II, p. 628 
Ibid., vol. n , p. 628 
Ibid., vol. II, p. 628
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tà ‘mu li-hamli mâ ‘ürida bi-hi ‘alâ mahâmil f i  'l-jawâzi wa-tahsmi 7- 
zann"). This will lead, al-Juwaynî adds, to a number of contradictory 
opinions, none of wliich is necessarily better than the others. If 
reconciling them is not possible, al-Juwaynî argues, all of them should 
fall together and the Companions aie to retain their original ‘adâla 
attested to by God and the Prophet.
This last point will be of great importance for oin understanding of 
the concept. Equally important is the second question in which the 
imagined opponent argues that since immimity is restricted only to him 
who was sent [by God] (i.e., die Prophet), and since the condition of the 
Companions oscillated [between good and evil], then this requires that we 
refrain from bestowing ‘adâla on them because oscillation is inconsistent 
with a definite verdict f"ghâyatiikiim hamlukum mâ nuqila min 
hannâtihim ‘alâ wiijühin miimkinatin f i  'l-Jawâzi, wa-lastum qâti ‘ma bi- 
hâ, bal wâfaqtum ‘alâ annahii lâ yajibii ‘ismatu ghayri 'l-mursali ‘alayhi 
j-salâm, fa-idhâ taraddadat ahwâliihiim fa-l-yaqtadi taraddiiduhâ 
[wîiqûfan] ‘alâ ta ‘dïlihm, fa-inna 'l-îaradduda yunâqidu j-hukma 7- 
bâttaT'f'^ Before responding to this, al-Juwaynî points out that this 
argument, being based on mere satisfaction witii the suspension of 
judgment, constitutes a retraction from the explicit disparagement of the 
Companions initially proposed by the opponent, which adds frirther 
evidence for its invalidation.^*  ^ To refrite the last point, however, al- 
Juwaynî says diat the ijmâ ‘ is enough to invalidate it. “The umma has a 
consensus,” he explains, “diat refusal to bestow ‘adâla on all the 
Companions of die Prophet is unacceptable {fa-inna 'l-ummata
Ibid., vol. II. p. 629 
Ibid.. vol. II, p. 630 
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mujmVatun ‘alà annahu lâ yasüghu j-imtinâ‘u ‘an ta ‘dîl jamVi ashâbi 
rasüli jlâht)"^^ In addition to this, al-Juwaynî says that this point would 
require abstention from bestowing ‘adâla on all those who contributed to 
the schisms and abstention from transmitting from any of them. This, 
again, contradicts “the creed of the umma and the consensus of the 
scholars (wa-hâdha bâtilun min dïni j-ummati wa-ijmâ ‘i j-ulamâ 7),” al- 
Juwaynî states.^^ The role of ijmâ ‘ is made very clear here and what this 
ijmâ ‘ determines—that refrising to bestow ‘adâla on all the Companions 
is impermissible—is significant. Al-Juwaynî concludes that God has 
allowed that ijmâ ‘ because the Companions were the transmitters of the 
sharVa^ and if their transmissions were questioned or rejected, the sharï‘a 
would not extend to subsequent ages upon the Prophet’s death.
Al-Juwaynî’s account suggests a mind that is more argumentative 
than literalist, and this argumentativeness of his mind may enable us with 
to understand what the Sunnï scholars really meant by the concept of 
‘adâlat al-sahâba. The main focus of al-Juwaynî is obviously on the 
schisms in which the Companions took part. After adducing evidence 
from the Qur’an and the biography of the Prophet {sira) to assert that the 
Companions were considered ‘udül during the lifetime of the Prophet, he 
turns to the opponent who challenges the concept. A close reading of the 
debate makes it clear that the debate is about the status of the 
Companions after the Prophet’s death. That the Companions might have 
done what the opponent is saying is not rejected here at first. What al- 
Juwaynî is arguing is that since we cannot be certain o f what happened, 
we have to suspend judgment on their ‘adâla after the Prophet’s death 
and stick to their original ‘adâla. The opponent’s view is that doubt about
vol. II, p. 631 
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what took place should make us abstain from bestowing 'adàla on them 
rather than applying ta'diL This is refuted on the ground that we have 
certainty about their original ‘adala, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
that we have an ijma‘ that has sanctioned this [al-Juwaynï’s position]. 
The ijmà ‘ here is on “the impermissibility of abstaining from bestowing 
"adala on the Companions.” That ijmà \  al-Juwaynl adds, was facilitated 
by God because of the hazai’dous consequences for religion that not 
trusting the Companions would certainly lead to.
The C., we can conclude, gives a rather different
presentation of the issue of the collective ta ‘dîl of the Companions. First 
of all, by establishing a link between the ‘adala of the Companions and 
trust in, not only the Sunna, but also the Qur’an (i.e. the whole religion), 
the concept has begun to assume a serious position in Sunni scholarship, 
although no fixed definition of companionship seems to have been settled 
yet. Second, a growing concern about what happened among the 
Companions in the decades following the Prophet’s death is also very 
evident. Contrary to the general attitude of the first five Hijri centuries, of 
preferring not to discuss what happened, the scholars of the 5^ /^11*^  ^ C. 
sought to broach the subject, to reinterpret those events, and to have their 
say on them. The strategies used were either to adduce Prophetic 
traditions that refer to the disagreements among the Companions and 
legitimize them, or to argue that accounts of those events which cannot be 
interpreted as a matter of ijtihâd are not accurate and, therefore, should 
not be taken to challenge the original ‘adala o f the Companions which is 
rooted in the Qur’an. Nothing was proven, so to speak, that called for 
reviewing the original ‘adàîa of the Companions.
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Now to the 7^ V13^  ^C. when Tzz al-Dîn ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1233) 
compiled his Usd al-Ghâba ff  Ma'rifat al-Sahaba^'^^ which he introduces 
by pointing out the need for his work: since the testimony of an unknown 
person (majhiiP) is unacceptable, and this rule applies to the Companions 
as he makes clear, it is vital to know the names of the Companions and 
their biographies. Knowing the Companions, he points out, is vital 
because they are tlie transmitters of the Prophetic traditions which, 
together with the Qur’an, represent the pillais of dispensation {al- 
shan'a). Since many compilers before him had differed on a number of 
issues related to tlie Companions, such as their names and their number, it 
was important to compile a work that gives a tliorough accoimt of the 
Companions of the Prophet.^^
Ibn al-Athlr then gives a niunber of definitions of 
Companionship.^^ His own position is not very clear. However, and 
despite some evidence to the contrary, the fact that he starts his 
discussion with definitions that restrict the tenn to the few people who 
actually resided in the same place as the Prophet for some time, can be 
taken to mean that he was in favour of this kind of restricted definition. 
Ibn al-AthIr does not argue for the belief that all the Companions were 
‘iidid, which he sees as too well known to be repeated.
To our disappointment, Ibn al-Atlnf’s account, which we expected 
to be much more thorough in view of his dictionary’s reputation as tlie 
most comprehensive work on the biogiaphies of the Companions, does 
not tell us much about the “Companions” as a group with a special status 
in Sunni Islam. Neither does it endorse what we have concluded about the 
5^Vl l^C., nor does it contribute to the development of the concept.
Uzz al-Dîn ibn al-Atlnr. Usd al-GhabaJiMa ‘Hfat al-Sahaba. Al-Qahira; Dâr al-Slia'b, 1970 
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^  Ibid., vol. I, pp. 18-9
70
At almost tlie same time, al-Ainidî (d. 631/1233) compiled his al- 
Ihkam Jt Usiil al-Ahkàm^^ where he adduces much linguistic evidence to 
support a wide definition of companionship (i.e. a definition that would 
encompass all those who saw tlie Prophet). This, he adds, is the belief of 
all scholars .He also argues that the majority of scholais have agreed on 
tlie 'adâla of the Companions. He mentions the opinion of other scholars, 
some of whom argued that the Companions remained 'iidid imtil they 
engaged in disagreement and schisms and thus they aie to have their 
'adâla scrutinized. Otlier scholars said that all those who fought against 
'All, the legitimate ruler in their view, are fiissaq (evildoers) and their 
narrations and testimony are to be discarded accordingly. To other 
scholars is ascribed the opinion that the narrations and testimony of both 
parties—i.e. 'All’s party and other parties—are to be discaided because 
one party of them was fasiq, but we are in no position to identify wliich. 
Otlier scholars, however, argued that since tlie original state (as/) of the 
Companions is ‘adâla, and we can only have doubt about the fisq of 
either side, we should accept tlieir naixation.^^ These last two opinions are 
identical with the opinions laid down by al-Juwaynî and liis opponent: 
while al-Juwaynî’s opponent argues that our doubt about the Companions 
maintaining their ‘adâla should prevent us from accepting them as 
transmitters and witnesses, al-Juwaynl argues that oiu certainty of the 
original ‘adâla of tlie Companions cannot be ovenailed by doubt about 
their/zsg
Al-Âmidî himself accepts and defends the opinion which he 
ascribes to the majority of scholars. Here he relies on the ^\unmatan 
wasatan'^ and '^khayra uinmatirC  ^verses and on the tradition in which the
Ibid., vol. I. p. 10
^  Sayf al-Dîn Abu al-Hasan al-Âinidî. Al-Ihkâm Jî Usiil al-Ahkâm. Bayrut: Dâr al-Fikr. 1997 
^  Ibid., vol. I, p. 255
71
Prophet says that God has chosen him and his Companions, and made 
tliem his supporters and relatives by marriage. “God’s choice cannot be 
for one who is not ‘aJ/,” he says. The service that the Companions gave 
for the victory of Islam, he continues, affirms their ‘adâla It is tlie duty 
of all Muslims, therefore, to see the schisms in the best possible way. 
Both parties were acting according to their ijtihâd and thought that what 
they were doing was for the best of Islam and the Muslims, he explains.
Ibn al-Salah (d. 643/1245), gives us in liis Miiqaddima^^, a 
lengthy and well organized accoimt of the Companions. He starts his 
discussion of tlie collective ‘adâla of the Prophet’s Companions by 
presenting a disagreement among the scholars about the definition of 
companionship. Ibn al-Salah distinguishes between two main attitudes 
concerning tliis point: that of the traditionists and Hadlth scholars {ahl al- 
hadfth), and that of tlie scholars of the principles of jurisprudence (al- 
lisüliyyün). For ahl al-hadfth (the traditionists), any Muslim who saw the 
Prophet is considered a Companion and he is to be treated accordingly. 
The usUliyyUn (the scholars of the principles of jurisprudence) on the 
other hand argued that since tlie word “companionship” refers, 
linguistically spealdng, to a relationsliip that lasts for some time, then a 
Companion of the Prophet is one who sat with the Prophet several times 
and received knowledge from liiin. '^  ^ The well-know successor (tâbV) 
Sa'îd ibn al-Musayyib held that only those who lived with the Prophet for 
a year or two, or fought in one or two of the Prophet’s battles, were his 
Companions. Ibn al-Salah refutes tliis opinion on the groimd that, if 
authorized, if would lead to the exclusion of some well-known
^  vol. I. p. 254 
Ibid., vol. I, p. 254 
Ibid., vol. I, p. 255
TaqT al-Dîn ibn 'Ainr ibn ‘Utlimân ibn al-Salah. Muqaddimat Ibn al-Salah. (Ed. ‘À’isha ‘Abd al- 
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Companions.^^ He does not, however, comment on the story that when 
Anas ibn Malik, a Companion himself, was asked whether there were 
Companions still living, he replied that only some people who had seen 
the Prophet were still living, but none of his Companions was there
96anymore.
The companionship of a person with the Prophet can be 
acknowledged by four ways, says Ibn al-Salah. The first and the second 
are al-tawàtur (unquestionable knowledge) and al-istifada (common 
loiowledge), the former being based on a larger number of people than 
the latter. The third is the testimony of one of the Companions. The 
fourth is the testimony of the person himself that he is a Companion. This 
is acceptable from him only after his ‘adâla has been attested, Ibn al-
Salah adds.^^
All the Companions, Ibn al-Salah states, share a common merit: 
their ‘adâla is not to be questioned. In his opinion this was a settled point 
since their ‘adâla is secured by the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the ijmâ‘ of 
those members of the umma whose ijma ‘ is to be considered (bî-ijmâ ‘i 
m anyu‘taddu bi-hifl 1-ijmâ‘î mina 1-umma). Three Quranic verses and 
one fradition are adduced to substantiate this conviction. As for the ijmâ 
Ibn al-Salah says that the ^^ummd^ has a consensus on declaring all the 
Companions—even those who took part in the schisms {fttan\ ‘udûl He 
says that God has evidently facilitated and allowed for this ijmâ ‘ to take 
place because the Companions are the transmitters of dispensation (al- 
sharVa)?^ This means that in addition to the testimony of the Qur’an and 
the Sunna to the collective ‘adâla of the Companions, the concept was in
Ibid., pp. 486-7 
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the interest of the whole umma because it is the guarantee that religion 
was properly transmitted.
In the 7^ Vl3*^  C. the definition of companionship seems to have 
been settled. The definition adopted by Ibn al-Salah is the one adopted by 
almost all later scholars. Companionship can be established by the mere 
sight of the Prophet (ruya). Ibn al-Salah, however, is very clear in 
distinguishing between the views of those who defined companionship 
differently. The questions that we could ask here are: Why was it in the 
interest of the Hadïth scholars and traditionists to widen the definition of 
companionship so that as many people as possible were included in it? 
And why was it in the interest of the juiists to tighten the definition of 
companionship and thus restrict the number of Companions? In addition, 
why did the Hadïth scholars win the day? The answers to these questions 
are beyond the scope of this dissertation and need a separate study.
What is also worth our attention in Ibn al-Salah’s account is his 
reference to the subject of ijmâ % He says that the umma has ijmâ ‘ on “the 
ta ‘dïl of the Companions,” including those who took part in the schisms 
because they think the best of them (ihsânan li- j-zanni bihim) and take 
account of their previous deeds. This is perfectly consistent with the ideas 
we put forward above in our conclusion on the C. The earlier
century’s introduction of the idea that there was some sort of divine 
intervention to allow the ijmà ‘ in order to preserve the religion is also 
reiterated here.
Another work of the 7^ Vl3^ ^^  C. is Muntahâ al-Wusül wa-l-Amal f i  
jlmay al-UsUl wa-l-Jadaf^, a work on usül al-fiqh by Ibn 'Amr 
'Uthman ibn 'Umar (d. 646/1248), widely loiown as Ibn al-Hajib. In this
Jamal al-Dm ibn ‘Aim* ‘Uthman (Ibn al-Hâjib). Muntahâ al-Wusül w a-l-A m alfi 'Ibnay al-Usûl wa- 
'l-Jadah (Ed. Muhammad al-Halabï.) Al-Qâhira: Matba‘at al-Sahàba, 1326 H. (1908 A.D.)
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account, a Companion is any contemporary of the Prophet who saw him. 
Two Quranic verses and one hadith are used to support die belief that all 
of the Companions were ‘iidUL As for the schisms in wliich the 
Companions took part after die death of the Prophet, diey are to be seen 
as ijtihâd, die legitimacy of which has been established by the consensus 
of the umma (wa-amma 'l-fitan, fa- ‘l-wâjib an tuhmala ‘alâ ijtihâdihim 
fa-lâ ishkâla ba‘da dhâlika li- ‘l-ijmâ‘i ‘alâ wujüb 'l-‘amal bi-j- 
ijtihâd)}^^ In other words, Ibn al-Hâjib justifies die early schisms by the 
right to exercise ijtihâd, and the role of ijmâ‘ here is to legitimize and 
authorize the use of ijtihâd. Ibn al-Hâjib’s accoimt confirms what we 
have concluded about Ibn al-Salâh’s work. The definition of 
companionship is the same and his attitude towards die schisms is also 
consistent widi Ibn al-Salâh’s.
In the 8^ 714^  ^ C. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) compiled his al- 
‘AqJda al-Wâsitiyya}^^ where he enumerates the articles of faith of ahl 
al-smma wa- ’l-jamâ‘a. According to Ibn Taymiyya, one of the principles 
of ahl al-sunna wa-l-jam.â‘a is die good attitude of dien lieaits and 
tongues in respect of die Companions of the Prophet Ç^wa-min usüli ahli 
'l-simnati wa-'l-jamâ‘ati salâmatu qidübihim wa-alsinatihim li-ashâbi 
rasüli 7 /# .”). Ahl al-sunna, Ibn Taymiyya adds, accept what the Book, 
the Sunna, and the ijmâ ‘ have established as to die merits and ranks of the 
C o m p a n i o n s . I n  a following passage he says that ahl al-sunna 
dissociate themselves fi'om the way of the Rqflda who execrate the 
Companions and vilify them (j^wa-yatabarra Tina min tarJqati j.-rawâfidi 
'lladhma yubghidima l-sahâbata wa-yasubbünahum.'"Ÿ'^^ Moreover,
p. 58
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they abstain from discussing what took place among the Companions. 
They maintain that narrations about the misdeeds of the Companions are 
either lies or distortions. As for any misdeeds tlie authenticity of which is 
proven, ahl al-sunna maintain that the Companions are excused because 
tliey were inujtahidün, whether the outcome of their ijtihâd was coixect or 
not Ç‘wa-yumsikûna ‘ammâ shajara bayna 7- sahabati, wa-yaqülüna 
inna hâdhihi 'l-âthâra 'l-inarwiyyata ft  masâwïhim minhâ mâ huwa 
kadhibun, wa-minhâ mâ qad zïda jt-hJ wa-naqas wa-ghuyyira 'an 
wajhihi, wa-l-sahJhu minhu hum ji-hi ma'dhünina immâ mujtahidüna 
musTbûna wa-immâ mujtahidüna mukhti 'ünaG) This does not mean, Ibn 
Taymiyya makes cleai*, tliat ahl al-sunna believe that each one of the 
Companions was immime from sin, whether minor or mortal. It is very 
possible that they committed all kinds of sins. Nevertlieless, Üieir past 
good deeds and their merits necessitate excusing tliem, if they had indeed 
committed sins. Moreover, ahl al-sunna believes that any of them who 
had committed a sin must have repented, or been forgiven on account of 
either his past good deeds or the intercession of tlie Prophet, especially 
since they were mujtahidün}'^^
A concern to justify the schisms in which the Companions were 
involved is thus very clear in Ibn Taymiyya’s work. Despite his statement 
that ahl al-sunna [should] abstain fr om discussing what took place among 
the Companions, he offers a succinct apology for those events arguing 
that reports of tliem were either lies or distortions, or tliat they were the 
outcome of ijtihâd. In case of ijtihâd, all the parties would be rewarded. 
As we can see now, the same ideas aie being repeated and later works 
offer hardly any novelty as fai* as our concept is concerned.
Ibid., p. 356
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In his Ikhtisâr ‘Ulüm al-Hadîth,^^^ Ibn Kathïr (d. 774/1372) 
opens his chapter on the Companions by defining a Companion as one 
“who saw tlie Prophet wliile being a Muslim, even if he did not 
accompany him for long, and narrated nothing from him (“wa- V- 
sahabiyyu [huwa] man ra 'à rasiila 'llâhi f t  hàli islâmi ’1-râwï, wa-in lam 
tatiil suhbatuhu lahii wa-in lam yarwi ‘anhu shay'any^ He adds that 
this is the opinion of the majority of early and late s c h o l a r s H e  also 
quotes an early scholar, whom he does not name, as saying “a day that 
Mu'awiya witnessed with the Apostle of God is better than 'Umar ibn 
'Abd al-'AzIz and his family ^fa-yawmun shahidahu mu'awiyatu m a'a 
rasüli 'llâhi khayrim min ‘uinara ibni ‘abdi 'l-'azJzi wa-ahli baytih)G^^^ 
He does not adduce evidence to support the concept and is satisfied with 
refeiTing to the praise of God and his Apostle for the Companions in the 
Qiu’au and the Sunna. Addressing what took place among the 
Companions after the death of the Prophet, Ibn Katlilr states that some 
events—such as the Day of the Camel—took place “imintentionally” ( 'an 
ghayr qasd), while others—such as the Day of Siffln—were out of 
ijtihâd. Ijtihâd is liable to be either sound or faulty, he adds. Those who 
erred are excused and rewarded, and tliose who were on tlie right side are 
rewarded twice, he adds. “'All and his companions were nearer to 
rightness than Mu'awiya and his companions, may God be pleased with 
all of them,” he concludes.
Ibn Kathïr then moves on to refiite the stances of other Islamic 
sects concerning the Companions. He ridicules the opinion of the 
Mu'tazila who argued that the Companions were ‘udül save those who
Ibn Katlîîr. Ikhtisâr 'Ulüm al-Hadïth. (Ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir asAI-Bâ'ith al-Hatlnth 
Shark Ikhtisâr 'Ulüm al-Haâîth.) Al-Qâlüra: Dâr al-Fikr. 2000 
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fought against 'A ll He mentions a tiadition that has the Prophet saying 
that his grandson—al-Hasan—was a master whom God would use to 
reconcile two great groups of Muslims (refening to al-Hasan’s abdication 
and the alleged subsequent reconciliation between the partisans of 'All 
and those of Mu'awiya).^^^ He also ridicules the Shï'ï belief that all the 
Companions became kuffar after the death of the Prophet except for 17 of 
them. Ibn Kathïr argues that this opinion is too vicious and prejudiced to 
be worthy of being refuted, citing the Companions’ merits and good 
deeds to further invalidate it.^^ ^
Ibn Kathïr then goes on to enumerate the different ranks of the 
Companions starting with the first fom' Caliphs in the order of their 
accession to power. He also quotes some early scholars on the number of 
the Companions, who, according to al-Shâft'ï, numbered about 60,000 
and according to Abu Zur'a al-Râzï 114,000 when the Prophet passed 
away. The issue of how the companionship of a person is to be known is 
also addressed and Ibn Kathïr says that there are four ways to attest that. 
The first and second are tawatur and istifada. The third is the testimony 
of another Companion. The companionship of a person can also be 
known if he narrates fi’om the Prophet while having been 
contemporaneous with him. There is a disagreement, however, on 
whether a contemporary of the Prophet, who is already known to be ‘adU 
and says “I am a Companion” is to be granted companionship. Ibn Kathïr 
quotes the opinion of a scholar that that person, albeit trustworthy, gives a 
legal verdict (hulm shar 7) here, and it is possible that he makes an eiTor
p. 127 
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in this/^^ By ‘‘hulon shar T  this scholar probably means the definition of 
companionship. These points will be commented on later.
Ibn Kathn does not add much to Ibn al-Salah’s account. The wide 
definition of companionship is adopted, and an attempt to account for the 
number of Companions is given accordingly (now they are as many as 
114,000).
In the 9*Vl5*^  C. Ibn Hajar (d. 852/1448) compiled his voluminous 
biographical dictionary, al-Isàba f i  Tamyïz al-Sahaba^^^^ which is 
entirely devoted to the Companions. Ibn Hajar opens this work by linking 
the study of the biographies of the Companions with the preservation of 
the Prophetic Sunna,* His definition of companionship is similar to that 
of Ibn Kathïr, but he adds a detailed refutation of other definitions and a 
discussion of the different views regarding the possibility of the jinn and 
the Angles being counted among the Companions.**^ The various ways 
by which a person acquires the title of a Companion of the Prophet are 
also the same. Ibn Hajar, however, is much more aware of the dilemma 
which someone’s testimony that he is a Companion creates. He says that 
the ‘adâla of a person who claims to be a Companion must be attested 
first before the acceptance of his claim, because if his ‘adâla is not 
known and his claim is accepted, the general ‘adâla of the Companions 
will extend to him, when he may not in fact be ‘adl. In other words, he 
would be like one who says: “I am ‘adF which is unacceptable for 
establishing ‘adâla. * *^
Ibn Hajar then asserts that ahl al-sunna have agreed that all the 
companions are ‘udûl. Here he quotes fi'om al-Baghdàdî’s al-Kifaya the
" U W ., p. 133
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Qiir’ânic verses and the Prophetic traditions tliat are taken to vindicate the 
concept, adding to them more traditions. In one of these, the Companions 
are put in a rank just after the prophets and messengers of God (“Verily, 
Allah has preferred my Companions to the two dependents (men and 
jinn) save the Prophets and the Apostles” (inna 'llaha ikhtâra ashâbî 
‘alâ 'l-thaqalayni siwà 'l-nabiyyma wa- 'l-imirsaïînj^^^
Ibn Hajar also quotes a scholar—one al-Mazm—who aigued that 
“when we [the scholars] argued that the Companions are 'iidiil we do not 
mean everyone who saw him [the Prophet] for a day or visited him for a 
short time, or met with him for a certain purpose and left; we mean, 
however, those who were close to him, who supported and backed him, 
and who followed the light tliat had been revealed to him.”**^  Ibn Hajar 
does his best to refute this idea and argues against the interpretations that 
restrict the Qiu’anic verses he quotes to certain gi'oups of Companions.**^ 
He also tries to prove that the concept was well-known in early Islam by 
mentioning an anecdote in which 'Umar abstains from pimishing a man 
when he knew that he had “companionship” with the Prophet. *^ °
To this century belongs also the Hadlth scholar Muhammad 'Abd 
al-Ralnnan al-Sakliâwî (d. 902/1496) who compiled a coimnentary on 
Zayn al-Din 'Abd al-RahIm al-'Iraql’s (d. 806/1403) Alfiyyat al-Hadïth. 
In Fath al-Miighïth^^^, al-SakliâwI defines a Companion as one who saw 
the Prophet. *^  ^ He then states that there is a consensus among ahl al- 
sunna tliat all of the Prophet’s Companions, those who plimged into the 
civil war included, were 'udûl. This stance is based on thinking of them
Ibid.. vol. I, p. 12117
" U W .,vo l.L p p . 10-11 
Ibid.. vol. L pp. 8-10 
Ibid., vol. I, p. 10
Abu ‘Abd Allali Muhammad al-Sakliaw, Path al-MughTth bi-Sharh Aljiyyat al-Hadîth. (Ed. 
Ridwan Jami‘ Ridwân.) Makka: Maktabat Nizar. 1999 
^-Ibid., vol. IV, p. 77
80
in good faith and on the basis of theii* many merits in Islam (wujuban li- 
husni j-zanni bihim wa-nazaran lima tamahhada lahum mina 7- 
ma'âthir min imtithàli awâmirihi ba'dahu sallâ jlâhu ‘alayhi wa- 
sallam)}^^ Al-Trâqî is cited here to quote approvingly a certain Ibn al- 
Anbarl, whom he does not identify, where the latter explains the position 
and logic of ahl al-sunna on this point. On this view, the ‘adala of the 
Companions does not entail their infallibility ( Hsma) and the 
impossibility of their committing a disobedience. It means, as Ibn al- 
Anbârî points out, only that their naixations are to accepted without 
putting their ‘adâla to the test. Verifying their ‘adâla would be necessary, 
he adds, only if it were proven that any of them had committed what 
would vitiate his ‘adâla. This, thank God, has not been proven, he says. 
Therefore, we continue to accept their condition during the time of the 
Prophet until the contrary is proven (fa-nahnu ‘alâ istishâbi mâ kânü 
‘alayhi f i  zamâni rasüli ‘llâhi hattâ yathbuta khilâfuhu). No '^serious 
attention is due to what historians have mentioned about the Companions 
because [generally speaking] it is not true, and what is ti'ue can be 
reinteipreted, he explains.* '^*
The prolific scholar of the 10^ Vl6^ *^  C., Jalal al-DTn al-Suyûtî (d. 
911/1505) wrote a commentary on the Taqrïb of Muhyî al-Dîn al- 
Nawâwî (d. 676/1277). In Tadrîb al-Râwïfi Shark Taqrïb al-Nawâwf^^, 
al-Suyütï reiterates the widest definition of companionship, considering 
all those who saw the Prophet as his Companions. Two verses are 
employed to vindicate the belief in their collective ‘adâla. Al-Suyütï then 
mentions various opinions on the ‘adâla of the Companions. According
Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 93-4 
vol. IV, p. 101
125 Jalâl al-Dîn Abu al-Fa^ al-Suyûti. Tadrîb al-Râwî f l  Sharh Taqrïb al-Nawâwï. (Ed. Ridwan Jami‘ 
Ridwân.) Maldca; Maktabat Nizâi*, 1997 - .
^^^jbid., vol. in, p. 842
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to one opinion, attributed here to the Mu'tazila, all the Companions are 
‘udül except those who fought against 'A ll On another view, all those 
who fought against each other lost their ‘adala as a result. Al-Suyütï 
rejects these views on the basis of good faith and considering their deeds 
after the death of the Prophet as ijtihâd for which all of them are 
rewarded (jhsànan li- j-zanni bihim wa-hamlan lahum f l  dhâlika ‘alâ 7- 
ijtihâdi j-m ajürifîhi kullun minhum)}^^
In light of the forgoing discussion of the souices it is possible to 
construct the mature Sunnï discourse on the issue of collective ta ‘dîl as 
follows. The Companions are all those people who saw the Prophet even 
if they could not speak to him. Knowing who those people are is crucial 
because it was they who transmitted the sharVa (taken in the wider, non­
technical sense) to the subsequent generations of Muslims. Their ‘adâla 
is established by the Qur’an and Sunna. There is an ijmâ ‘ among posterity 
on either the impermissibility of abstaining fi'om bestowing ‘adâla on the 
Companions (al-imtina ‘ ‘an al-ta ‘d ïl\ or the duty to bestow the ‘adâla 
(wujüb al-ta‘dïî). This attitude derives its legitimacy fiom the certainty 
that the Companions were declared ‘udül by God and the Prophet, and the 
uncertainty whether the subsequent events in which they participated 
constitute a sufficient reason for reviewing their original ‘adâla. On this 
last point, the proper attitudes towards those events are either to refi'ain 
fi'om discussing them, or thinking the best of the participants in them and 
in light of their original ‘adâla (by arguing that they were either lies or 
distortions, or the outcome of ijtihâd). That attitude towards the 
Companions, the Muslim scholars maintain, has been facilitated by God 
because of the seriousness of the issue to the whole religion.
127 Ibid., vol III, p. 846
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Resorting to the Qur’an and Sunna to vindicate the concept of the 
collective ta ‘dîl of the Companions is not surprising. Almost all early 
sects of Islam argued that the Qur’an was the source of all their 
conflicting legal and theological beliefs. Therefore, most of them used the 
Qur’an as a justification for their dogmas. However, since it was always 
possible to find at least one Qur’anic verse to count on to vindicate a 
belief, the fabrication of Prophetic traditions was almost unavoidable. 
Indeed, this phenomenon is admitted by most Sunnï scholars and it was 
this fact that inspired them to develop many methods of Hadïth criticism 
and verification in the hope that this might halt or at least curb the 
proliferation of fabricated traditions.
The doctrine of the collective ta'dfl of the Prophet’s Companions 
was no exception. The Sunnï scholars counted on a number of Qur’anic 
verses and many Prophetic traditions to vindicate it. Some of those verses 
and traditions are of general reference and those are the ones we mainly 
referred to in our discussion of the sources. There are however a number 
of verses with specific reference. These refer to specific groups of the 
Prophet’s contemporaries. One verse, for instance, refers to “those who 
are with” the Prophet (XLVIII, 29). Another refers to those “of the 
believers” who “follow” the Prophet (VIII, 64). Some verses make 
explicit reference to the Muhàjirün and/or the Ansar (IX, 100; LIX, 8-10; 
LVI, 10-12). One verse refers to those who gave the pledge to the Prophet 
in al-Hudaybiyya (ILVIII, 18). The same can be said about the Prophetic 
traditions, some of which allude to certain Companions who participated 
in significant events of the Prophet’s time. While this last group of verses 
and traditions may seem insignificant in the context of arguing for the 
concept of the “collective” ‘adâla of (all) the Companions, their use by 
the Sunnï scholars must have had certain motives. Later, we will see that
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the Sunnï scholars were keen to prove that the Qur’an attests to the 
original ‘adâla of those Companions who were accused by other sects of 
losing it when they participated in the schisms. In view of the fact that 
most Companions who participated in the schisms after the death of the 
Prophet were among those re&rred to by these Qur’anic verses, it can be 
argued that the use of these verses, even if arbitiary, is not pointless. The 
wider the definition of companionship became, the greater was the need 
for verses with no specific reference.
Conclusion
What we can conclude ftom this chapter is that the root of the Sunnï 
attitude towards the Companions, finalized in their concept of their 
collective tadf[ is to be found in the differing views on the Companions 
resulting from their involvement in the early schisms. That the early 
Muslims were disturbed by what took place among the Companions and 
had to shape views concerning those events, is natural. It is only likely 
that some of them would not shrink ftom openly insulting and cursing 
some or all of the participants, while others either abstained from judging 
them on the basis of those events or sought to excuse the events and the 
contributors thereto.
That the earliest traditions on the Companions are mainly 
concerned with the prohibition of insulting the Companions suggests that 
the Sunnï attitude towards the Companions was initially shaped out of 
opposition to that vilification. This meshes well with Juynboll’s ideas in 
this respect. The issue of ‘adâla in the earliest Sunnï writings on the 
Companions is almost absent, and the main focus is on the merits of the 
Companions, which also suggests that the concept was not initially
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introduced to serve some goal in Sunnï Hadïth criticism, as Dickinson 
has argued. This may have been only a later use of the concept.
A distinction between the case of the Companions before and after 
the death of the Prophet can be infened from a close scrutiny of the Sunnï 
sources. The Sunnïs accept it as a dogma that the ‘adâla o f the 
Companions duiing the Prophet’s life was proven by God and the 
Prophet. Basing the ‘adâla of Companions on the Qur’an and Hadïth may 
have been done consciously to solve the problem we raised when 
discussing ‘adâla as a tool in ‘Urn al-jarh wa- j-ta ‘dîl; i.e. who bestows 
‘adâla on the ‘udalal By basing the ‘adâla on the Qur’an and the Sunna, 
the Sunnï scholars ft-eed themselves ftom arguing for the eligibility and 
capability of those who bestowed the ‘adâla on the Companions. What 
the Sunnï scholars were striving to prove was that the Companions 
remained ‘udül after the death of the Prophet and did not commit what 
might have made them liable to jarh. This explains the fact that the Sunnï 
sources talk about both the ‘adâla as well as the ta ‘dîl of the 
Companions; the former being rooted in the Qur’an and the Sunna, while 
the latter is based mainly on the ijmâ ‘.
The Surmï sources were, it seems safe to suggest now, more 
concerned to argue for the ta ‘dîl of the Companions than for their ‘adâla, 
simply because the former will necessarily lead to the latter. Al- 
Juwaynï’s discussion of this point is very revealing. It suggests that since 
it is hardly possible to make a strong case against the Companions given 
the lack of strong evidence, either for or against, tlie sound attitude is to 
abstain ftom disparaging them. The same logic was reiterated by Al- 
Khatïb al-Baghdâdï in al-Kifaya and by Ibn al-Anbârï in Fath al- 
Mughîth. This argument contradicts the widely-accepted rule in Sunnï 
Hadïth criticism that if the jarh  and the ta ‘dîl happen to be ascribed
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simultaneously to someone, the former is be privileged—the point which 
al-Juwaym’s imagined opponent was in fact making. Nevertheless, this 
argument is well in agreement with another rule in Sunni Hadïth 
criticism, and in some schools of law, that everyone is ‘adl until proven 
otherwise. This is similar to the legal rule of al-istishab, found in some 
Sunnï schools of law, notably the Mâlikï school. This rule was 
unequivocally employed by Ibn al-Anbârï in his discussion of the 
Companions. If we apply this rule to our case the result would be that 
anybody retains his ‘adâla until proven otherwise. Al-Juwaynï counts on 
this last point, in addition to the ijmâ ‘ on the “prohibition to refuse to 
bestow ‘adâla on all the Companions” in order to refute the opponent. 
The ijma ‘ was needed to sanction this attitude, i.e. the ta ‘dll, which is to 
be understood here as not actively bestowing ‘adâla, but as abstaining 
from jarh.
But it seems that the Surmï scholars wanted to find a solution for 
the contradiction referred to above—the acceptance of ta ‘dîl while jarh  is 
to be privileged according to their theory of al-jarh wa- j-ta ‘dîl. It is also 
held in Surmï Hadïth criticism that one who disparages another has to 
produce evidence. That evidence may well be argued not to constitute a 
sufficient case for disparagement.*^^ This may explain the tendency of the 
Surmï scholars starting from the 5**Vl I**' C. to abandon the passive attitude 
of earlier scholars—who were of the view that it was better to refrain 
from discussing the early schisms—and seek actively to argue that what 
is narrated about the schisms was, for many reasons, not enough to alter 
the original state of affairs. What the Surmï scholars wanted to establish, 
in other words, is that the narrations about those events gives rise to at 
most doubt, and definitely not to certainty. Doubt, it is also generally held
128 See chapter two.
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in Sunnï jurisprudence, does not outweigh, and consequently cannot rule 
out, certainty. The 'adâla of the Companions which the Sunnïs believe in 
is thus the product of the process of ta 'dîl, and not primarily the 'adâla 
which, as they claim, is established by the Qur’an.
This should not be talcen to conflict with the fact that some works, 
some as early as the early 5^Vl 1^ C., state that there was an ijmâ ' on tlie 
'adâla. This can be explained as follows. First of all, 'adâla is a corollary 
of ta 'dîl. This does not mean that both are identical, as we have shown 
before, but it does allow their interchangeable use. If our understanding 
of Sunnï scholarship on the subject stands, tlien we can argue that it was 
not illegitimate for the Simnï scholars to say that there was an ijjyiâ ' on 
tlie 'adâla of the Companions, which the ta 'dîl has maintained. Secondly, 
tlie Sunnï scholars may be arguing tliat tliere was an ijmâ ' on tlie 'adâla 
of the Companions before tlieir participation in the schisms because this 
was what the Qur’anic verses were taken to attest to. Thirdly, we should 
not forget what that attitude was originally all about. The early Smmï 
scholars, who were already engaging in bitter polemics against other 
sects, were very keen to prove that the 'adâla of the Companions was 
inlierent in them. Arguing that the Companions were 'udül only because 
the umma have decided not to disparage them for the mere lack of 
evidence was a concession that was unlikely to be made in the midst of 
tlie battle. After the triiunph of ahl al-sunna in tlie late C., it was
possible and even necessary to put the concept in subtler tenns, and the 
inconsistencies had to be dealt with. The aim then was to purify the 
history of the Companions and clear their names after the Prophet’s 
death. Hence tlie interest in their biograpliies.
If this imderstanding of the beginning of the concept of the 
collective ta 'dîl of the Companions is accepted, it can be argued that the
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collective ta ‘dîl, or ‘adâla, of the Companions was not in fact a belief 
the early Sunnïs held as much as an attitude they adopted towards the 
Companions. The Sunnï scholars did not rule out the possibility that the 
Companions could have done what would make them liable to jarh, as 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Anbârï made clear; they ruled out, however, the 
idea that this had certainly happened. The Sunnïs believe that the original 
‘adâla of the Companions during the lifetime of the Prophet was 
confirmed by the Qur’ân. Ta‘dîl is the attitude the Sunnïs adopted 
towards the Companions and it is this that most Sunnï scholars were 
seeking to prove and which, if proven, would reestablish the ‘adâla of the 
Companions on a new, unchallenged basis.
This attitude is reminiscent of the Murji’a, who were named after 
their stance concerning the early schisms. It may be surmised then, that 
the Sunnï concept of the collective ta ‘dîl of the Companions was based 
on the attitude taken by the Murji’a. The Sunnïs may have found it safer 
for the unity of the Umma to adopt the thesis of the Murji’a. This smmise 
will next be verified by studying early Murji’ï and Muiji’ï-related works, 
and the works ascribed to Abu Hanïfa who was accused of holding the 
views of the Muiji’a yet came to be considered eventually the founder of 
the largest school of law in Sunnï Islam. To the Murji’a we shall now 
turn.
Chapter Four
The Background of the Concept
That Murji’ism and Sunnism have many things in common is not a new 
idea.* The basic tenet of the Murji’ï creed, or at least the tenet presented 
as such by those who have written about the Murji’a—the tenet 
pertaining to the definition of faith (îmàn)—has indeed been adopted in 
Sunnï Islam and has become a fundamental article of the Sunnï creed. 
Work ( ‘amal) has been excluded by the Sunnïs as a constituent part of 
faith.^ This issue, however, is closely connected with other theological 
points, about which Sunnism and Muiji’ism have much in common. It is 
hardly surprising then to know that some prominent Sunnï scholars were 
accused by their opponents not only of holding Muiji’ï  views, but also of 
belonging to the Muiji’a. Notable in this respect is Abu Hanïfa ibn al- 
Nu'man (d. 150/767), the scholar after whose name the largest Sunnï 
school of law is named. Al-Ash'arï (d. 324/935), the eponym the largest 
school of theology in Sunnï Islam—al-Ash'ariyya—and his followers 
were also accused of Muiji’ism by the Hanbalïs, as we will see later in 
this chapter.
Chapter three has tried to show how ideas in Sunnï Hadïth 
criticism could have contributed to the development of the concept of the 
collective ta ‘dfl of the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions. This chapter 
will try to trace the roots of the Sunnï attitude towards the Companions. It 
was also suggested in chapter three that the Sunnï representation of the
 ^For tiiis, see the article “Mur^i’a” in E f  by W. Madelung, vol. VII, pp. 605-07; and M. Watt, The 
Formative Period o f  Islamic Thought. Edinbm'gh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973, pp. 119-143, 
especially p. 128 where Watt explicitly says that “. . .  as opponents of the divisive tendencies of both 
ShPites and Khai ijites all these early Murji’ites were forerunners of the Sunnites, and deserve to be 
honouied as such.”
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concept of the collective ta ‘dîl o f the Companions is reminiscent of what 
is generally known about the Murji’T attitude towards the Companions. 
This chapter seeks to put this proposition to the test. This will be done by 
examining the alleged Muiji’î  sources that we have on the one hand, and 
by putting the concept of collective ta ‘dil in the context of the larger 
Sunnï creed on the other. It will be argued that the Sunnï concept of the 
collective ta ‘dïl of the Companions meshes very well in the general Sunm 
context and is consistent with other beliefs that the early Sunnïs held. 
These beliefs are the definition of ïmàn and its relation to work, the 
position of the grave sinner, and the attitude towards the authorities. In all 
these, as this study hopes to show, the Sunnï views show a great deal of 
similarity, which could hardly be a matter of coincidence, with the 
Murji’ï  views suggested by the extant Muiji’î  sources. Again, this is not a 
new idea.^ This chapter, however, seeks to show how relevant these ideas 
are to the early Sunnï attitude towards the Companions and how this 
might have contiibuted to the development of the concept of the 
collective ta ‘dîl o f the Companions. This will require a brief discussion of 
how the Sunnï scholars dealt with the fact that many of their ideas were 
of Muiji’ï  origin.
A Review of the Sources on the M urji’a;
As with other early Islamic sects that have failed to survive, most of our 
knowledge about the Muiji’a comes from Sunnï sources, notably the 
heresiographical works. We are fortunate, however, to have other early 
sources, allegedly Muiji’ï or Muiji’ï-related ones, on which we can count.
 ^This is not to say that all Sunni scholars maintained the same definition o f faith, or had the same 
perception on the relation between work and faith. A brief discussion of their differences on this point 
will be given later in this chapter.
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We have an epistle ascribed to Al-Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al- 
Hanafiyya, grandson of 'AIT ibn Abî Tâlib, that bears the title Kitàb al- 
Irjà ’ and has been thoroughly commented on by J. van Ess and M. Cook. 
This is taken by some scholars as the earliest Muiji’ï  primary source that 
has managed to survive. Also at our disposal is a refutation by an early 
IbadI scholar of the arguments put forward in this epistle. This is the so- 
called Sirat Salim ibn Dhakwan published and translated by M. Cook in 
his Early Muslim Dogma. We also have three creeds ascribed to Abu 
Hanïfa, translated and published by A. J. Wensinck in his The Muslim 
Creed. To the same scholar is ascribed an epistle in which he defends 
himself against accusations of irja\ in addition to a work in which he 
answers questions put forward by a disciple of his. In this and the other 
works, views are given on the schisms that the Companions were 
involved in, and on what attitude to take towards the events and the 
Companions involved. In what follows, we will introduce these sources 
with a brief discussion of the different views on their authenticity, 
followed by an analysis of their contents.
According to Van Ess, the Kitâb al-Irjà' is “das erste {{Buch» zu 
diesem Thema und scheint damit den Beginn der Murgi’a zu markieren.”  ^
It is ascribed to al-Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya (d. c. 
100/719). Parts of the original work were quoted by al-Dhahabî (d. 
748/1348) in his history TarJkh al-Islâm and by Ibn Hajar (d. 852/1449) 
in his biographical dictionary Tahdhïb al-Tahdhïb. A complete version of 
the text is given in Ibn Abï ‘Umar al-‘Adam’s Kitàb al-Imân.^ Van Ess
 ^For a similar argument see J. Schacht “New sources for the History o f Muhammadan Theology,” 
Stitdia Islamica, vol. I (1953), p. 38
 ^Van Ess, J. “Das Kitàb Al-Ir§à‘D^s Hasan B. Muhammad B. al-Hanafiyya.” Arabica, vol. XXI 
(1974), pp. 20-52
 ^Van Ess, J. “The Beginning of Islamic Theology,” in John Emery Mui doch and Editli Dudley Sylla 
(Eds.) The Cultural Context o f  Medieval Learning. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, p. 93
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argues for the authenticity of this epistle and suggests that it might have 
been compiled when al-Hasan and his father concluded a sort of 
rapprochement with the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan in 
the early 70s H. (late 7**^ C. A.D.).^ This would mean that the epistle was 
written c. 75/694. M. Cook, however, taking a rather skeptical approach 
to the authenticity of most epistles supposedly written in the late first or 
early second centuries of Islam, takes a Murji’T attitude himself as far as 
this epistle in concerned, on the ground that its content “does not provide 
any really strong arguments for or against an early dating.”  ^Elsewhere, 
he speculates that the epistle might have been compiled in the second half 
of the second century as an attempt to “rehabilitate what could be 
rehabilitated of the Murji’ite heritage.”  ^ Cook also suggests that Iraq— 
Küfa in particular—might have been the site o f early Muiji’ism.^ 
Commenting on Cook’s views on this work, however, W. Madelung 
argues that there are no “cogent reasons” to reject either al-Hasan’s 
authorship of the work or its authenticity.***
The second epistle, known as Sïrat Salim, is that o f the Ibâdï 
scholar Salim ibn Dhakwan In this work, the author takes the offence 
against some alleged Muiji’î  views. If  authentic, this epistle also dates to 
the first half of the 70s H.** For many reasons, M. Cook casts grave doubt 
on the authenticity of this epistle, speculating that it might have been the 
product of “the strong tensions between activism and quietism within the
 ^Ibid., pp. 95-7
’ M. Cook. Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Critical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981, p. 88
 ^M. Cook. “Activism and Quietism in Early Islam: The Case of the Early Mmji’a,” in Alexander 
Qudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Eds.). Islam and Power. London, Croom Helm, 1981, p. 20 
U W .,p p . 17-8 
W. Madelung. “Murdji’a” in E l\  vol. VD, p. 605 
" Ibid., p. 16
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Ibâdï community of the later Umayyad period,”*^ In other words, Cook, 
who establishes a link between the authenticity of the Kitàb al-lrjâ ’ and 
the Sirat Salim, argues that both epistles were compiled around the 
middle of the second century of tlie Hijra (tliird quarter of tlie 8* C. 
A.D.). But if both works “stand or fall together” as Cook argues,*'’ and in 
view of the fact that Cook’s doubts about the authenticity of Kitâb al- 
lrjâ' have failed to convince many scholars, tlien both works will be 
tieated here as authentic.
To Abu Hanïfa ibn al-Nu'mân (d. 150/767) are ascribed five extant 
works in which a reference to the “Companions” is made. At least tliree 
of these appear to be authentic. These are al-Fiqh al-Absat, al-Risâla ilâ 
'Uthmân al-BattJ, and Kitâb a l-'Alim wa- 'l-Muta'allim. Two other works 
have had their authenticity questioned. These are al-Fiqh al-Akbar and 
Wasiyyat Abï Hamfa. *"*
Wensinck refers to al-Fiqh al-Absat as al-Fiqh al-Akbar I  and to 
al-Fiqh al-Akbar as al-Fiqh al-Akbar II. The texts of al-Fiqh al-Absat 
and al-Fiqh al-Akbar I  are not completely identical; the latter contains 
one more article. However, because the difference is minimal, the Sunnï 
scholars have tended not to distinguish between tliem. Wensinck, on the 
other hand, did not ignore that difference, but he argued for the 
authenticity of al-Fiqh al-Akbar I  in view of the text of al-Fiqh al- 
Absat^vihoso  authenticity he held.*^
Cook, Early Muslmi Dogma, p. 102 
Cook, “Activism and Queitism,” p. 16
Abû Hanïfa al-Nn'mân. Al- Âlim wa- 'l-Miita 'allim, Al-Fiqh al-Absat, Al-Fiqh al-Akbar, RisâlatAbT 
Hanïfa ilâ ‘Uthmân al-Botfï, Al-lFasiyya (Ed. Muhammad Zâlùd al-Kavtliaii). AI-Qâliira: Al-Maktaba 
al-Azliariy>'a li-T-Turâtli. 2001 
A. J. Wensinck. The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Universit}' Press, 1932, pp. 122-3
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The Risâla ilà 'Uthmàn al-Batfï is a letter allegedly sent by Abü 
Hanïfa to the Basran scholar ‘Uthman al-Batti (d. c. 143/760) who had 
sent him an inquiry about his beliefs and about his alleged Murji’î  
inclinations. This epistle, whose authenticity, to the best of my 
knowledge, has not been questioned, refers much more obviously to the 
events in which the Companions were involved. It is here where Abü 
Hanïfa gives a clear explanation of his ideas on those events and how 
they should be perceived by Muslims.
Equally important is Kitâb al-'Âlim wa-l~Muta'allim; the W m  
(scholar) being Abü Hanïfa and the muta "allim (student or disciple) being 
Abü Muqâtil al-Samarqandï, one of Abü Hanïfa’s disciples. In a form of 
dialogue where the student asks and the tutor answers, Abü Hanïfa 
explains his views on a range of issues raised by his student. It is also 
clear here how ideas were interconnected in the early discussions. J. 
Schacht acknowledges the authenticity of this epistle, except that he 
argues that it, like Al-Fiqh aUAbsat, originated in the circle of Abü 
Hanïfa’s disciples rather than with Abü Hanïfa himself. He ascribes it to 
Abü Muqâtil al-Samarqandï, the supposed student in this circle.
The fourth work is the so-called Wasiyyat AbîHanïfa, which is put 
in the form of a creed allegedly narrated by Hammâd ibn Abï Hanïfa 
from his father. Unlike al-Fiqh al-Absat, Wensinck challenges the 
authenticity of this work on the ground that we have no idea about how it 
was preserved and transmitted.^® The work, in Wensinck’s view,
Actually, it is held by Schacht to be “the only authentic document by Abü Hanîfe which we 
possess,” “Abo Hanîfe,” E f,  vol. I, p. 123.
Schacht, “Abo Hanîfe,” E f, vol. I p. 123. For a detailed analysis of this epistle, see: J. Shacht “Early 
Murci’ite Treatise.” Oriem, vol. XVn, no. 2 (1964), p. 100, where he ai-gues that Abu Muqâtil himself 
the muta ‘allitn in this epistle, is “the real author of the treatise and not merely as its first transmitter.” 
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 185. Schacht holds the same opinion concerning Üie authenticity of  
this work, “AbO Hanîfe,” E f, vol. I, p. 124
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represents a higher degree of theological sophistication than al^Fiqh al- 
Absat, but both are primitive in comparison with later well-known 
creeds. The main purpose of the work, he points out, is not to present 
the articles of faith of Islam, but to refute ideas held by certain sectarian 
deviations?^ About the dating of this work, Wensinck argues that it might 
have originated in the interval between Abu Hanïfa and Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal; i.e., the second half of the second century H. (late 8* C. or early 
9^  ^C. A.D.). He came to this conclusion by comparing some articles in 
al-Fiqh al-Absat with known views of Ahmad ibn Hanbal.^^
The fifth work is Al-Fiqh al-Akbar which, Wensinck argues, 
represents “the embodiment o f the final position of the community in 
relation to Muttazilism.”^^  For many reasons, Wensinck argues that this 
work as it stands shows many similarities to the ideas historically 
ascribed to Abü al-Hasan al-Ash'arï (d. 324/935).^ On this basis 
Wensinck argues that the real author of the work must have been 
connected with al-Ash'arï (to whom Wensinck seems to have wished to 
ascribe the work had sufficient evidence existed).^"  ^ Schacht also argues 
that al-Fiqh al-Akbar, like Wasiyyat Abï Hanïfa, have no connection 
whatsoever with Abü Hanïfa.^^
In conclusion, we have seven works to deal with, two of which 
belong at the earliest to the last quarter of the first century H., and at the 
latest to the fir st half o f the second century. If  the latter, then we can say 
that we have five works compiled in the first half of the second century
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 185 
^Ubid,, p. 185 
^^Ibid., p. 187 
Ibid., p. 246
Schacht, “Abî Hanîfe,” E f, vol. I, p. 124. 
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 247 
Schacht, “Abî Hanîfe," E f,  vol. I, p. 124.
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(all the works we have mentioned except the last two ascribed to Abü 
Hanïfa). In either case, we are relying on works that are of relatively 
early origin. One work seems to have originated in the late second or 
early third century. One work might be as late as the early fourth century. 
The following is an analysis of the parts of theses that are relevant to our 
study in these works.
An examination of the sources:
Kitâb al-Irjâ^ and Sîrat Sâlimi
Kitâb al-Irjà * of al-Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafîyya opens with a 
brief history of the Prophet’s career, how he revolutionized the lives of 
his people, and how his mission achieved success.^^ One cause of that 
success, al-Hasan points out, was God’s election of people who sacrificed 
their lives and money for the triumph of the new religion. Among those 
people were some who abandoned their homes and their families and 
migrated, and some who sheltered [the former] and supported the Prophet 
and his Message.^^ The reference here is obviously to the Muhàjirün and 
the Ansar. The term sahâba is not used and no reference to any Qur’anic 
verse is given. What this shows, however, is that in the earliest Muiji’î 
text at our disposal, there is a clear appreciation of certain groups of the 
Prophet’s contemporaries and an attestation of their role in the success of 
the Prophet’s mission.
One part of Kitâb al-Irjâ ' is of particular importance for our study. 
The following is Van Ess’s English translation:
Cook, in Early Muslim Dogma, p. 7, calls this opening the “mission topes,” characteristic of many 
early epistles. For J. Givony, the “mission topos” in tliis epistle in particular has a specific function. It 
aims at “emphasizing his [i.e. al-Hasan’s] pious beliefe and values. . .  to safeguar d himself fi"om 
accusations of infidelity;” The MurjVa and the Theological School o f  Abü Hanïfa. Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University o f Edinburgh, 1977, p. 19 
J. Van Ess. “Das Kitâb al-Irgâf^ pp. 21-22
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“if someone wants to ask us [i.e. the Murji’a] about out' position 
and OUI* opinion, we are people whose master is God, whose 
religion is Islam, whose guide is the Quran, and whose prophet 
is Muhammad ... . Among the chiefs of our community 
{a 'immatinà) we approve of Abü Bakr and ‘Umar, we approve 
their being obeyed, and we condemn their being opposed. We 
are enemies of their enemies, (but) we reserve our judgment 
{nurji) about those among them (i.e., the chiefs of the 
community) who first participated in the schism (of the 
community: ahl al-furqa al-uwaî). We make every effort to 
remain loyal to Abü Bakr and ‘Umar, because the community 
did not engage in fighting or dissension with respect to them nor 
did they doubt about anything concerning them. “Reservation” 
is only due concerning those who are blamed by the people, 
whereas we were not present (in order to build up a judgment of 
our ow n),..
What we have here is an unequivocal statement about the different 
attitudes of the Murji’a—affiliation and dissociation—and the logic 
behind each. They associate themselves with the first two Caliphs 
because, they maintain, the umma did not argue about them and had no 
doubt about their affairs (wa-lam tashukk f i  amrihim). As for subsequent 
rulers, presumably ‘Uthman and ‘All, they reserve theii* judgment 
because people differ on them and they [the Murji’a] did not witness 
them.
28 J. Van Ess, “The Beginning o f Islamic Theology,” p. 94
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In M. Cook’s view, the content of this passage and a similar 
passage in Sïrat Salim indicate that the Muiji’a held that “since we were 
not there, and hear only conflicting testimony, we cannot judge who was 
right and who was w r o n g . T h e  epistemological ground for this, Cook 
argues, is the belief that one can legitimately pass a judgment if and only 
if one of two stipulations is fiilfilled. The first stipulation is autopsy; i.e. 
the direct witnessing of the events in question and the people involved in 
them. The second is unardmity; i.e., when there is a “consensus” (the 
debate over what this term really means should not detain us here) with 
respect to the events and the people involved. One does not have to have 
both in order to be able to pass judgment. Cook adds, and the Muiji’a did 
take positions regarding events and peoples on the basis of only one 
stipulation (associating themselves with the first two Caliphs, for 
instance, is a position taken on the basis of only one stipulation— 
unanimity). Without both, however, one must refi*ain from holding or 
defending any opinion.^^
However, a very significant point is made clear in this passage 
which can be taken to constitute the real epistemological ground of the 
Murji’ï  stance; that is, incertitude or doubt (shakk). This passage makes it 
unequivocally clear that with the existence of doubt, or lack of certitude, 
no judgment can be justifiably passed. Incertitude is established by 
controversy or disagreement on people and events and the [physical] 
absence from those events. In other words unanimity, or the lack of 
autopsy when there is no agreement, are only criteria for the lack of 
certitude. Therefore, if the main question that the Muiji’a were striving
^  Cook, “Activism and Quietism,” p. 16 
Cook, Early Muslim Dogma, p. 28
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with all the time is “to judge or not to judge” as Cook puts it?^ then we 
can say that the Muiji’a decided that the answer should be: “when in 
doubt, do not.”
It is on this ground of uncertainty that the Sunni scholars argued 
that the Companions who participated in the schisms maintained their 
original "adala. That original "adala, which was further confirmed by the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, cannot be nullified on the basis of unproven or 
uncertain information. Apparently, however, the Murji’ï  and the Sunnï 
stances seem to be different: the former abstain from judgment while the 
latter acknowledge and bestow ‘adala. However, this should not be taken 
to constitute a fimdamental difference between the Mmji’ï  and the Sunnï 
positions on this point. The SunnTs, as might be clear now, only took the 
argument one step further. Acting in accordance with their belief that 
everyone is 'adl until proven otherwise, they only argued that since we 
cannot pass judgment on the schisms and the Companions involved in 
them for lack of certitude, we have to adhere to the (well-attested) 
original ‘adala. This step was based on grounds provided by the 
development of ‘ilm al-jarh wa-%ta‘dil, which the Murji’a, of course, 
did not have. It now seems safe to surmise that had the Murji’a survived 
as a theologico-legal school, they might have come to the same 
conclusion.
Kitâb al-Irjâ' continues with an attack on the Saba’ïs—an early 
group of extremist Shï‘ïs for “lying about Banu Umayya and about God.” 
Cook, who strives to prove that the Murji’a, contrary to what is 
commonly held about them, were in fact revolutionaries,^^ argues that
Cook, “Activism and Quietism,” pp. 20-21, where he defends his hypothesis by arguing that 
‘^ vhether one takes the early Mmji’a to be activists or quietists, one is left with soinetiiing to explain 
away.” “My contention,” he explains, “is that the activist assumption leaves us with less to explain
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“Banû Umayya” here (which may be taken to suggest that the author was 
a supporter of the Umayyads) might be a textual corruption resulting 
from a misreading by someone “who believed, as modem scholars have 
tended to, that the Muiji’a followed the religion of their kings.”^^  It is 
beyond the scope of this study to argue for against this thesis. It is 
however important that we say something about it because, as we shall 
show, the attitude of the Murji’a (and the Sunnis as we will discuss later) 
towards the authorities is consistent with their overall theological 
conviction. Other scholars have endeavored to provide an explanation for 
the accounts that apparently contiadict the thesis that the Murji’a were 
quietists.^"  ^The following is a contribution, albeit brief, to this.
In the passage quoted above the author says “among the chiefs of 
our community {a 'immatina) we approve of Abü Bakr and ‘Umar.” By 
implication he also acknowledges that the rulers o f the Muslim 
community other than Abü Bakr and ‘Umar, about whom there was no 
doubt as he argues, were also seen by him and by the members of the sect 
to which he belongs as legitimate mlers of the Islamic state (a Hmma, 
plural of imam, which linguistically means “exemplary figure”).^  ^This is 
consistent with what is known about the Murji’a and their relations with 
the authorities and what the author himself says here about the Umayyad
away than the quietist.” See also Cook, Early Muslim Dogma, pp. 33-34 especially p. 36. It is my 
argument here, however, that it is Cook’s thesis that leave us with most to explain away.
Cook, Early Muslim Dogma, p. 43
For example, Givony argues tiiat the mawalT who participated in the revolt o f Ibn al-Ash'ath against 
the Umayyads had suffered from the brutal treatment they experienced at the hand of al-Hajjâj ibn 
Yusuf Therefore, “they could hardly avoid taking sides when the rising came;” Givony, The Murji’a 
and the Theological School o f  Abü Hanïfa, p. 64. This does not mean that all the mawâlï took part in 
the revolt. However, “those who refrained from doing so were totally ignored and the militant fection 
o f  the sect came to the fore; hence, the rebellious, militant reputation of the Murji’a,” he adds; p. 74
This is not to say, o f course, that imâm and a ’imma cannot be used in a pejorative sense. Actually, 
they do appear in reference to unjust rulers. In Sïrat Salim, for instance, the author refers to the 
Umayyads as “a ’immat al-jawr^ It is very unlikely, however, to find this sense suffixed by a 
pronominal ending; e.g. ^^ a’immatima a ’immatu ’l-Jcufr.^ ' Above it is suggested that the use of the 
pronominal ending in reference to the Umayyads reveals a sort of affiliation to them.
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Caliphs. The word ""a'immatina'' is also repeated in the concluding 
paragraph of this epistle. Here the author says: “This is our stance and our 
opinion . . . and we remind our people of it and anyone who asks us 
[about it] from amongst our rulers; [who may use it] to deem the 
shedding of our blood lawful, or to expose their lives to us (fa-hâdhâ 
amrunâ wa-ra 'yunà. . . wa-nudhakkiru hi-hi qawmanà wa-man sa * aland 
min a ’immatind fa-yastahillü ba‘dahu dimâ’anâ aw y u ‘arridü 
dimâ 'ahum lanâ.y^^^ This passage can be taken to support either view of 
the debate over the attitude o f the Murji’a towards the authorities. The 
author’s saying that the (Umayyad) authorities might use the argument he 
presents in the epistle to shed his and his sect’s blood may be referring to 
the refusal of the Muiji’a to curse ‘All (a refusal which is of course 
consistent with their general beliefs).^^ The second part, in which the 
author says that the same argument can be used to legitimize the shedding 
of the rulers’ blood, apparently supports the thesis that the Murji’a were 
not quietists (and also challenges Van Ess’s suggestion that the epistle 
was written as a sign of gratitude to an Umayyad Caliph). It can be 
inferred, however, that the author says only that if the Murji’a were 
intimidated to make them give up their ideas, or denied their rights (here 
by the authorities), they would fight for them. Thâbit Qutna (d. 110/728), 
a Muiji’i poet, says in one of his poems that the Muiji’a fight for “self- 
defense.” ®^ If we apply this here, the second part of the above statement 
might be a corollary of the first part. The author might simply be saying 
that if the Umayyads take the views put forward in this epistle as a 
justification to shed the blood of the Murji’a, they will expose their own
Van Ess, “Dm Kitâb al-lr§â’f  pp. 24-25 
Madelimg, E f,  vol. VII, p. 606
Watt, The Formative Period, p. 124.
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lives to the Muiji’a as a matter of “self-defense.” A second possible cause 
for revolting against the Umayyads might be that the Umayyads denied 
new converts their full rights as Muslims and refused to waive the taxes 
which they continued to impose on them “on the pretext that they still 
ignored, or failed to fulfill, some of their most basic duties under 
Islam.”^^  A further elaboration on this last point will be given in the 
discussion of the definition of iman. For the moment, however, the 
previous discussion suggests that the Muiji’a might have been quietists in 
their normal attitude towards the authorities, but were ready to fight if 
they had to. Being quietist does not necessarily entail being unwilling to 
fight in all circumstances, neither does it mean complete harmony with 
the authorities. In other words, it can still be maintained that in the case of 
the Muiji’a, peaceful coexistence with the authorities was the norm while 
revolt was the exception. This is to be contrasted, for example, with the 
case of the Khawarij, for whom fighting seems to have been the norm. 
The whole debate might in fact be on the definition of quietism and on 
what we would expect from a quietist sect.
In complete harmony with the attitude presented in the Kitâh al- 
Irja ’ is the opening passage of that part of Sîrat Salim where the author 
discusses Muiji’T ideas."^  ^ This part opens with what the author of the 
work describes as the basis of Murji’ï  views on the early Muslims. 
According to this, the Murji’a held that Muslims should only pass 
judgment on what they witness and suspend their judgment on what they 
do not know (“then others, who had no forebears in whose footsteps they 
followed or authorities on whose rectitude they modeled themselves, 
propounded the doctrine of suspended judgment (irjâ’). They said: ‘We
39 Madelung, “Mur^i’a,” E f , vol. VII, p. 606
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are prepared to testify with regard to what we have seen and been present 
at of the most recent schism (Jurqa)', but we defer judgment on what we 
did not witness {mà ghaba ‘anna) o f the first schism’.”) What the author 
of Sîrat Salim tries to show in the rest of this part is that Muiji’i views are 
utterly contradictory and inconsistent. He proceeds in a style of refritation 
typical of the Mu‘tazila, showing how inconsistent any point the Muiji’a 
make is with other ideas they also held. For instance, the aforementioned 
Muiji’T argument would lead to the infidelity of ‘All, Talha, and al- 
Zubayr on the one hand, and the people of Kûfa and Basra on the other: 
the former allowed themselves to call people to something they [people] 
had not witnessed, and the latter acted on the ground of something they 
had not witnessed [the murder of ‘Uthman], The Muiji’a are equally 
inconsistent in their beliefs, Salim adds, when they call their children to 
dissociate from Mu‘awiya, whose deeds their children did not witness."^  ^
On mentioning Mu‘awiya, the author moves to refute the Murji’a 
on their position concerning him. They aigue that “a/i/ al-furqati ’l-ülà 
{or al-uwaiy whom they were talking about (and whom they affiliate 
with or suspend judgment on) were the Companions of the Prophet {innà 
ahla %furqati 7- ‘ülâ ashâbu rasüli ’llahi).^^ This can be taken to indicate 
two things. The first is that the Companions should be given 
preferential treatment, or, at least, judgment on them needs a higher than 
usual degree of certitude. This is consistent with the role ascribed to the 
Companions in Kitâb aUIrjà'. The second is that they [the Murji’a, as 
Salim claims] did not consider Mu‘awiya a Companion. But Mu‘awiya, 
Salim responds, was one o f the secretaries of the Prophet and was
In our discussion of this work, we will rely on Cook’s translation and the Arabic text which he 
publishes in Early Muslim Dogma (Aiabic text: pp. 159-63; translation: pp. 23-26)
Sirat Salim, in Cook, Early Muslim Dogma, p. 160 
Ibid., p. 160
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admired by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab who appointed him governor; and he 
was not the only one about whom the umma differed. People also held 
different opinions about Abü Bakr and ‘Umar, Salim adds."^  ^ What the 
author is trying to get at here is: to be consistent, the Muiji’a ought either 
to associate with all those who took part in the schisms, or to accept 
openly the fact that many other participants, on whom they keep silent, 
went astray as well and condemn them accordingly. This alleged Muiji’T 
attitude about Mu‘awiya is in disagreement with their attitude towards the 
authorities. We are not told here, however, why the Murji’a might have 
adopted this attitude towards the first Umayyad Caliph. Below a 
conclusion about the content of this epistle might answer this question.
The next step in Sîrat Salim is to ridicule the Muiji’T belief that the 
rulers of the day are believing Muslims from whom, however, God has 
made dissociation licit and for whom he has forbidden asking him for 
forgiveness. The author also endeavors to show that the first part of this 
proposition is inconsistent with the second part. The rulers, in other 
words, are either Muslim believers and in this case association with them 
and praying for them is incumbent upon Muslims; or people for whom 
God has forbidden asking for forgiveness, in which they are not believers 
and they are to be dealt with accordingly. The discussion below of the 
definition of îmân will help to clarify this point. The same technique is 
used to refute other theses on the position of the rulers. Another thesis, 
supposedly also held by the Murji’a, considers the rulers “erroneous 
believers {mü’miniin dulM; lit. believers who have gone astray).” The 
author refutes this thesis on the ground that one can either be a believer 
(mü’min) or an unbeliever (kâfir). Qur’ânic evidence is adduced to
43 Ib id , p. 161
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ridicule the combination the Murji’a allegedly made between error 
{dalâî) and faith {ïmân).
As might be clear now, this work refutes ideas that are not 
expressed in Kitâb al-Irjâ \  which severs any necessary relation between 
the two epistles as Cook suggests. This may also explain what Salim says 
about the views of the Muiji’a on Mu‘awiya. It may be that he ascribed 
these views to a group which he arbitrarily classified under the rubric of 
the Murji’a. We will see later that the term “Muiji’a” as a pejorative and 
polemical term is very loose. It is also possible that this use of the term 
Muiji’a is perhaps a reference to another sect which he was refuting 
before the Muiji’a in the same epistle. Moreover, this epistle also shows 
that its author has the same inconsistencies that he uses to refute the 
Murji’a. For instance, Salim states that he and his sect “affiliate to 
Muslims who lived before our time and whom we have not seen, on the 
strength of the testimony of the Muslims; and we dissociate from those of 
the imams of error who lived before our time and whom we have not 
seen, and their associates, on the strength of the testimony of the 
Muslims.”"^  This is inconsistent with the fact he mentioned earlier in the 
epistle that views differed regarding not only those who participated in 
the schisms, but also those who did not take part such as the first two 
Caliphs [who were not alive at the time of the schisms]. If, however, he 
accepted only the testimony of people who held the same beliefs as his, 
then he can be easily refilled on the ground that the Muiji’a also only 
trusted people who shared their own views.
This leads us to the question of testimony, which is explicitly 
raised here and which seems to demarcate a fundamental difference
44 Ibid., p, 26
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between the author of this epistle and the addressees. The author says that 
the Muiji’a do not accept the testimony of those who argued against the 
participants in the schisms (according to what we loiow about the 
Khawarij, he may be referring here to ‘Uthman, ‘All, Mu‘awiya, ‘Amr 
ibn al-‘As, al-Mughïfa ibn Shu‘ba, and others, all of whom the Khawarij 
considered unbelievers). While the author does the same by rejecting the 
Shî‘î  testimony against the first two Caliphs, he summons the Murji’a to 
“believe the believers” who testify against the perpetrators of the fitna, 
and against the rulers of the day “who do not judge in accordance with 
what God has revealed.”"^  ^This last point further weakens the thesis that 
the Murji’a were hostile to the authorities. But why would the Murji’a 
reject the testimony of those who testified against the participants in the 
schisms? This is what Abü Hanïfa may be able to explain in one o f his 
works below.
AbuHantfa^s worksi
In the first work ascribed to Abü Hanïfa—Al-Fiqh al-Absat, there is an 
article that says: “We disavow none of the Companions of the Apostle of 
God; nor do we adhere to any of them exclusively.”"^  ^ The next article 
reads: “We leave the question of ‘üthmân and ‘All to Allah, who knows 
the secrets and hidden things.” According to Wensinck, the first article is 
directed mainly against the Shî‘îs who elevated the ranlc of some 
Companions while openly cursing others. As it stands, this article does 
not represent an actively positive position towards the Companions. If we 
do not dissociate from the Companions it does not necessarily mean that
163
Generally but not always, we will rely in this section on Wensinck’s translation in his The Muslim 
Creed, pp. 103-04.
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we associate with them. This is consistent with the second article where 
we find an abstention fiom judging what had taken place among the 
Companions. The commentator on this creed, probably Abu al-Layth al- 
Samarqandî (d. 373/983), explains that “the author [i.e. Abü Hanïfa] does 
not express his doubts concerning this question; but he chooses the safest 
way, that is, of restraining our tongue from this fitna, just as Allah has 
made us restrain our swords from it.”"^  ^ What the commentator means 
here is that Abü Hanïfa was of the same opinion as the Sunnïs of his [the 
commentator’s] age, when the mere desisting from dissociating from the 
Companions was ceasing to be the sound attitude of a good Muslim. 
What the commentator does not explain, however, is why he and the 
colleagues of his age do not refrain from discussing what happened. This 
is consistent, nevertheless, with the chronology of the development of the 
Sunnï attitude on this point. They came to discuss and explain the 
schisms mainly in the 5*Vl 1*^  C.
What should detain us in this creed, however, is the article which 
asserts that the “difference of opinion in the community is a token of 
divine mercy.” As we saw in chapter three, this idea, which found its way 
into some Prophetic traditions, was one of the bases for the Sunnïs’ 
argument concerning the Companions. It has a direct link with the issue 
of ijtihad, which was used to justify the schisms in which the 
Companions were involved. It is not clear, however, whether by the 
difference of opinion in this article is meant differences on legal matters, 
or differences in general. Nevertheless, the link that is established here 
between the differences and God is significant. We also saw in chapter
47 Ibid., p. 109
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three that differences between the Companions were acknowledged in a 
Prophetic tradition where God Himself validates those differences.
In al-Risala ilà ‘Uthmân al-Battf^, Abü Hamfa, who is supposed 
to be defending himself here against accusations of showing “Muiji’T 
tendencies,” gives a watertight explanation for the position he maintains 
with respect to the early schisms and the people involved in them. He 
starts by informing the addressee of what he [Abu Hanïfa] understands 
to be the charge against him. “You wrote to me saying that you have been 
informed that I am one of the Murji’a and that I say: ‘an erroneous 
believer (mU’min dall; lit. a believer who has gone astray)’. T h i s ,  the 
reader will remember, is one of the theses that the Ibâdï Salim refutes in 
his Sïra, which suggests that this opinion was ascribed to some “Muiji’i” 
groups. Abu Hanïfa starts by making clear the distinction between work 
and belief: neither has a direct relation to the other. One may have a 
strong belief in something, yet be in error with respect to some things 
pertaining to that belief. In other words, Abu Hanïfa argues that there 
must be a difference between one who is in error because he does not 
have knowledge of God and his Apostle, and another who does believe in 
God and his Apostle but does not excel in the deeds or acts required by 
that belief. The Qur’an is also used here to prove that God himself used 
the word “da/â/ (error)” in reference to some believers and in contexts 
where "’"‘da làr  cannot be taken to mean "‘‘ku frr Between “error” and
Abo Hanïfa al-Nu‘man, Risàlat Abî Hanïfa ilà 'Uthmân al-Battî, in Abü Hanîfe al-Nu‘mân. Al- 
'Âlim w a-j- Muta'allim, aFFiqh al-Absat, al-Fiqh al-Akbar, Risâlat Abî Hanïfa ilà 'Uthmân al-Battï, 
Al-Wasiyya. (Ed. Muhammad Zahid al-kawtharl). Al-Qahira: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-’l-Turâth, 
2001.  ’
Ibid., p. 71
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“belief,” in other words, tiiere is no necessary aversion, Abii Hanïfa 
argues
Now let us turn to the participants in the schisms, about whom the 
whole discussion may be about. Abu Hanïfa points out that starting from 
‘Umar, the Caliph was called ""aimr al-mü'mmïn (commander of the 
faithfiil)” and argues that this makes it clear that they understood ïmân to 
be different from work. If work, which was imlikely to be observed by 
everybody in the Muslim commimity, were a real determinant of ïmân, 
the Caliph would not be die commander of everybody in his community. 
Moreover, ‘All did not desist from calling the Syrians against whom he 
fought, believers. The question is, Abü Hanïfa wonders: did ‘All fight 
tliem while considering them at the same time to be rightly guided 
(miihtadim)! Now the main question that Abü Hanïfa poses to ‘Utlnnân 
al-Battî is: “the Companions of the Apostle of God fought each other, 
both sides could not have been on the right path together [in view of the 
last point made with respect to ‘Alï and the Syrians]; how would you then 
call the aggressor side? (wa-qad iqtatala ashâbu rasüli llâhi wa-lam 
takuni ’atàni muhtadiyatayni jamJ‘an, fa-ma isinu 'l-baghiyati 
'indaka?)r Before anticipating and replying to the different possible 
answers to this, Abü Hanïfa makes it clear tliat he cannot think of a sin 
tliat is greater than the shedding of blood, especially if this blood was that 
of the Prophet’s Companions. It is safe now (in light of what we said in 
the discussion of the last two works) to say that the early epistles ascribe 
a special status to the Companions. Abü Hanïfa then says tliat if ‘Uthmân 
al-Battî argues that the two sides were either both on the right path 
{miihtadim) or both in error {dallim), he [al-Batti] is an innovator {Jd-in
50 Ibid., p. 73
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z a ‘amta annahumà muhtadiyatâni jamVan ibtada‘ta, wa-in z a ‘amta 
annahumà dàllatâni ja m î‘an ibtada‘td). If  al-Battî argues, however, that 
only one side could have been on the right path, then Abu Hanïfa asks 
him: “What would the other [side] be?” Abü Hanïfa then says that “God 
knows better;” or, “only God knows {Allahu a 7am)” is the sound answer 
to this question {wa-in qulta inna ahadahuma muhtadin, famà 1-âkharu? 
Fa-inqulta ’llâhu a ‘lamu, asabtd).^^
Now this passage as it stands poses a problem. We would expect 
“only God knows” to be the answer to the question: who was right and 
who was wrong? But the answer here seems to refer to the description of 
the participants in the schism; i.e. given that one side must have been 
right, how would we describe the other side? The answer here, to be 
consistent with Abü Hanïfa’s preceding argument for the possibility of 
being a “mi/ 'mm” and a “dâ//” at the same time, should have been: “the 
other side are dâllünr That “only God knows” should have been the 
answer to “who was right and who was wi'ong” is further supported by an 
unequivocal statement made by Abu Hanïfa afterwards: “I hold 
concerning the disagreement that took place among the Companions of 
the Apostle of God on what faced them: only God knows {wa-innï aqülu 
fl-mâ madà min ikhtilàfi ashâbi rasüli llâhi fi-mâ kâna baynahum: 
allâhu a ‘lam u.f This, Abü Hanïfa asserts, was the position maintained 
by the Companions of the Prophet according to some Successors. 
Regarding the term al-Muiji’a Abü Hanïfa explains that the term was 
coined by the enemies of “aM al- ‘adl wa-ahl al-sunna (people of justice 
and the Sunna);” with whom Abü Hanïfa seems to associate himself.
51 Ibid., pp. 74-75
no
In the second work ascribed to Abu Hanïfa, Wasiyyat Ahl 
Hamfa^^^ only one article is of direct interest to us. That articles says: 
“We confess tliat the most excellent of this commimity, after 
Muhammad, our Prophet, is Abü Bakr al-Siddïq, then ‘Umar, then 
‘Utlnnân, then ‘All—Allah’s good pleasure be on all of them, according 
to His word: ‘And they were foremost on earth, tlie foremost still; tliese 
ai'e tliey who shall be brought nigh to God, in gai'dens of delight.’ And 
everyone of them who has the foremost place is also the most excellent. 
Every God-fearing believer loves them, and every reprobate mimafiq 
hates them.”^^  The first comment to make here is that we cannot be sure 
to whom this article specifically refers. The verse it adduces is one of no 
particular reference. We cannot be certain who “everyone of them” refers 
to. Yet fi'om the use of the Qura’nic verse, which we encoimter here for 
die first time, and the subsequent sentence (and eveiyone of them who 
has the foremost place is also the most excellent) it seems that the author 
of the creed accepts tlie Qur’an as a witness to tlie merits of certain 
people. Whoever is praised by the Qur’an should be held in high esteem 
by the believers. The fact that the names of the first tliree Caliphs are 
mentioned here also suggests that the article was directed mainly against 
tlie Shî‘a. The last point to make is that we see here talk of “hate” and 
“love,” wliich is reminiscent of many Prophetic traditions that were 
quoted later by Siumî scholars in support of tlie concept of collective 
ta 'dll and which is also consistent with the earliest Simiii accomits about 
tlie Companions. The only accusation made here is of “wv/ag” (an elusive
Aba Hanïfa al-Nuliiân, .46/ Hamfa. in Abü Hanïfa al-NuTnân. Al- 'Âlim 7-
Àliiîa'allim, al-Fiqh al-Absat, al-Fiqh al-Akbar, Risâlat Abî Hanïfa ilâ ‘Utlnnân al-Battï, Al-Wasiyya. 
(Ed. Muhaimnad Zalüd al-KaMhaiï). Al-Qâliira: al-Maktaba al-ÀzliarivTa li-T-Tiuâtli. 2001 
- U 6 K  p. 85
I l l
term that was used differently by different early Islamic sects), and not an 
absolute kufr. Again this agrees with the earliest writings we examined in 
chapter three.
In Risàlat al- ‘Alim wa- 1-Muta ‘allim,^^ there is one question that 
has a particular significance for our purpose here: no other passage in any 
of the works we are consulting represents the logic of irjà’ and how it is 
related to other theological ideas better than this passage. The passage 
opens with a question on the origin of irjà \  its meaning, and to whom it 
should apply {la-qad wasafta ’l- ‘adla, wa-làkin akhbirnî min ayna j à ’a 
aslu ’l-irjà 7 wa-mà tafsîruhu wa-mani ’lladhï yu ’akhkharu wa-yurja ’u 
amruhul). In his answer, the ^sLholar ascribes the origin of irja’ to ^  ^
heavenly creatuies, the Angels, and irjà ’ is thus associated with the story ' 
of the beginnings of humankind (“the origin of irjà ' is from the Angels 
when God asked them: “Inform me of the names of these.” The Angels 
feared [to make] a mistake should they speak arbitrarily without 
loiowledge and they refrained (fa-khàfati j-malà’ikatu 1-khata’a in 
takallamU bi-ghayri ‘ilmin ta ‘assufan fawaqafat) and said: “Be glorified!
We have no knowledge save that which Thou last taught us,”^^  and they 
did not make an innovation {wa-lam yabtadi‘u)\ in the way of a man who 
is asked about a matter which he does not know [yet] speaks about it 
heedlessly. If  he does not give the correct answer, then he is mistaken; 
and if he does give the right answer, he is [still] not to be praised, because 
he spoke arbitrarily without knowledge. This is why God said to his 
Prophet: “follow not that whereof thou hast no knowledge;” i.e., do not
Abü Hanîfe al-Nu‘mân, Risâlat al- ‘Âlim wa- j-Muta ‘allim, in Abü Hanîfe aHS!ii‘mân. Al- ‘Âlim wa- 
j -  Muta'allim, al-Fiqh al-Absat, al-Fiqh al-Akbar, Risâlat Abï Hanïfa ilâ ‘Uthmân al-Battï, Al- 
Wasiyya. (Ed. Muhammad Zahid al-Kawtharî). Al-Qâhira: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-’l-Turâth, 2001 
The reference here is to Qui ’ân II, 30-1. This reference is peculiar. The widely held view about the 
root of ijrd’ is Qur’an IX, 106 which says “some are deferred for the command of God.” Madelung,
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say what you do not know for certain (ay la taqiil ma lam tajamhu 
yaqJnan). And He said: “Lo! The hearing and the sight and the heart—of 
each of these it will be asked [He] did not permit his Messenger to 
speak [on] or slander anybody [counting] on doubt without certitude (bi- 
'l-zanni min ghayri yaqJnin).)
And in explaining the meaning of irjâ* the scholars says: “die 
meaning of irjà ' is: if you are asked about a matter, pertaining to what is 
legal and what is illegal, which you do not know; or about the reports of 
[the events of] those who were before us, you [ought to] say: God knows 
better about it (allahu ajam u bi-hi). If tiiree people come witli a story 
(hadlthan) which we do not know [to be eidier true or false] and which 
we cannot [know] by experiment and analogies (bi-j-tajanibi wa-'l- 
maqâyïsi); you [ought to] defer die knowledge of this to God and abstain 
(taniddu 'ilma dhâlika ilâ ’llâhi wa-taqif.’’ To illusti'ate Ms point, he 
gives an apparently hypotiietical case although its bearing on what took 
place among the Companions is unmistakable. Two groups, well known 
to us for their piety and righteousness (and the author calls this the “as/;” 
i.e., tiieir original state), fight each other while we are absent. Neither side 
can provide us with an independent witness. Consequently, no certitude 
can be established. No judgment, dierefore, should be passed. It must be 
inferred from the situation, however, diat at least one side is in die wrong. 
Both sides cannot be in the right at the same time. It is also according to 
irjâ' that we do not pass judgment about their eternal fate. Lack of 
knowledge about the whole case and about the retribution on the Day of 
Judgment prevents us from passing a valid judgment.
“Mur^i’a” in£7~, vol. VII, p. 606; and Givony, The Murji 'a and the Theological School o f  Abii 
Hanïfa, pp. 5-12 
The reference is to Qur’an XVII, 36
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The meaning of irjâ \ which has been interpreted differently as we 
have said before, is made clear here: it means abstention from arbitrarily 
passing a judgment without sufficient knowledge. Two key terms are 
imequivocally used here by the scholar: doubt and certitude {shakk and 
yaqJn). Wliereas tlie former cannot constitute a valid groimd for 
knowledge and judgment, tlie latter can. This supports our point that it is 
the issue of doubt and certitude tliat constitutes the real epistemological 
concern of the Murji’a. Autopsy and imanhnity are only tools that 
establish certitude in place of doubt. This is evident in the passage when 
tlie author says that neither of the two belligerent sects can produce 
witnesses otlier than itself; i.e., tlie testimony of either against the other 
camiot establish certitude because one’s testimony for oneself or against 
one’s opponent can always be suspected. In case of lack of certitude, 
tlierefore, tlie appropriate stance that a Muslim should take is to refrain 
from passing any judgment or holding any view on events or on the 
people who participate therein, tlie scholar argues. In other words, tlie 
proper attitude towards tlie whole issue then is: to hold tliat one side must 
be wrong, to abstain from holding tliat one side in particular is wrong; 
and to ask for forgiveness for tliose who are wrong because tliey are, after 
all, believers. (This links tlie whole issue to the debate over the definition 
of faith which we will discuss later.) This last point is in full agreement 
with “and we do not mention them except to speak well of them (wa-lâ 
nadhkiiriihiim ilia bi-'l~khayry\ a statement about the Companions tliat 
we have encoimtered in many Sunni sources staiting from the 4^VI0^  ^C. 
to as late as Ibn Taymiyya in the 8 /^14^  ^C. As we have argued in the last 
chapter, it is implicit in this statement that they could be mentioned 
otherwise.
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Some other points raised here are also relevant to our discussion. In 
an earlier question the Student asks about the relation between faith and 
work. The Scholar replies tliat the two are completely separate. To 
support this, he points out that in the Qur’an it is stated tliat God has 
revealed only one religion {dfn\ religion here is tlie subject of belief or 
faith), but several laws {shara 'i % laws, in tlie wider sense, are tlie sources 
or determiners of work).^^ People, the Scholai’ continues, are of tlnee 
kinds: those who believe with tlieir hearts and tongues, tliose who believe 
with their tongues without their hearts, and those who believe with their 
hearts without their tongues.^® The first group are considered believers by 
both God and people. The third group are believers in God’s knowledge 
but infidels in people’s sight. The second group are infidels in God’s 
loiowledge but must be held believers by people who, first of all, do not 
loiow what is inside then hearts; and, secondly, have no duty to know it 
(wa-laysa 'alayhim an yatakallafu ‘ilma mâ fi- ’l-qulüb).
It is this second group that brings us back to the fundamental 
difference between al-KTiatïb al-Baghdâdï and Ibn al-Salah concerning 
the basis upon which a critic can justifiably pass a judgment on the 'adala 
of a transmitter. Wliile Ibn al-Salâh argued that tlie critic could do so on 
the basis of what the transmitter openly shows in fi*ont of people, al- 
Kliatlb al-Baghdâdï argued that this was not enough, and that he had to 
exert more effort to malce sure that what the transmitter shows is 
consistent with what he does in secret. We have said that most other 
works on Hadïth sciences are favorable to tlie view presented by Ibn al- 
Salah. These two differing views are consistent with what we know 
about the two scholars and the schools to which they belonged. Unlike
AbuHanfraal-Nirmâiiui?/5â/a/a/-T//w pp. 14-16
^U W ..p. 16
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Ibn al-Salâh, al-Khatïb al-Baghdâdl was a Hanbalî scholar and held a 
very negative view of Abü Hanïfa, to whom he devotes a whole chapter 
in his Târïkh Baghdad, a chapter full of stories ascribed to earlier 
authorities about the evil natuie of Abü Hanïfa and the pemiciousness of 
his teachings?^ This may also explain the relatively long chapter in al- 
Kifaya where al-Khatïb refutes the claim of the “Irâqï scholars” that 
‘adala can be established on the mere manifestation of Islam. The 
Hanafîs and the Hanbalïs in their definition of faith differ on a specific 
point: while both maintain that work does not lead to kufr, they differ on 
whether it affects the degree of ïmân o f a believer or not. Since the 
Hanbalïs acknowledge an important role for work in the determination of 
the degree of faith, a Hanbalî critic would understandably be dissatisfied 
with what a transmitter manifests and would exert as much effort as he 
could to uncover the reality of the transmitter being scrutinized. As we 
will see later, the Hanaff definition of ïmân has prevailed over the 
Hanbalî; hence the triumph of Ibn al-Salah’s view on the issue of 
bestowing ‘adâla. This analysis assumes a relation between faith and 
‘adâla. It will be argued in the conclusion that the two cannot be 
separated and that the Sunnï treatment of the issue of collective ta ‘dîl of 
the Companions seems to have followed, or at least to have been affected 
by, the earlier arguments about the Companions’ faith.
This might answer the question we asked earlier in connection with 
Salim’s charges against the Murji’a: why did the Murji’a reject the 
testimony of those who judged against the participants in the schisms? In 
light of what Abü Hanïfa says, and on the assumption that Salim wr ote 
his epistle some 40 years after the beginning of the fitna (the murder of
Al-Khatïb al-Baghdâdï. Târïkh Baghdâd. Bayrüt: Dâr al-Kitâb al-‘Arabï, 1967, vol., XIII, pp. 325-7
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‘Uthmân was in 35/655), we can say that the Murji’a were consistent in 
theii’ views as represented by Abü Hanïfa. The testimony of those who 
took parts in the events or, by implication, their immediate descendants, 
none of whom can act as independent witnesses because their impartiality 
can be easily challenged, cannot be taken to constitute evidence for or 
against either side. Therefore, the proper attitude is to reject their 
testimony and abstain from judging. This might also answer a question 
we raised in Chapter three: why was it important for the Sunnïs to argue 
that the ‘adala of the Companions was confirmed by the Qur’ân and the 
Sunna, since it is in fact the original state of anybody that he is ‘adl until 
proven otherwise? It is known that some non-Sunnï sects, notably the 
Shï‘ïs, held and argued that some of the Companions (most of the 
Companions whom the Sunnï venerate even more than the others, 
including the first three Caliphs and nine of the ten to whom the Prophet 
testified that they were destined to Paradise) were unbelievers during the 
very time of the Prophet.^^ Therefore, an independent witness was 
needed. What witness could be more veracious than God and His 
Apostle? Moreover, the Sunnï scholars must have also felt uneasy about 
the hypocrites whom the Qur’ân often mentions as living in Medina 
together with the Muslims, and who are therefore Companions by the 
dominant Sunnï definition of Companionship. This is a point from which, 
to the best of my knowledge, they did not try to escape, and which they 
even refrained from discussing. It may have been their eagerness to block 
any argument against the “original” ‘adâla of the Companions that made 
it necessary for the Sunnï scholars to resort to the Qur’ân for support.
For an overview o f the Shi‘î  opinions on the Companions, see E. Kohlberg, "The attitude of Shfi 
Muslims to the Companions.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, no. 5 (1984), pp. 143-175
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In Al-Fiqh al-Akbar, there is an article tliat says the “the most 
excellent of men after the Apostle of Allah is Abü Bakr al-Siddiq; after 
him, ‘Umar ibn al-Kliattab al-Fârüq; after him, ‘Utlnnan ibn ‘Affan, he 
of the two lights; after him, ‘All al-Miirtada, may Allah encompass all of 
them with His good pleasure, being His seivants who persevere in truth 
and with truth. We cling to all of them and we name all the Companions 
of Allali’s Apostle in the way of praise only.” This article, as it stands, 
does not seem to belong to the 4^710^  ^C., which is when Wensinck dates 
tlie whole creed. It also differs in one important respect from what al- 
Ash‘ari writes about the Companions. Al-Ash‘arî, as we have seen in his 
Ibana, shows a degree of awareness, albeit primitive, of the importance of 
having a say on the first schisms. It is ti'ue that he does not give a verdict 
on the battles of the Camel and Siffin, yet he does pass a verdict on the 
murder of ‘Uthmân. The lack of any reference to either the murder of 
‘Utliman or the fighting between ‘All on the one hand, and Talha, al- 
Zubayr, Mu‘awiya and ‘Amr on tlie other, suggests that this present creed 
cannot have been compiled by the author of al-Ibana or by any of his 
disciples. The last sentence of the article (and we name all the 
Companions of the Apostle of God by way of praise only) suggests tliat 
tliis creed belongs to earlier times, when the main interest was to stop tlie 
abuse of the Companions and hopefiilly establish love for and association 
with them.^^
In The Muslim Creed, p. 246, Wensinck counts on many tilings to date the creeds. Among tiiese are 
the lengtii of the creed, tiie diversity' of tlie subjects it touches upon, and tlie degree of tiieological 
sophistication tliat tlie creed displays. Basing liis speculation on a number of articles tliat he tiiinks 
developed \iitliin the course of tlie 4^ 710^  ^C,, he came to the conclusion tliat tliis creed has an Ash'arite 
stamp.
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Sunnism and Murji’ism:
In a recent Ph.D. thesis that examines the way the Miirji’a are portrayed 
in Siumi literatnre,^^ I. H. Inal emphasizes certain ideas that aie relevant 
to our purpose in this section. First of all, all the Siimiîs were seen by the 
Shfls to be Miuji’a; one of the reasons for this was the Simnï attitude 
towards the authorities which was considered by the Shï’îs to amoimt to 
total and unconditional submission to the authorities in general and the 
Umayyads in particulai.^^ Second, the Hanbalîs accused the Hanafis and 
the Ash'arTs of maintaining some Miuji’T views, especially in their 
definition of Tmm and tlie position of the grave sinner. "^  ^ However, Ibn 
Hanbal liimself, Inal points out, expressed some of the views historically 
ascribed to the Miirji’a. Some of these are tlie view that no one ought to 
be considered an unbeliever because of a sin he has committed,^^ and tlie 
illegality of revolting against the ruler.
The Sunni scholars were thus aware that their ideas brought tliem 
in line with tlie Murji’a. Inal shows tliat many Simnl scholars 
acknowledged the similarity between their “sect” and the heretical 
Miuji’a in many an issue. Inal, tlierefore, argues that his study supports 
tlie tliesis tliat “tlie later Sunni body of Islam absorbed the mainstream 
Miuji’I idea” especially concerning the issues of Tmari^  the position of the 
grave sinner, and the attitude towards the authorities.^^ This in itself is not 
a novel idea. Otlier scholars have come to the same conclusion regarding 
some of the basic Simnl beliefs as we have said be fo re .W h a t  is new.
Inal, I. H. The Presentation o f the Murji 'a In Islamic Literature. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2002 
Ibid., p. 147
p. 11
p. 110 
Ibid.. p. I l l  
Ibid., pp. 170, 174
^  Cf. Madeiung, “Mur^i’a” £7", vol. VU. p. 607, Walt, Formative Period, pp. 119-43
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however, is the thesis that this recent study and our current study allude 
to: that the Sunnis and the Muiji’a have more in common than was 
previously thought and, more importantly, more than the Sunni scholars 
might have wanted us to believe. Below is an endeavor to place the 
concept of the collective ta'dïl of the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions 
in a wider theological Sunni context in view of the Murji’I ideas put 
forwai'd above.
Some other Sunnî views:
Under the rubric of “Sunnism” there is always more than one view on 
almost every theological and legal issue. Some views are too 
contradictoiy to be reconciled, and this explains the fact that some 
prominent “Sunni” scholars charged other prominent “Sunni” scholars 
with not only heresy, but also unbelief. Therefore, the mere identification 
of different sects does not necessarily mean that each one of them is 
homogenous, or that the boundaries between them are watertight. Yet the 
fact remains that ideas in Islam were classified under what we might call 
“ideal types,” where each type was represented by a sect; and the avant- 
garde of each sect were concerned with either carefully distinguishing 
their sect from all other sects, or at least representing it in such a way that 
makes that sometimes arbitrary distinction. This is a reality that this study 
has to deal with, though this is not to suggest that the process of 
demarcation was completely arbitrary. Though it is not one of the main 
aims of this study, we will briefly point out how the classification of 
seemingly contradictory views under the rubric of Sunnism was made 
possible as far as some theological issues are concerned.
Two different views on the issue of the definition of faith (ïmân) 
were once in contention in Islam. The first is the definition held by the
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Hanafis. Here faith is defined as belief {tasdîq) to the total exclusion of 
work ( 'amal). Work and faith, in other words, have nothing whatsoever to 
do with each other. Consequently, faith is not liable to increase or 
decrease: one is either a believer or an unbeliever and a distinction cannot 
be made between a “good” believer and a “bad” one. Closely related to 
this debate is the position o f the grave sinner. If  faith has nothing to do 
with work or acts, then no sins, not even mortal ones, ever lead to, or can 
be taken as a sign of, unbelief {kufr). Not even grave sins, the Hanafis 
argue, affect the very core of faith. One can perfectly well, but of course 
not preferably, be a true believer and a grave sinner at the same time. 
These views are typical of the Muiji’i view which Abu Hanïfa expresses 
in more than one of his works discussed above, Al-Ash’arl expresses two 
views as far as the issue of ïmàn is concerned; although most Ash’arîs 
maintain the view presented above.^^ This view has indeed been dominant 
in Sunni Islam. As Wensinck points out, “this, then, is the position of 
orthodox Islam: faith alone is sufficient for salvation; but this should not 
become a reason for neglecting works.”^^
The other definition, which was held by the Hanball scholars, 
considered work an integral part of faith. Since people differ in their acts, 
they also differ in their faith. Put differently, faith increases and decreases 
depending on work.^^ Grave sins, therefore, can seriously impair faith and 
can be taken as a sign of the feebleness of one’s faith. How, then, did the 
Hanbalîs avoid arguing that grave sins may lead to kufr\ and, how was it
^  Inal, The Presentation o f  the Murji'a, p. 52. Inal points out that in many of his works, aI-Ash‘arï 
defined m an  as the Hanbalîs defined it. In Kitab al-Luma ', however, he defines it “as tasdiq only, 
which is shared by the Hanafi-Murji’Ts.”
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 49; Watt, Formative Period, p. 134
Watt argues that the whole issue of m an  had to do with membership of the community. In other 
words, by asserting the equality o f all people as far as îmân is concerned, the aim was to assert the 
equality o f all people as members o f the Islamic community in terms of their rights and duties; “The
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possible for the Hanbalîs and the Hanafis to be eventually classified 
together under the same rubric of Sunnism? The Hanbalîs generally held 
that although grave sins can seriously degrade faith, they never lead to 
kufr. In other words, kufr and îmân are two distinct things. We are not 
dealing with a continuum at one end of which we have faith and at the 
other unbelief. We are dealing with two continuums. Believers move on 
the continuum of îmân according to their acts. But their acts never take 
them out of the realm of faith if belief {tasdîq) exists. A distinction was 
also made between the so-called “/cz(/r shirk (denial o f God or associating 
someone with Him)” which is basically lack of belief, and '''‘kufr nVma 
(denial of God’s blessings by disobeying him)” which is negligence of 
religious duties and observances. It is this the supremacy of tasdîq which 
made it possible first to put the Hanbalîs and the Hanafis in the same 
sect; and, second, to distinguish between both of them on the one hand 
and the Khawarij on the other. It will be seen later how the Sunnis 
distinguished themselves from the Muiji’a on this and on other points. 
Suffice it to say here that the Sunni views on this point share the basic 
emphasis they put on belief.
Closely related to and consistent with these ideas is the Sunni 
attitude towards the authorities. This debate may go back to the murder of 
‘Uthman and the question whether he was justly or unjustly killed. The 
proto-SunnIs argued that ‘Uthman was unjustly killed, probably not at 
this stage on the basis o f his being a Companion, but on the basis that he 
was a believer and had not done anything to justify his being killed. By
Conception of Imân in Islamic Theology,” Der Islam, vol., XVni (1967) p, 5. This is why faith cannot 
be taken to increase or decrease.
For a detailed discussion on this issue and similarities and dissimilarities among the Sunnrsub-sects, 
see Madeiung “Early Sunnî Doctrine Concerning Faith as Reflected in the Kitâb al-Imân of Abu 
‘Ubayd Al-Qasîm B. Sallâm,” Studîa Islamica, vol. XXXII (1970), pp. 233-54
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tiie same token, the participants in the subsequent schisms did not 
abandon tasdîq and thus cannot be justifiably charged with kufr. The 
same applied to the Umayyad Caliphs after the schisms. All kinds of 
grave sins were ascribed to them, but this was not a valid reason to 
challenge their faith. Praying behind them was therefore incumbent upon 
or at least recommendable to Muslims. Revolt against them was, not only 
uiinecessaiy, but also imjustifiable. Again, tins is not to say that tlie 
Sunnis were unanimous on tliis. To Abu Hanïfa, for example, were 
attributed many contradictory opinions on this (from financially 
supporting revolts against the Umayyads to prohibiting revolt against 
tliem and defining the appropriate attitude towards unjust rulers as 
praying that God may lead them to the right path).^^ It is a fact, however, 
tliat quietism is tlie attitude that has characterized Sunnî Islam and has 
been held and expressed by most Suimî scholars.
Conclusion:
This chapter has sought the roots of the Sunnî attitude towards the 
Companions, which eventually became a conviction of their collective 
'adala, by analyzing the early Miuji’ï texts at our disposal. Resorting to 
the MuijiT texts was suggested by analyzing the medieval Simnl writings 
about the Companions. The Murji’I texts discussed here clarify the 
groimd upon which the Simnî scholars might have developed their final 
attitude towards the Companions. That the Murji’î attitude towards the
^ Cf. Schacht, “Abû Hanïfa” in £7', p. 124; Inat p. 99. Of conrse tliis debate can be related to wider 
debate about tlie attitude of tlie Muiji’a at large. As we liave said before tlie idea tliat Abû Hanïfa is an 
early Muxji’I autlioritj  ^has established itself in modem Western scholarsliip. Defining liis attitude 
towards tlie authorities is important for supporting either side of tlie debate over the attitude of tlie 
Muiji’a. In his article on Abu Hanïfa in £7‘, vol.. I. p. 124, Schacht rejects tlie accounts of Abu 
Hanîfa’s putative revolutionan' attitude as anomalous to tlie works ascribed to liim, the point tliat 
supports my tliesis tliat contrary to what M. Cook maintain, the quietism of tlie Muiji’a is much easier 
to prove tlian tlie contraiy.
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Companions may have provided the ground for the Sunnî concept of the 
collective ta'dll o f the Prophet’s Companions is further evidenced by the 
similarities between the two sects in other beliefe that are directly related 
to the concept of the collective 'adala o f the Companions.
How then did the Sunnî scholars deal with the reality that they had 
much in common with the Murji’a? Inal describes several techniques that 
the Sunnî scholars used to solve this problem. On the one hand, some 
Sunni scholars were willing to admit the similarity between their beliefs 
and those ascribed to the Murji’a. The two Hanafî scholars, al-Mâturïdï 
(d. 333/944) and Abû al-Mu'în al-Nasafî (d. 508/1114), found no 
difficulty in ascribing Murji’î  views to the founder of their schoo l .The  
distinction was made, however, between the so-called “good” Murji’a 
and the “bad” Murji’a (a distinction made by al-Mâturîdî);^^ or between 
the Murji’a of the jurists (murji’at al-fuqaha’) and the extremist Muiji’a 
(al-murjVa al-ghulat) (made by Ibn Taymiyya);^^ or, ironically, between 
'^murji’at al-sunnd' and "'murji’at al-bid'd' (made by al-Shahiastânî)^^. 
On the other hand, many Sunnî scholars strove to deny any resemblance 
between their ideas and those of the “heretical” Murji’a. One way of 
doing so was to avoid elaborating on or even mentioning the views of the 
Muiji’a while explammg then own views.^^ Another technique was to 
present one extremist Murji’î  sub-sect as making a false generalization on 
behalf of the whole sect.^^ Watt, for instance, explains this by arguing that 
“later Sunnite heresiographers, finding the name ‘Murji’ite’ widely used, 
did then best to describe a sect of Murji’ites who were heretical from the
Inal, The Presentation o f  the Murji 'a, pp. 179-192 
^U W .,p. 153
76 Ibid., p. 119
Ibid., p. 91. For a complete summary of these distinctions, see ibid., p. 206. 
""/W., 166 
~^Ubid., 192.
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Simnite standpoint, but in fact they can only produce one or two 
uninfluential figures who went to extremes on one point or another. . . . 
among these extreme views was that ascribed to Muqatil that sins along 
with îmân did not harm.”*^
This was made possible by, and may even explain, the fact that a 
single definition of Muiji’ism can hardly be discerned from the Sunnî 
sources.^^ Other techniques were to manipulate the definition of some 
teims, such as unbelief {kufr\ or to make distinctions such as that made 
between islàm and îmân.
Heretical Muiji’ism was thus a Sunnî construction. Madeiung 
argues that “Muiji’ism was indeed not generally considered as heretical 
among the traditionists despite the vigorous efforts of the ‘followers of 
Ibn Mas‘ûd’ to band it as such.” “Only in the century was
Muiji’ism completely suppressed in Sunnî traditionalism,” he points 
out.*  ^Watt explains that Muiji’ism was initially branded heresy “from a 
khârijite or Mu‘tazilite standpoint; and it is only from such a standpoint 
that Murji’ites in general are heretics.”®^ It should not be surprising then 
to find the basis of the concept of the collective ta ‘dll o f the Prophet 
Muhammad’s Companions in the Muiji’î  creed.
Watt, “The conception o ilm a n f  p. 4. Watt here refers to the dictum taken by many SunnT scholars 
to be the main adage of the Mmji’a that says “/ô tadw ru ma ‘a j-imanl ma 'siyatun, wa-la tanfa 'u ma 'a 
j-ktdfn t a ‘atun (witli faith, no sin harms; [wliereas] with imbelief, no obedience matters.” In tlie 
Presentation o f  the Murji ’a, p. 119, Inal points out that it was the tendency o f the Hanball sources to 
ai'gue tliat this was the main tenet o f the Murji’i creed. He also points out that it was only Ibn 
Taymiyya, the well-known 8^/14 '^ Hanball scholar, among the Hanbalîs who was aware of how 
polemics against other sects created felse ideas about them. “The scholars rely on rumours in their 
pronouncements and in attacking so-called heretics. They do not rely on what these heretics themselves 
say. What the result of all this is that they wrongly attribute to these groups opinions tiiey in feet do not 
hold,” Ibn Taymiyya points out; p. 120. As for the Murji’a, Ibn Taymiyya observes that “the claims 
diat, for the Murji’a, religion (din) and belief (îmân) are the same and that m an  is [only] confession by 
the tongue are felse and stem from the felse method of dealing with the Muiji’a;” ibid., pp. 120-1 
Ibid., 213; Watt, Formative Period, p. 73 
W. Madeiung. “Some reflections,” p. 241 
Watt, “The conception of îmân,” p. 4
General Conclusion
Ail the previous discussion suggests that if we are to seek the roots of any 
attitude towards the Companions, the schisms that they were involved in 
must be put in the foreground. As Cook rightly points out, “the first civil 
war is a favourite ground of sectarian self-definition in early Islam.” ^  It is 
our contention in this study that the creed of irjà ’ provided the ground for 
the later Sunnî concept of the collective ta ‘dil of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s Companions. Arguing along the same line as Cook, Watt 
concludes that “it is most likely that the first application of the idea of 
irjà ’ was to the decision in respect of ‘Uthman and ‘ AlL”^
The issue that seems to have early occupied the minds of Muslim 
theologians was whether anything that the Companions had done could 
have led to the nullification of their îmân. The eventual Sunnî position on 
this question was determined on the basis of two points. The first is the 
importance of deeds vis-à-vis faith; i.e. whether deeds are constituents of 
faith and thus affect it. The second, which was a later development, is the 
issue of ijtîhâd: who has the right to use ijtihâd and what is the scope of 
ijtihâd. On the first point, Sunnism does indeed show a great deal of 
similarity with the Murji’î  position. Deeds, regardless of how evil they 
might be, never lead to the nullification of faith. The two do not intersect, 
so to speak. While the Hanafis took the view that faith, which neither 
increases nor decreases, is never affected by acts, the Hanbalîs granted 
some role to deeds in deciding the degree, rather than the existence, of 
faith.
The second issue is that of ijtihâd, which was developed primarily 
in Sunnî Islam within the domain of jurisprudence. It was settled in Sunnî
’ Cook, “Activisim and Quiet i smp.  16 
 ^Watt, Formative Period, p. 124
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Islam that anyone, if he has the proper laiowledge, had the right to 
exercise ijtihâd. Exercising ijtihâd is a good deed that is to be rewarded 
regardless of the outcome it produces. Therefore, the stances tliat the 
Companions took in the schisms are to be seen as a matter of ijtihâd. This 
perception of ijtihâd was rejected by both the Shf a and the Kliawaiij. 
The former ai'gued that it the imâms had the right to exercise ijtihâd 
because they were the only ones who possessed the proper knowledge. 
‘All, tlierefore, was the only Companion entitled to use ijtihâd and all 
other Companions sinned gravely when they disobeyed him or abstained 
from supporting him. The Kliawarij, on the other hand, gave no one the 
right to exercise ijtihâd in any matter that the Qm’an cleai'ly addiesses. 
They held that the Qur’an was imequivocal in its rejection of any 
compromise between ‘All and MiTawiya. Consequently, ‘All disobeyed 
tlie Qur’an when he accepted tlie arbitration and he thus put himself in no 
better situation than his enemies. The same groimd was used by the Sunni 
scholars to argue for tlie ta 'dll of tlie Companions. In other words, while 
tlie issue of ijtihâd played an important role in early Islam in defending 
the Companions against accusations of kufr (leveled against them by the 
Kliawarij, early Shf a and others), it played an important role later, 
starting rouglily from the fifth century of the Hijra, in defending the same 
Companions against charges of loss of ‘adala,
A  modem scholar, J. Givony, has argued tliat the real root of irjâ ’ 
lies in the position tliat some leading Companions took concerning the 
conflict between ‘All and MiTawiya. Those Companions “refused to take 
sides and remained neutral,” he explains.^ Reftisal to take sides and 
remaining neutral, however, does not support his idea on the root of irjâ \ 
This study argues tliat the creed of irjâ' was based upon a specific
Givony. The Presentation o f  the Murji a. p. 13
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epistemological ground. This groimd necessitates abstention from passing 
any judgment if certitude is lacking. It was likely that the Murji’a, would 
have taken part in the civil war had they witnessed it. This confrision 
about the Miuji’T stance may have stemmed from the fact that the Miuji’a 
are argued by many a scholar to have tried to reconcile the differences 
within the Muslim coimnunity in order to establish peace. In Givony’s 
words, “it does seem plausible as a historic situation, that at a time of 
political schism a third neutral block would emerge, and would either 
take a non-aligning, passive stand, or adopt a pacifying active role.”"^ The 
epistemological ground that we, on the other hand, contend to be the 
essence of the Miuji’I creed and therefore tlie real basis of the concept of 
collective ta 'dïl, may also explain to us some points which the soiurces do 
not help us to answer in a direct way. For instance, tliough the Simni 
scholars did not address tlie question of the Qiu’anic verses that tallc 
about the hypocrites and did not try to reconcile them with their concept, 
it can be surmised tliat a Sunni scholar admit that some of the 
Companions were hypocrites, but say we are in no position to know who 
tlie hypocrites were and thus have to abstain from judgement.
Wliat tliis study has concluded is that: tlie Sunnî attitude towards 
die Companions was initially built upon tlie Murji’î  position on tlie same 
issue. This Miuji’ï/Simnî attitude was consistent with other theological 
points that both sects held. The definition of faitli and the perception of 
ijtihâd adopted from jurisprudence were employed to defend the 
Companions against accusations of imbelief. At a later stage, when the 
Prophetic Hadîth had come to play a role of great importance in Sunnî 
Islam, the focus was now on defending the 'adâla of the Companions to 
legitimize them as Hadîth transmitters. Again, defending the 'adâla of
 ^Ibid.. p. 15
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the Companions was in harmony with other general rules agreed upon by 
Sunnî scholars of Hadîth criticism. The main argument here is that what 
we know about the schisms in which the Companions participated is 
insufficient to nullify their original state of ‘adala, confirmed by the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, and thus cannot constitute a valid ground for 
disparagement. This idea also represents the core of the Murji’î  attitude 
towards the Companions: we were not there and people differ on what 
happened and on who was right and who was wrong; therefore, we 
refrain fi*om judgment. Refraining from judgment means only refraining 
from disparagement. The Murji’a did not need to go one step further and 
argue that the original ‘adala was maintained. The Sunnis had to take this 
step only when they began to theorize about chains of transmission.
When the Sunnî scholars came to establishing the concept of 
collective ta ‘dîl, they had to deal with the problem that some sects argued 
against the faith, and, therefore, the ‘adala of the Companions, even 
during the lifetime of the Prophet. Moreover, the Sunnî scholars 
themselves acknowledged the possibility of different views on whether a 
certain act is enough to deprive someone of his ‘adala, which made it 
difficult for them to avoid responding to the charges made against the 
Companions. The Qui*’an and the Sunna provided the answer. The Sunnî 
scholars strove to adduce as many Qur’anic verses as they could and the 
number of Prophetic traditions that venerate the Companions multiplied 
to confirm the original ‘adala (the asl) o f the Companions. Having done 
so, they were able to argue that the Companions are to retain their ‘adala 
because we can never be certain that what they had done vitiated their 
original ‘adala. Incertitude, they argued, cannot overrule a certain ruling. 
This means that we, when we talk about the concept of the collective 
ta ‘dîL have to make the distinction between the ‘adala and the ta ‘dxl. The
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former, from a Sunnî point o f view, is the original state of the 
Companions because, first, it is the original state of everyone until proven 
otherwise, and second because the Qur’an and the Sunna confirmed it. 
The ta ‘dîl, however, is a Sunnî conclusion based on the epistemological 
ground of the Muiji’a and taken one step further. Whereas the former, the 
‘adâla, is based mainly upon the Qur’an and the Sunna; the latter is based 
on the umma (taken in the wider sense, i.e., including the early “heretical” 
sects). It is the umma by its disagreement on the schisms which deemed 
the whole situation uncertain. The ijma‘, as usual, has sanctioned the 
whole view and the collective ‘adala of the Prophet’s Companions has 
become an article of faith.
As we have seen, the Sunnîs, facing the repugnant reality that they 
shared some views with a sect that, for some reason, had acquired a 
negative reputation too obvious to be hidden, had to construct other 
representations of the Muiji’a against which to compare themselves. We 
are neither this sect nor that sect, the Sunnîs seem to have wished to 
show; and the names of sects can be put according to the issue under 
consideration. In the case of the attitude towards the Companions, the 
Sunnîs would say: “we are neither Khawarij nor Murji’a;” or they might 
say: “we are neither Shî’a nor Khawarij.”
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